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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation undertakes a rhetorical reading of three treatises (Thomas Sheridan's 
Leaures on ElocutioB. John Wdker's Elements of Elocution, and Gilbert Austin's 
Chironomia) from a neglected episode in rhetorical history, namely the eighteenth-century 
British elocutionary movement. By attending to the intellectually marginalized but socially 
significant domain of bodily rhetonc (Le., delivery), the elocutionary writers 
simultaneously seek cultural capital for themselves and their field of enquiry within the 
dominant disciplinary hierarchy, and offer limited opporhmities for aspulng public speakers 
to improve tbeir social status. Guided by the concepts of "deconim" and "status aspiration," 
this study investigates how Sheridan's, Walker ' s , and Austin's works negotiate the 
problems of disciplinary and bodily decorum within a context of social mobility and efforts 
to standardize language use. Specifically, it analyzes the rhetorical strategies of persuasion 
these writers use to address a mùced implied readership of critical scholars and both adult 
and adolescent students. This analysis draws on recent theories of "politeness" discourse, 
argumentation, and visual rhetoric to elucidate the appeals of ethos, logos, and pathos 
which dominate, respectively, the opening erordia and narratives, the middIe confi i t ions.  
and the closing perorations of Sheridan's, Waiker 's , and Austin's rhetorical ueatises . 
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The fvst question to receive attention was naturally the one that cornes frst 
naturally-how persuasion can be produced from the facts themselves. The second is 
how to set these facts out in language. A third would be the proper method of 
delivery; this is a thing that affects the success of a speech greatly; but hitherto the 
subject has been neglected. . . . No systematic treatise upon the rules of delivery has 
yet been composed. . . . Besides, delivery is-very properly-not regarded as an 
elevated subject of inquiry. Still, the whole business of rhetoric being concerned 
with appearances, we must pay attention to the subject of delivery, unworthy though 
it is, because we cannot do without it. . . . (Aristotle, Rhetonc 3.1403b-1404a) 
If al1 societies . . . that seek to produce a new man through a process of 
'deculturation' and 'reculturation' set such store on the seemingly most insignificant 
details of dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners, the reason is that, treating the 
body as memory, they entrust to it in abbreviated and practical, Le. mnemonic, fom 
the fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of culture. The principles em- 
bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot 
be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation, cannot even be made explicit; 
nothhg seems more ineffable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and, 
therefore, more precious, than the values given body, made body by the 
transubstantiation achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy. . . . 
The whole trick of pedagogic reason lies precisely in the way it extorts the essential 
while seeming to dernand the insignificant: in obtaining the respect for form and 
fonns of respect which constitute the most visible and at the same t h e  the best- 
hidden (because most 'natural') manifestation of submission to the established order. 
. . . (Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 95) 
Aristotle's views on the canon of delivery and Bourdieu's ideas about the "essential" 
role of "insignifcant" bodily practices in strucniring social orders provide strategic points of 
entry for this exploration of the eighteenth-century British elocutionary movement. Though 
vastly different in their attitudes and analysis, both Aristotle and Bourdieu understand the 
persuasive power of bodily conduct and recognize that these f o m  of conduct are 
"neglected" or "hidden," that they are not explicated. In this latter sense, Aristotle and 
Bourdieu situate bodily persuasion at the outlying boundaries of rhetoncal and social praxis: 
a necessary but unworthy subject; an essential but (apparently) insignifïcmt pedagogy; the 
most visible yet best hidden sign of social propriety. 
I am interested in the elocutionary movement because it emphasizes the neglected 
canon of delivery and, consequently, the problematic issue of bodily persuasion. Within 
classical rhetoric, the canon of delivery compnsed the non-verbal, physical dimensions of 
persuasion, primarily as these worked through paihos, or the speaker's emotional appeal. 
Typically, these dimensions were classified into two main components: actio (the 
management of the body through posture, gestures, and so on) and pronuntiario (the 
management of the vocal tones, pitch, rhythm, volume, and so on).' The eighteenth-century 
British elocutionists concerned themselves, to varying degrees, with both dimensions. 
Although actio most obviously represents the role of bodily conduct in persuasion, 
pronuntiatio also depends on the management of non-verbal, phy sical aspects (i . e . , the vocal 
organs). As Cicero explains, "delivery is a sort of language of the body, since it consists of 
movement or gesture as well as of voice or speechn (Orator 17.55). Hence, in this study 1 
use the phrases bodily persuasion and bodily decorum to refer to both vocal and gestural 
delivery . 
For the purposes of this study, 1 limit my investigation of the British elocutionary 
movement to roughly the second half of the eighteenth cenniry. According to other 
researchers, the time-fkame 1 have selected corresponds with the period of greatest 
publishing activity and popular interest in elocution in Britain, though it does not encompass 
the movement's full s c ~ p e . ~  The texts which this study focuses on (namely, Thomas 
'~lthough the division into the two main parts of voice and gesture is consistent, the 
designation of the former as "pronuntiation and the latter as 'action is not. Cicero, for 
example, refers to "delivery" (including both parts) as "action (De Oratore 3 S6.2 13). As 
Quintilian notes, "Delivery [pronumiafio] is often styled action. But the fxst narne is 
derived from the voice, the second from the gesturen (Imtitutio 1 1.3.1). 
2Habennan's discussion of "English Sources of American Elocutionn covers the period 
from 1750- l8OO. Robb's similar shidy covers 1760-1 827 (Oral Intepretation) ; Fritz begins 
with Sheridan's Lectures and ends with the Chironomia ("Beginningsn); Gray mentions 
Mason's 1748 Essay on Elocution as the commonly accepted starting point of the 
rnovement, but he credits Howell ('Sourcesn) with demonstrating that it actually began 
Sheridan's A Course of Lecrures on Elocution [1762], John Walker's Elements of Elocution 
[2 vols., 178 11, and Gilbert Austin's Chironomia 11 8061) were published near the. 
beginning , middle, and end of this period, as were the texts that figure less prominently in 
my discussion (Le., John Mason's An Essay on Elocution and Pronwiciation [1748], James 
Burgh' s The Ar t  of Speaking [ 176 11, William Enfîeld's The Speaker [ 17741, and John 
Herries ' Elemems of Speech [ 17731) ? Despite the early nineteenthcentury publication date 
of Austin's treatise, a comment in one of his foomotes shows that the book was composed. 
at least in part, during the last decade of the eighteenth cenairy? 
Traditionally , the term elocution, from the Latin "elocutio, " designates the third part 
of rhetoric, that concerned with verbal style. The elocutionists, however, appropriate this 
term for their own study of non-verbal style, rejecting the English translations of both the 
Latin terms "pronuntiation (pronunciation) and "action (action) to describe their domain of 
inquhy5 Generally, the term "elocution" in eighteenth-century Britain came to comprehend 
"the just and graceful management of the voice, countenance, and gesture in speakingn 
(Sheridan, Lectures 19). yet each writer defmes and justifies the use of the term sornewhat 
differently. Indeed, Austin, whose Chirunomia. or a Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery (1806) 
sums up many aspects of the elocutionary inquiries, rejects the term altogether in preference 
of "delivery." These varying tactics for defining and naming the field of study indicate the 
ongoing effort of the elocutionary movement to establish its disciplinary propriety-and 
hence its intellecfual property-through the ordering principle named by the term "elocution." 
From the perspective of Kenneth Burke's rhetorical theory, the elocutionists' naming 
of their subject matter is an example of the process of "conversion," one in which old orders 
"about a hundred years prior . . . in John Wilkins' Ecciesiastes . . ." ("What Was 
Elocution?" 1). 
'For this study, 1 have used the 1842 edition of Enfield's The Speaker and the 1775 
edition of Burgii's The Art of Speaking. 
40n page 55, he refers to "the present (1794) fashion of dress." 
'sec Howell, Eighteenth-Century . 149- 150 and Haberman, Elocutionary Movement, 79 
for a discussion of the reasons for this transfer of the title 'elocutio," or elocution, from the 
third to the fifth part of rhetoric. 
or "pietiesn are impiously misnamed and a new order constructed through the developrnent 
of a replacement terminology (Rosteck and Leff 330; Permanence and Change 113). In his 
discussion of the social practices of distinction, Bourdieu similarly stresses the political 
~ i g ~ c a n c e  of the naming process to a group's attempts to distinguish itself within and/or 
against the existing, dominant social order: 
A group's presence or absence in the officiai classification depends on its 
capacity to get itself recognized, to get itself noticed and admitted, and so to 
win a place in the social order. It thus escapes from the shadowy existence of 
'nameless crafis'. . . The fate of groups is bound up with the words that 
designate them: the power to impose recognition depends on the capacity to 
mobilize around a name, . . . to appropriate a common name and to 
commune in a proper name, and so to mobilize the union that rnakes them 
strong, around the unifying power of a word. (Distinction 481) 
The unification of late eighteenth-century writers on delivery around the term "elocution" is 
a sign of the strength of communal mobilizing. However, the different definitions and uses 
of this term (including the refusal to use it at d l )  show the discontinuities that characterized 
this group's attempts to secure a place within the social and disciplinary order. 
Aristotle's comrnents that delivery is a necessary but unelevated feanire of rhetoric 
represent a dominant, though not homogeneous, attitude toward the roIe and status of 
delivery within rhetoric: a simultaneous recognition of its power and necessity , and of its 
relative unworthiness compared to the natual superiority of "factsn and rational logic 
represented by verbal Begmdgingly, Aristotle grants not only that non-verbal 
delivery does contribute signifcantly to the success of a speech but also that "we cannot do 
without it"; he responds to this unfortunate but unavoidable reality by desiring (though not 
developing) "a systematic treatise upon the rules of deliveryn7 Such a treatise would, 
6 ~ y  "verbal language," 1 mean the language of words (whether spoken or written), as 
distinct from the non-verbal language of gestures, expressions of the countenance, vocal 
tones, and so on which may or may not occur simultaneously with verbal language and are 
not reducible to it. 
'~his  unfortunate reality is owing, Aristotle says, "to the defects of the hearers" 
(1404a)-that is, in an ideal world, with ideal hearers, the rhetor would not require the non- 
presumably, help to defme the boundaries and regulate the pracîices of the "unwonhy" 
domain of bodily persuasion: the articulation of a "proper methodn of delivery will not, 
Aristotle irnplies, elevate this subject, but could help to keep it from exceeding its 
appropriate limits by placing it under the control of rational rules. 
Bourdieu's sociological analysis of bodily dispositions, conduct, and pedagogies 
clearly exceeds the traditional boundaries of rhetorical study. However, this excess pennits 
a perspective that enlarges and complicates concerns for physical delivery within the 
discipline of rhetoric. In his description of the systernatic operations of bodily behaviours, 
Bourdieu highlights how these "seemingiy . . . insignificant details" of culture are in fact 
very significant to both the reproduction and modification of social realities. According to 
Chris Shilling, Bourdieu's understanding of the "interrelationship between the development 
of the body and people's social location" stresses the centrality of bodily management "to the 
acquisition of status and distinction" (127), although the "intellecnialism of intellectuals" 
prevents us from seeing the connection between social distinction and the dispositions of the 
body (Bourdieu, Distinction 474). Bourdieu argues that these dispositions, which embed 
and reveal the structures of the habitus "defmed as a system of dispositions," are both 
habitua1 ways of being and predispositions or tendencies to behave in these ways (Oiuline 
2 14). However, despite the general durability of bodily dispositions in different cultures, 
these forms of behaviour are neither predetermined nor static because "the habitus is an 
endless capacity to engender products-thoughts , perceptions, expressions, actions-whose 
limits are set by the histoncaily and socialiy situated conditions of its productionn (Ourline 
95). This means that an individual's or group's efforts to acquire social distinction through 
bodily conduct operate within a socially and historically comtituted "field of the possibles" 
in which a person's position of origin constinites merely the starting point of a range of 
potential txajectories (Distinction 1 1 1 - 1 12). 
Bourdieu's broad perspective helps to unravel the ambivalence of Aristotle's 
comments about delivery : the latter's dominant message is that delivery , righdully , occupies 
rational, non-factual appeal of delivery to be persuasive. By associating the persuasiveness 
of delivery with the audience's defectiveness, Aristotle reinforces the devaluation of this 
canon of rhetoric. 
an insignifcant or trivial position within rhetorical snidy, but Aristotle's unwelcomed 
realization that delivery conmbutes vitally to successful persuasion troubles the main 
message.' Aristotle responds to this discomfort by implicitly cailing for a system of rules, a 
proper method, an explicit pedagogy to defme and govern physical delivery. But Bourdieu 
cautions against the assumption that pedagogies for aansforming bodily conduct through 
whoily conscious, deliberate transformation can be successfully explicated. According to 
him, although the management and modification of bodily behaviour to acquire social 
distinction is a fundamental feature of culture, the social value of bodily practices derives at 
least in part from their transmission through an "implicit pedagogyn (Outline 95) that 
incorporates "social differences as ' natural' differences" (Shilling 136). 
Disciplinary and Social Pmblerns 
The subject matter and airns of the elocutionary treatises are problematic in at least 
two, related senses. First, they threaten to disrupt the traditional hierarchy of the discipline 
of rhetoric by privileging the canon of delivery above and apart from the "firstn part of 
persuasion-that associated with the invention of ratioriai, disembodied arguments. Second, 
these treatises c m  be seen as situated, lirnited attempts to make explicit the obscured 
pedagogies of a particular set of bodily behaviours and hence, perhaps, the social values and 
"political concessionsn (Bourdieu, Outline 95) which these polite behaviours e r n b ~ d y . ~  
'In this study, I frequently use the terms "ambivalent," "ambivalence," and 
"ambivalently , " and also the terms 'ambiguous , " "ambiguity , " and "ambiguously . " While 
both sets of terxns imply a polysemy of meaning, 1 use the former, as Susan Stewart 
explains in her book Nonsense, to mean essentially " U t  which belongs to more than one 
domain at a time and will not f~ its identity in any one member of this set of domains; it is 
'both this and that'," while "the ambiguous is that which cannot be defmed in t e m  of any 
given category ; it threatens the integrity of individual categories, being 'either this or that or 
something else'" (61). . 
'~lthough this study of elocution does not examine bodily behaviours directly-rather, it 
studies the representation of bodily conduct in three elocutionary handbooks-my own 
Heeding the Aristotelian cal1 to develop a system of bodily management for rhetoric, 
the eighteenth-century elocutionists write systematic treatises on delivery . By making 
delivery the whole focus of their treatises, they threaten the traditional hierarchy of rhetoric 
because they place the fifth canon and its emotional appeals at the centre instead of at the 
bonom or penphery, of the discipline. Potentially, the elocutionary validation of delivery 
disrupts both the classical order of the five canons of rhetoric (Le., invention, arrangement, 
style, memory, and delivery) in which invention figures fust and delivery last, and the 
traditional Aristotelian privileging of logos above pathos. The elocutionary repositioning of 
delivery thus entails implicit, if not explicit, re-positionings of the "fust" or highest parts of 
rhetoric-those concemed with smctly rational argument based on "factualf' evidence. 
In a larger sense, their extended focus on and validation of the body potentially 
counters the mind-body hierarchy of Western culture. According to Roy Porter, the 
elevation of the mind or sou1 and disparagement of the body is "a totally familiar aspect of 
the metaphysics of Our civilization," traceable to the dualistic visions of both Classical and 
Judeo-Christian cultural heritages ("Historyn 206). So pervasive is this consuvct in Our 
cultural consciousness that "even wrïters who have sought to rescue the body from neglect 
or disrepute have nevertheless commonly perpetuated the old hierarchiesn (206). Even as 
they foreground the s i ~ i c a n c e  of the body in rhetoric, the elocutionists partiaily 
perpetuate the traditional assumption of the superïority of mind over body and conserve the 
subordinate statu of delivery within the full discipline of rhetorical study . 
In Bourdieu's terms, the elocutionists recognize the social significance of apparently 
insignificant "details of . . . physical and verbal m e r s . "  They exploit this recognition by 
conception of "the bodyn is consonant with Bourdieu's understanding of human bodies as 
simultaneously symbolic-cultural constructs and material-biological beings, in the sense that 
they physically embody social forms and meanings. Bourdieu's phrase "bodily hexis" refers 
to this practical embodiment of social values in physical dispositions: "Bodily hexis, a basic 
dimension of the sense of social orientation, is a practical way of experiencing and 
expressing one's own sense of social valuen (Distinction 474). As Chris Shilling explains, 
"Bourdieu's analysis of the body as a bearer of symbolic value, and a form of physical 
capital, can be seen as implicitly containing a view of the body as a biological and social 
phenornenon. . . . For Bourdieu, the body has become a bearer of value to the degree that 
it constantly enters into cultural and social markets which bestow value on prestigious 
bodily forms . . . " (Shilling 148). 
explicating a "repertoire of rulesn for those who lack practical rnastery of the highly valued 
competence (Bourdieu qtd. in Whigharn 5) of bodily conduct appropriate to "politen society 
in late eighteenth-century Britain. Their systems presume a range of possible social 
trajectories for people who can increase their stanis through the distinction of bodily 
decorum. In this sense, the elocutionary treatises participate in the larger modification of 
the established social order occurring in Britain at this Ume. However, the elocutionary 
treatises also presuppose a specific social hierarchy that continues to naturaiize an 
asymmetrical distribution of power across ranks. For example, while their prescriptive 
systems bring a range of bodily practices into the realrn of voluntary transformation, this 
range is delimited by the writers' presupposition of ideal forms of conduct available only to 
those whose "natural," originary talents place them beyond the management of rules and the 
effects of education. Further, at the same tirne as the elocutionary systems open up 
opportunities for some people to acquire increased social distinction, they exclude those 
below the middling ranks who, in eighteenthcenniry Britain, were the majority of the 
population (Thompson 18). Therefore, the explicit articulation of theones and mles of 
elocution functions both to demystifj irnplicit codes of socially respectable behaviour and to 
reinforce the socially exclusive ideology of polite society that emerged during the late 
eighteenth cenniry . 
A Rhetorical Reading of Rheto&d Handbooks 
To understand how the elocutionary writers negotiated the disciplinary and social 
problems of focusing on bodily practices, this study presents a rhetorical reading of 
Sheridan's, Waiker's, and Austin's representative handbooks. The nature of my study is 
rhetorical not only in the sense that these texts elaborate a content of rhetoncal theory and 
practice, but also in the sense that they can be viewed as themselves persuasive rhetorical 
actions addressed to particular audiences in particular contexts . As David Goodwin argues, 
" [r] hetorical handbooks are rhetorical not only because they explicate the theories and 
practices of persuasion, but, more importantly, because they attempt to persuade the reader 
to believe in, and act on, a particular image of what rhetonc is and should be as a 
disciplinen ("Imitation 26). I assume, therefore, that a selective reading of a few - 
representative elocutionary tex& guided by rhetorical theories and methodologies can yield 
valuable insights about this historical episode as a complex rhetorical event in its own right. 
And by implication, such a reading encourages attention to the rhetorical nature of other 
episodes and to the histoncal narratives about those episodes. Such a critical rhetorical 
approach to episodes within the history of rhetoric promises, as Carole Blair suggests, 'at 
least in principle to better serve those interested not just in the history of rhetoric but also in 
rhetoric" (421). 
Like Goodwin, Michael Cahn stresses the importance of the "analysis of the rhetoric 
of rhetoric" for understanding how the discipline presents and constitutes itself. In his view. 
"the argumentative strategies with which rhetoric faces its critics and its customers are never 
extemal ornarnents. Rather, they pertain to the very possibility of the discipline of rhetoric. 
These suategies are the source of power that enables any discipline to establish itself at dl" 
(62). Cahn's analysis attends to the "strategies of disciplinary self-affirmation" at work in 
classical handbooks of rhetoric. Similarly, my study explores the rhetorical strategies which 
the elocutionists employ to try to a f f m  the disciplinary statu of their work. However, my 
study differs in a significant way: whereas Cahn looks at the rhetorical "tropes" used to 
establish rhetoric as a discipline in the first place, I examine the tactics of persuasion 
employed by marginal writers seeking entry into the already-constituted, dominant 
discipline. An analysis of how the elocutionists figure the relationship of their marginal 
project with the central, established field of rhetoric is crucial for understanding their 
attempts to achieve disciplinary self-affirmation. l0 
1 present this rhetorical reading as an alternative to the general neglect or 
disparagement of the elocutionary movement in disciplinary narratives wrinen after the 
movement's occurrence. Wilbur Samuel Howell's conclusions in Eighteenth-Century 
'%en 1 speak of the "discipline of rhetoric," 1 do not mean that any single, coherent, 
stable "disciplinen does, or even should exist. Rather, 1 mean that the desire for disciplinary 
coherence and legitimacy motivates the elocutionary texts in significant and complex ways, 
just as Cahn shows how this desire motivates the different rhetorical constructions of the 
discipline of rhetoric found in classical handbooks. 
B f i s h  Logic and Rhetoric strikingly exemplify the disparaging attitude. In his narrative. 
the elocutionary movement is held responsible for the demise of rhetoric as an intellectually 
respectable art because it focused on the canon of delivery to the exclusion of more 
"philosophic" theones of content and arrangement. As a result, Howell claims, 
the elocutionists made rhetoric appear to be the art of declaiming a speech by 
rote, without regard to whether the thought uttered were trivial or fdse or 
dangerous; and under auspices like these rhetoric became anathema to the 
scholarly cornmunity and sacred only to the anti-intellectuals within and 
outside the academic system. (British 7 13) 
Other critics, such as Fredenck Haberman. Douglas Ehninger, Mary Margaret Robb, G. P. 
Morhrnann, and so on, have presented kinder versions of the role of the elocutionists in the 
history of rhetoric, versions which 1 will discuss along with Howell's representation at 
greater length in my concluding chapter. However, my own approach differs from these 
few attempts to establish the "inteIlectualn l e g i h c y  of the elocutionary treatises because I 
am less concemed with deterrnining their status as important sources for later theories and 
practices of speech education in the United States than I am with discoverhg the f o m  and 
functions of persuasion which these texts enact in their immediate contexts. 
The intention of this study is to show the elocutionas, texts to be interesting and 
s ignificant rhetorical actions as much because of their apparent failures and incongruities as 
because of their inherent persuasiveness. In this sense, 1 am less confident than Cahn that 
the rhetorical strategies of rhetorical handbooks actually succeed in overcoming the 
"intrinsically problematic cbaractern or "improbability" (Cahn 64) of their versions of 
rhetonc as a discipline. Rather, I suggest that the tensions and instabilities in the 
eiocutionary texts are important because they reveal the complexity of these writers' 
responses to the problematic disciplinary situations and social interests which motivate and 
interact with their texts. This approach fmds some justification in recent scholarship in the 
historiography of rhetoric, where writers such as Takis Poulakos and Jmies Berlin argue for 
interpretations of rhetorical history that foreground the heterogeneity, unevenness, and 
complexity of bief, local episodes rather than uunidirectional, extensive, and comprehensive 
narrativesn (Poulakos 3). 
The main direction of my analysis, therefore, is to approach complexities and 
instabilities of context through the complexities and Uistabilities of text: my rhetorical 
analysis of the texts will indicate features of the social contexts and concems that surround, 
motivate, and interact with these treatises, or rather, to be precise, the contexts as these are 
perceived, rendered, and acted upon by the elocutionary writers. A rhetoncal study of 
selected strategies and structures of persuasion in Sheridan's Lectures on Elocution, 
Waker's Elements of Elocution, and Austin's Chironomia cari help us to understand the 
complexity and instabiiity of the rhetorical situations to which these texts respond and which 
they address. Specifically, 1 shall argue that these texts, through a variety of rhetorical 
techniques, perform intricate acts of negotiation intended to alleviate the problematic social 
and disciplinary dimensions of the elocutionary project. An analysis of this process of 
negotiation requires attention both to the frequent moments of textual instability and 
incongruity-moments which highlight the pro blernatic , precarious nature of the elocutionary 
enterprise-and to the various rhetorical strategies which the elocutionary writers employ to 
try to resolve these incongmities. 
Previe w 
My study draws on the classical rhetorical concepts of arrangement and of the three 
pisreis of ethos, logos, and pathos to aoalyze how the elocutionists negotiate the problematic 
dimensions of their project and, in so doing, create persuasive texts. The comection 
between classical oratory and the elocutionas, utterances is quite obvious in the case of 
Sheridan's Lectures. As H. Lewis Ulman argues, the Lectures have a decidedly 
"deliberative slantn and are expressly part of "a very public campaign airned at garnering 
support for a practical scheme of educational reform" (158). While Walker's and Austin's 
treatises offer a less explicitly argumentative or deliberative approach to the subject of 
delivery , nonetheless an examination of their treatises through the conceptual framework of 
classical rhetoric reveals how al1 three writers attempted to a f f m  the disciplinary s tms  and 
social significance of their new field of enquiry within the context of late eighteenth-century 
British society . The rhetorical techniques that their texts employ demonstrate how the 
elocutionists shaped their "linguistic utterances" (Bourdieu, Language 18) to appeal to a 
mked market of readers interested both in the academic theory of elocution and in its 
practice as a source of social distinction. 
My rhetoncal analysis shows how Sheridan's, Walker's, and Austin's treatises are 
arranged into three main sections, each of which emphasizes one of the three traditional 
appeals to try to persuade their mbced readership of their works' value. First, the opening 
sections, which combine a form of exordiam (introduction) with a type of narrotio 
(statement of the case), highlight the pistis of ethos to secure the audience's goodwill, make 
the audience receptive and attentive to the writers' subject, and narrate key aspects of the 
case and of the characters of those affected by the case. Second, the rniddle sections stress 
the appeal to logos both by develophg logical arguments to prove the value of elocutionary 
snidy and by constnicting quasi-logical systems of rules and notations that attempt to bind 
and relate in a methodical manner the various elements of elocution (Yoos 411). Third, the 
closing sections emphasize the pistis of pathos both through a belated justification of 
elocutionary doctrine on the basis of its status as a "naturaln laquage of the emotions and 
through f m l  perorations which employ motivating emotioml appeals based on inspirational 
visions of the ideal orator. By organizing my analysis according to these main divisions 
(rather than treating each text individually), 1 mean to highlight the differences as well as the 
similarities among the writers' rhetoncal structures of negotiation within each general part. 
As well, this organization allows me to point out both the continuities and the discontinuities 
between each of the main parts as they occur in sequence. 
Before embarking on this rhetoncal analysis of the arrangement and appeals of the 
primary texts, my first chapter provides a theoretical introduction to the guiding concepts of 
decorum and status aspiration which frarne the subsequent study . 1 distinguish the concept 
of decorum into two modes: that of disciplinaly decorum, which concems mainly the 
elocutionary writers' efforts to legitimate their field of study in scholarly r e m ,  and that of 
bodily deconun which concems social propriety in bodily conduct. Each of these 
interrelated modes of decorum links, on the one hand, to the elocutionists' cultural 
aspirations as scholars and teachers, and, on the other, to their implied students' desires for 
social advancement through bodily deconun. To ground this theoretical framework and to 
situate the subsequent close reading of the primary texts, this chapter also oudines key 
features of the elocutionists' social and cultural contexts, their personal biographies, and 
their readerships. In particular, it highlights the late eighteenth-century interest in 
standardizing and codiwing language use and the contextual opportunities for social 
mobility . 
In the second chapter, 1 begin my study of the rhetorical actions of Sheridan's, 
Walker's, and Austin's texts by examining the strategies of ethos that they (as weli as one or 
IWO other writers) employ in the opening sections of their treatises to establish the 
credibility of their general field of enquiry as well as their specific productions. To perform 
this analysis, 1 merge classical views of ethos with Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson's 
current theory of positive and negative politeness strategies. Generally, the elocutionists 
affirm the ethos of their project by demonstrating their subject matter's respectability and 
relevance to their audience, by showing their own good characters, and by narrating both 
the public situation and the personal cases that motivate these publications. The issue of 
disciplinary deconim is central to these sections, as the writers try to negotiate the unstable 
line between, on the one hand, asserting the absolute value of their subject matter and the 
significance of their enquiries, and, on the other. deferentially avoiding the vice of 
cacozelia, or indecorous self-assertion, by representing the value of their work and their 
own characters in negatively polite terms. 
In the thûd and fourth chapters, I examine the systems of elocution which Sheridan, 
Waker. and Austin consmct in the middle, main sections of their treatises to try to make 
this art knowable and teachable. These conf'iirmations of the elocutionary project emphasize 
the appeal to logos in two main ways: fust, especially in Sheridan's case, they advance 
explicit arguments to demonstrate the logical value of developing systematic rules and 
methods of instruction in elocution; second, especially in Walker's and Austin's cases, they 
undertake a quasi-logical demonstration of the facts of elocution by articulating logical 
methods of instruction. C h a h  Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's recent theories of 
argumentation provide a set of analytic tools for deciphering these two forms of logos. In 
the middle sections, the issues of disciplinary and bodily decorum becorne intertwined as the 
elocutionists seek to establish scholarly prestige for themselves by elaborating cornpiex, 
sysiernatic approaches to the codification and instruction of bodily decorum: a kind of 
written grammar of the body. Indeed, a key argument for the value of the elocutionary 
systerns is that the art of speaking requires senled principles and explicit d e s  like those 
which (os tens ibl y) govem written language . 
In explicating their "grammars" of bodily decorum, Waiker and Austin employ quasi- 
logical structures of division to ampli@ the detailed complexity of their techmi (the rules 
and knowledge of a practical art) while obscuring the narrowness of the aspects of elocution 
that these methods actually cover. In Austin's case, the integration of scientific visual forms 
(e.g., symbols, tables, and drawings) with his verbal elucidation of a detailed gesniral 
system expands the techniques of differentiation and classification at his disposal, 
particularly in the spatial distribution, partitioning, and abstraction of the speaker's body. 
Ultùnately, for al1 their detail and depth, the narrow focus of these technai on the "elements" 
(Walker , title page) or "rudiments" (Sheridan, Lectures 95) of elocution constmcts a limited 
ideal of a merely competent speaker. This generic speaker has learnt how to control his (not 
her) body so as to avoid giving offense but does not possess great or noble powers of 
persuasion." This limited ideal, I wil1 argue, corresponds to both the socially aspiring 
position of the implied users of the elocutionary texts and the culturally aspiring position of 
the elocutionary writers themselves . 
If the middle sections tend to delimit the deferential, rule-bound ideal of the 
competent speaker who, because he does not have the advantage of a life-long cultivation in 
the art of deconim, requires the assistance of a "repertoire of rules" to gain at least a degree 
of this "highly vdued competencen (Bourdieu qtd. in Wgharn 5) ,  then the closing sections 
of Sheridan's and Walker's works (discussed in Chapter Five) focus by contrast on the 
inspirational but perhaps incommensurable ideal of the complete, truly excellent orator. 
The "consummate eloquencen (Austin 509) of this figure rests primarily on his "natural 
talents" (Sheridan, Lectures 123) which presumably place hirn above the domain of rules. 
Sheridan's and Austin's scholarly rationale for this ideal speaker draws on the contemporary 
''~hroughout this study, 1 use the masculine pronoun to refer to the typical speaker 
implied by the elocutionary treatises because these works clearly presuppose and are 
addressed to male snidents. In this sense, my use of the masculine pronoun is not a generic 
reference to human beings, but a specific reference to the masculine gender intended to 
foreground the virtual absence of the ferninine gender from the discursive domain of 
eighteenth-cenhiry elocution. See Chapter One for a fuller discussion of this issue. 
philosophical-psychological topic of the "natural" language of the emotions expressed 
through gesmres and tones. But this rationale occupies an incongruously belated position in 
their works and it leads to further instabilities as they attempt to deal with the conflict 
between the concept of a "natural," "universal" lanpage and that of a socially exclusive code 
of conduct regulated by culturally detennined rules and standards. The closing appeal to the 
ideal of the consummate speaker creates a mysterious connection between the lesser, 
socially-aspiring speaker for whom the techmi of elocution are designed and the vague 
principle of perfection at the top of the elocutionary hierarchy. This mysterious comection 
inspires the implied students and supporters of elocution by obscurhg the limitations of the 
preceding rechnai. It also displaces the writers' accountability for the success of their 
students by naturalizing truly effective delivery as ostensibly ineffable, incommunicable. 
and inimitable (Bourdieu, Outhe  95), no t consciousiy teachable or leamable. 
To conclude this study of the rhetorical forms and functions of Sheridan's, Walker's, 
and Austin's treatises, 1 move from my main examination of the primary texts to a brief 
discussion of the rhetorical motives and structures in twentieth-century secondary 
scholarship about the elocutionary movement. Encouraged by the arguments of recent 
historiographers of rhetoric, 1 approach this criticism as another layer of representation in 
the ongoing historical construction of elocution within the discipline of rhetoric. Like the 
primary texts themselves, this criticism develops rhetorical arguments and patterns of 
representation that reveal not so much the historical "mith" about the eighteenthcentury 
movement as the situated interests and disciplinary motives of the twentieth-century writers 
thernselves . Finally , 1 reflect on my own disciplinary motivations and predispositions for 
undertaking this study which addresses the rhetoric of the history of rhetoric (Schilb 13) and 
which, 1 hope, encourages grezter attention to the possibilities of bodily persuasion within 
traditional and future histories, theories, and practices of rhetoric. 
CHAPTER ONE 
GUIDING CONCEPTS AND FEATURES OF CONTEXT 
In this chapter, 1 outline the two guiding concepts of "deconimn and "status 
aspirationn which provide a general theoretical framework for rny rhetorical snidy of 
Sheridan's Lectures on Elocution, Walker's Elements of Elocution, and Austin's 
Chironornia. I then describe some of the key features of the elocutionists' social and 
historical contexts to ground the preceding conceptualizations and to indicate some of the 
situational factors which the elocutionary texts seem to address. 
First, though, let me offer a few words of explanation about basic rhetorical terms 
and assumptions which figure in the following analysis. My general rhetorical perspective 
draws primarily on Kenneth Burke's ideas, in the sense that 1 understand language use as a 
form of symbolic action by human agents intended to motivate other human agents to adopt 
attitudes or undertake actions, even when this language use is not ovenly persuasive or 
argurnentative.' 1 am interested, then, not only in what specific uses of language represent 
or record but in what they actually do or attempt to do: that is, in their social and functionai 
aspects. A Burkean perspective emphasizes the performative nature of particular uses of 
language . Thus, I conceive the elocutionary treatises as rhetorical 'acts" that imply specific 
actors or speakers, audiences, and scenes of performance. For Burke, the "scenen of a 
rhetorical act refers to its setting. The scene contains the rhetorical actors and their actions, 
and is consistent with their nature (Grammar 3). Burke's concept of "scene" is not limited 
to the immediate situation in which a rhetorical action occurs. but expands to include broad 
social, historkal, and political contexts as these are relevant to the particular situation. 
'In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke defines the basic function of rhetoric as "the use of 
words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agentsn (41). 
Language is "a symbolic means of induchg cooperation in beings that by nature respond to 
symbols" (43). 
Further, 1 assume that these treatises or rhetorical actions are, in Norman 
Fairclough's sense, essentially social practices both because language use is socially 
determined and has social effects and because "the language activity which goes on in social 
contexts . . . is not merely a reflection or expression of social processes and practices, it is a 
part of those processes and practicesn (23). Rather than conceiving the rhetorical situation 
and social context of particular linguistic events as a set of extemal exigencies which dictate 
and control the speaker's or writer's utterances (Bitzer 5; Consigny 175), 1 presuppose a 
mode1 of text-context interaction which understands the elocutionary treatises as 
simultaneously responding to a d ,  to a limited extent, shaping the larger discursive contexts 
which surround and motivate these particular texts. 
These basic assumptions about the social and situated nature of rhetorical actions 
relate to Bourdieu's concepts of "linguistic utterance, " "fieldn and "market. " Linguistic 
utterances (spoken or written) are forms of practice "adapted to a 'situation' or, rather, 
adapted to a market or fieldn (Sociology 78). According to Bourdieu, a field-such as the 
field of nineteenthcentury philology or contemporq fashion or, for this study, the field of 
eighteenthcentury elocution- "defmes itself by . . . defining specific stakes and interests, 
which are irreducible to the stakes and interests specific to other fieldsn (Sociology 72). 
Different fields, therefore, engender different f o m  of linguistic utterance which address 
"the specific stakes and interests" of each field and the markets that regulate it. These 
markets confer a value on the linguistic utterances produced by members of the field. 
Therefore, "part of the practical competence of speakers [or writers] is to know how, and to 
be able, to produce expressions which are highly valued on the markets concernedn 
(Longuage 18). For the elocutionists , this means constructing linguistic utterances adapted 
to the historical markets in which the study of elocution is recognized as valuable. 
However, because their works are intended to defme a new field, the markets that the 
writers address are more complex and less well-defined than those which regulate a well- 
established field. In this situation, part of the writers' competence is to be able to shape, as 
well as respond to, an appropnate market for their utterances. 
This attempt to defme a new field and market is a socially-historically located 
process of conflict and negotiation. Gunther Kress argues that individual texts, whether 
conversations or single-authored treatises, are dialogic sites in which different discourses 
and social interem wme into conflict- These differences and the resulUng conflicts provide 
the motivation for the text, which, in nim. aaempts to resoive or aileviate the conflicts: 
'Indeed the task of the authorhriter is precisely this: to anempt ro conmuct a text in which 
discrepancies, mnuadictions, and disjunctions are bridged, covered over. elimhatedn (Kress 
15). This definition of text supports my basic contention ihat the elocutionary 
treatises-namely, the siniateci rhetorical actions of the elonitionary wrirers-are important 
sites for analysis because of, not despite, the conflicts and discrepancies which motivate and 
structure their performances. 
Guiding Concepts: Decomm and Status Aspiration 
The concepts of deconun and statu aspiraion guide my analysis of the elocutionary 
treatises. Together, these concepts help to show how, on the one hand, the elocutionary 
treatises conservatively invoke and reinforce established forms and values, while, on the 
other hand. they create limited opporhmities for social and disciplinary rnobilicy which 
modifies established orders. In general, the principle of decorum functions to alleviate the 
instabilities introduced by status aspiration. 
In classical thought, decomm refers to the appropriateness of rhetorical expression, 
or style, to the subject rnatter, speaker, audience, and occasion. For the First Sophists, the 
terrn to prepon ("the appropriate and the proper") referred primariiy to the compatibility or 
harmony of style to subject matter. However, as John Poulakos points out, the linking of to 
prepon with kairos ("the opportune. or timeliness") increased the doctrine's scope to include 
the appropriateness of the rhetor's speech as a whole to the particular audience and occasion 
(Poulakos 35). The Aristotelian conception of decorum sirnilarly stresses the importance of 
suiting style to subject matter. but it also ernphasizes the significance of speaking in ways 
appropriate to social position and character (Rhetoric 3.1408a). According to Robert 
Kaster, "in its post-Aristotelian formulations," decorum was extended 'beyond the 
coordination of style with speaker and subject. to include the interaction of style and 
context" (Kaster 3). For example, for Cicero udeconim" means attending to the propriety of 
the "thoughtn as well as the verbal style and the physical delivery of speech with reference 
to the character of the audience, speaker, occasion. and subject matter (Orator 22;73-74). 
In these senses, decorurn acts as a foundational principle or, as Cicero says, "a universal 
rulen (Orator 22.71) in classica1 theories of rhetoric, one which can and should motivate 
vimially al1 strategies of persuasion and concem al1 aspects of the rhetorical situation. 
According to Kaster, the socially élite nature of classical conceptions rneant that the 
art of decorun "could be mastered only if one were bred into the social system in which 
decorum was embedded" (Kaster 6). In this sense, classical deconun for the most part 
defmes a "closed" (Kaster 6) and conservative system because the social norrns which 
determine what is and is not decorous are assumed and reflect the interests of the dominant 
c~asses.~ The stability and authonty of these n o m  depend on their rernaining irnplicit, and 
hence naturalized. In Kaster's words, 
One had to grow into decorum: it was a matter of education in the broadest 
sense, cultivation . . . . [D]ecorum was an effective part of the high culture's 
mechanism of exclusion and equilibrium. It depended, in the last analysis, on 
the life-long development of a point of view shared by the limited cornrnunity 
of those of comparable background and status, and so was a powerhil, 
centripetal force of social integration and control. (7) 
On one hand, the general classical theory of deconim functioned to perpetuate an 
ideology of social order that served the interests of those who inhabited an élite, ruling 
position. However, because the art of decorurn also was inscnbed through explicit, 
prescriptive sets of rules for proper conduct, its practice became to a limited extent available 
to people outside the élite community "of those of comparable background and status." 
Robert Hariman notes how classical handbooks of rhetoric presented decorum both "as a set 
of conventions and a theory of conventionsn (153). The "common sensen set of conventions, 
argues Hariman, offered an explicit system of terms that "seemed to represent a natural 
order," but which in reality "embodied the ideology of the ruling éliten (153). However, 
'1 Say "for the most part" because the early Sophistic views of decorum, or to prepon, 
and its association with kairos suggest a more flexible approach to the doctrine through the 
kairotic recognition of the cultural and contextual contingencies of social values and noms, 
and hence d e f ~ t i o n s  of "propriety . " 
these systems, in addition to reinforcing a 'closed" order, simultaneously permitted orators 
to "imitate signs of statusn and thus "expIoit the social code governing a situation" (152, rny 
emp hasis): 
. . . any time the system of rules is explicit, as in the [rhetorical] handbooks, 
subversion of the social order recorded in the mles is possible. Instruction in 
rhetoric would equip one to simulate rank and feign deference; such 
instruction always was undertaken with the expectation that one could 
advance oneself beyond ordinary expectation. (Hariman 154) 
In this sense, the elocutionary systems of rules for bodily decorum both invoke the forms 
and values of an élite community and make these practices avaiiable for imitation by people 
born outside this community . 
In the elocutionary art of decorum, as in classical theories, the ide& of verecundia 
and self-restraint guide the successful practice of decorum, especially for those whose 
inherited social position places them outside or at the margins of "high culture" (Kaster 7). 
Verecundia, according to Kaster, translates as "rnodesty," "respect," "a sense of shame." In 
this sense, decorum refers to the speaker's ability to act in a modest, inoffensive manner 
and to avoid exceeding the boundaries of good raste by lapsing into the vice of cacozeiia 
("indecorous self-assertion") through "an unsuccessful saiving for distinction or novelty" 
(Kaster 9). Cicero, especially in De Wciis, "pulls the concept [of decorum] inwardn by 
emphasizing the idea of self-restraint and control of the body, ideas which conjoin with 
politicai conceptions of social order and restraint (Hariman 155). This theme of self- 
restraint specifically in connection with bodily conduct likewise plays a central role in 
Norbert Elias' sociological study of the practices of civility within modern European court 
society where, he argues, the courtier's self-conscious control over his emotional impulses 
and their spontaneous bodily manifestations became a key requirement for secur ing and 
maintaining a privileged position (Shiiiing 164). Similarly , Anna Bryson draws on Elias' 
theories to demonstrate how "control of the body was held to reflect and enhance the status 
of the gentleman in Tudor and Stuart Englandn (137). In the elocutionary treatises, these 
ideals of verecundia and self-restraint figure not only in the texts' representations of bodily 
conduct but also, to some extent, in the writers' characterizations of themselves and their 
field of enquiry . 
Recentiy, severai scholan have revitalized the classical doctrine of d e c o m  for 
contemporary rhetorical criticisrn. By contrast with classicd formulations, a contemporary 
approach to deconim emphasizes the non-foundational, contingent, and mutable nature of 
the standards and conventions of propriety. Thomas Rosteck and Michel Leff argue that 
Kenneth Burke's secular-rhetoncal concept of pieo, as a principle of order and coherence 
for human symbolic activity, can be interpreted as a concept of propriery. In a Burkean 
fkame, the terms piety and propriety "uncover order within a relativisfic social universe" 
(329, my emphasis) . Propriety , for Burke, is always a principle of local hierarchy , and any 
principle of propriety always functions in cornpetition with or opposition to other ordering 
principles. For example, "the gashouse gangn loafmg at the sûeetcorner has its own "deeply 
felt sense of the appropriate," revealed through the practice of "proper oaths, the correct 
way of commenthg upon passing women, the etiquette of spitting" (Burke, Permanence and 
Change 77). This local principle and practice of propriety-which clearly opposes the 
traditional c o ~ e c t i o n  of propriety with "exquisiteness of tasten and "the 'better' classes of 
people" ( P e m e n c e  and Change 77)4emonstrates in an extreme way the possible conflicts 
arnong different ordering principles. Thus, schemes of piety operate within particular social 
contexts as temporarily stabilizing structures which orient human perceptions about what is 
decorous in a given circurnstance; however, these schemes are "not immutable or inert 
givens . . . . p] ieties are processes as well; they corne to be, change, and pass out of 
existence in accordance with the situated interests of human communities" (Rosteck and Leff 
330). These processes of change inevitably entail conflicts and incongruities between "rival 
perspectivesn to the extent that these perspectives are motivated by diverging or changing 
human interests (Rosteck and Leff 330). 
Rosteck and Leff underline the importance of attending to conflicts between different 
schemes of propriety, but they do not sufficiently acknowledge the possibility of conflict and 
incoherence within a particular order of decorum. By contrast with their assumption of the 
possibility of the local coherence and integration of rhetoncal performances, 1 would argue 
that the principle of propriety which holds together any rhetorical performance or situation 
masks @ut does not resolve or remove) its incompatibilities and ambiguities. A rhetorical 
analysis of the governing principles of propriety reveals not so much the text's or speech's 
"realn order, but rather the desire for the appearance of decorum as well as the rhetorical 
strategies which a writer or speaker employs to create the impression of order and 
appropriateness . 
By applying the concept of decorum to the elocutionary project, 1 wish to emphasize 
the ways in which the rhetorical construction of the treatises 1 will examine represents 
elocution as a socially appropriate underraking. An analysis of this representation shows 
how the study of elocution, for both wrïters and readers, at once confomis to and modifies 
established conceptions of cultural propriety. Because the articulation of codes of bodily 
deconim constitutes the heart of the elocutionary project, it is central to the writers' efforts 
to secure disciplinary or scholarly status for thei. work. There are, therefore, two main, 
interrelated dimensions of decorum in these treatises: first, the principle of decorum 
strucnires the rhetorical arguments and appeals that Sheridan, Walker, and Austin make for 
the appropriateness of elocution as a general field of enquiry, as well as for the persona1 
propriety of themselves as writers and of their publications. This dimension 1 cal1 
"disciplinary decorum" because it refers essentially to the elocutionists' attempt to secure 
disciplinary status and scholarly legitimacy for their field of enquiry. Second, the desire to 
establish an explicit set of conventions for decorous bodily conduct motivates the 
elocutionists' rhetorical systems of physical delivery and their figurations of the proper 
public speaker's body within their treatises. This dimension 1 refer to as "bodily decorum." 
These two levels of deconim roughly correspond, and respond, to the main problerns of the 
elocutionary movement which 1 have identified already: namely, the problem of the threat to 
disciplinary propriety by focusing on the devalued canon of delivery , and the problem of 
demystiSing bodily behaviour through the articulation of explicit pedagogies. 
The forms and strategies of deconun at work in the elocutionary treatises counter- 
balance the instabilities of stutus aspiranon that characterize the markets to whom these 
texts are addressed. Status aspiration therefore constitutes a fundamental feature of the 
rhetorical situation motivating the elocutionary project. Because the structure of status 
aspiration is paradoxical, it accounts for the inherent instabilities and tensions within the 
texts which the techniques of deconun attempt to alleviate. Just as the principle of decorum 
manifests itself on two levels, so the principle of status aspiration informs both the 
elocutionists' desire to achieve scholarly prestige and their implied users' aspirations to 
achieve higher social status by learning new practices of bodily decorum. 
Within the complex, but increasingly mobile and heterogeneous, social hierarchy of 
late eighteenth-century Britain, the elocutionists and the implied users of their handbooks do 
not occupy a niling, uuly élite position, but rather a middling status. As James Burgh 
explains, his treatise on The An of Speaking is directed toward "al1 that part of youth, whose 
situation places them within the reach of a polite education" (Burgh 5 ) ,  not necessarily 
toward those who aiready possess a polite education as their birthright. Similarly, the 
elocutionists' decision to focus on the marginal canon of delivery cornbined with their own 
mixed cultural backgrounds place them at the margins, rather than at the centre, of 
established disciplinary and scholarly endeavours. Therefore, the rules and forms of 
decorurn elaborated in the elocutionary treatises have a double function: they constitue a 
rhetorical tool for "making placesn in the social order, a tool that c m  be used both to 
reinforce the exclusivity of an élite order and to serve the aspirations of lower-status, mobile 
readen who wish to acquire greater social distinction (Whigham 5-6). 
Peter Stallybrass highlights the paradoxical nature of status aspiration in his 
definition of the class aspirant as someone who 'has an interest in preserving social closure, 
since without it there would be nothing to aspire to. But at the same tirne, that closure must 
be sufficiently flexible to incorporate himn ("Patriarchal Territones" 134). Paradoxically , by 
making gestures of conformity, status aspirants constnict new and better places for 
themselves within a social hierarchy ; lacking inherited cultural capital, they strive to acquire 
it through the practices of decorum.' The figure of the status aspirant within the context of 
'I have chosen the phrase 'status aspirant/aspirationn rather than 'class 
aspirant/aspirationn because the appropriateness of describing eighteenth-century British 
sociey as a "classn structure remains debatable. As well, the aspirations which motivate the 
elocutionary writers and their implied readers are not simply class ones-for example, ethnic 
and gender distinctions, as well as cultural and educational hierarchies also inform the 
structures of aspiration in these texts. 
4 ~ n  Bourdieu's theory, cultural capital refers to 'knowledge, skills and other cultural 
acquisitions, as exemplified by educational or technical qualificationsn (Thompson, 
Language 14). Cultural capital may be inhented or acquired (especially through education); 
the mode of acquisition rnay affect the relative value of the capital possessed (Bourdieu, 
Distinction 80). Physical capital, which refers to 'the development of bodies in ways which 
are recognized as possessing value in social fields," constitutes one f o m  of cultural capital 
(Shilling 1 27). 
the elocutionary rnovement thus inhabits an unstable position on the threshold of polite, élite 
society: the aspirant's ability to cross that threshold depends on his ability to convince the 
gatekeepers of social and disciplinary decorum that his conduct legitimately reflects and 
reinforces (rather than feigns or subverts) the exclusionary codes of high culture, while he 
simultaneously crosses the boundaries of this culture? In this way, the stabilizing forces of 
social and disciplinary decorum mask the instabilities of social mobility. However, 
Stallybrass ' stress on the "closedn nature of the Renaissance hierarchy in which the "class 
aspirant" seeks social advancement does not do justice to the climate of social mobility in 
late eighteenth-century Britain. In this clhate, incorporating status aspirants into the 
established order does not simply reinforce social closure. Rather, as 1 shall discuss further 
in the next section, the openly tolerated aspirations of the middle ranks modify the nature of 
cultured behaviour as these groups defme new standards of polite society and respectable 
conduct. 
For the elocutionary writers, the paradox of status aspiration means that the 
rhetoncal representations of their scholarly ambitions and achievements and of ideal forms 
of bodily conduct negotiate the tension between cacozelia, or indecorous self-assertion, and 
a modest, limited conception of their own and their implied students' powers and scope of 
activity . In general, withh the topic of disciplinary deconun, these treatises negotiate the 
tension between the writers' desire to distinguish the scholarly significance and propriety of 
their subject matter, and their simultaneous appreciation of its problernatic cultual status. 
The principal ways in which they attempt to cover over the incongruities created by this 
tension include developing an ethos for their project that subsumes its novelty within the 
traditional canons of classical rhetoric and within established contemporary fields of 
scholarship; constructing a personal erhos that validates the writers' diligent processes of 
composition rather than the success of their h l  products; asserting both the centrality of 
'Like Stallybrass, 1 use the masculine pronoun advisedly to refer to this figure-as 1 will 
throughout this study when referring to the aspiring speaker implied by the elocutionary 
texts-because the opportunities for statu aspiration within elocutionary discourse were very 
much a male phenornenon. This does not mean that other less public forms and processes 
of status aspiration were not available to eighteenth-century women, but that the dominant 
assurnptions and structures of the elocutionary rnovement were directed toward men of 
middling to upper social statu. 
elocution to the study of oratory and its subordination to verbal eloquence and rational 
argument; providing an impression, through complex techniques of vertical differentiation, 
of systematic, scientific fullness, while in fact restraining the scope of their inquines to the 
basic elements of elocution; and reinforcing a traditional mhd-body hierarchy by locating 
the origins of effective elocution in the "intenial" nature of the speaker and by constructing 
an abstract, disembodied elocutionary doctrine to regulate the embodied practices of 
aspiring speakers. In sum, the elocutionary writers address the problem of consmicting 
disciplinary d e c o m  for themselves and their project by negotiating tensions between 
novelty and tradition, product and process, marginality and centrality. rudiments and 
systematic comprehensiveness, the external and the intemal. and between the embodied and 
the abstract. 
The primary tension in their discourse of bodily decorum occurs between the ideals 
of the cornpetent speaker and the consummate speaker. The interplay of these ideals permits 
the elocutionists to advance their systems of delivery within the framework of a symbolic 
hierarchy motivated by the mysterious ideal of powerhil, consummate oratory. The systerns 
themselves, however, are confimed to demarcating a relatively narrow code of bodily 
decorum suited to the middling, aspiring stanis of the handbooks' impiied users and of the 
elocutionary writers themselves. This middling status embodies the paradoxical tension 
between the aspirant's desire to resemble those above him in the elocutiooary hierarchy with 
a simultaneous recognition of his difference in kind from the status to which he aspires. The 
mysterious co~ec t i on  between excellence and cornpetence that the elocutionary treatises 
develop allows the aspiring speaker to participate in the ideal of excellence without ever 
achieving it. In this way, the mysterious figure of the consummate orator motivates the 
lesser ideal of the competent speaker, while at the same time these figures inhabit 
incommensurable worlds: the élite orator at the top of the elocutionary hierarchy possesses a 
"natural" grace and deconun that transcends the domain of explicit mles and instruction, 
while the competent speaker delineated by the elocutionists' prescriptive systems lacks 
"practical rnastery of a highly valued comperence" and thus requires 'an explicit and at least 
semi-fonnalized substitute for it in the form of a repertoire of mles" (Bourdieu qtd. in 
Whigham 5). If the consummate speaker has "grow[n] h to  decorum" (Kaster 7) and hence 
can practice these habits effortlessly and unconsciously, the aspiring competent speaker, by 
contrast, must exercise diligence and continuai self-vigilance in the learning and 
performance of bodily deconun. At the same t h e ,  the consmiction of deconun requires a 
representation of the upper levels of the social hierarchy as somewhat permeable and 
flexible: in order to justiQ the viability of the elocutionary handbooks for creating bener 
social and cultural places for their readers and writers, the differences between the character 
and position of the aspirant and the character and position of the "noblen speaker (Austin 
508) must be rendered as, at least in principle, scalable differences of degree! 
Social Context, Writers, and Readers 
mat the elocutionary handbooks contain such tensions within their constructions of 
disciplinary and bodily decorum, and that the techniques of decorum do not fully succeed in 
resolving these incongmities is, 1 suggest, less a sign of the logical or structural deficiencies 
of these texts than it is a sign of the complex nature of the rhetorical contexts which rhese 
texts address and within which they attempt to establish the credibility of the new field of 
elocution. Through a close reading of selected features of Sheridan's, Austin's, and 
Walker's treatises, 1 will show how these writers employ rhetorical appeals and techniques 
to negotiate the intricacies of the scenes in which the drama of their rhetorical actions takes 
place. Before 1 undertake this close reading, however, 1 will highlight here some aspects of 
the late eighteenth-century cultural context relevant to the composition and reception of the 
elocutionary works. This selective delineation of contextual issues is a lead-in to the 
rhetorical analysis of the contexts and social motivations implied by the elocutionary texts 
thernselves. My assumption is that a close reading of the elocutionary texts cm enhance Our 
understanding of the situations and audiences which motivated and interacted with these 
specific linguistic utterances. In this sense, context refers both to the writers' subjective 
perceptions and rhetorical representations of the situations which their texts address and to 
the objective histoncal realities which stmctured the market for their field of enquiry. As 
6Unless otherwise stated, al1 parenthetical references to "Austinn refer to the 
Chirunomia. 
John Thompson notes. Bourdieu's concepts of fields and markets require elucidation in 
terms of "the specific interests at stake in the practices and conflicts which take place in 
panicular fields" because every field and its markets have distinctive properties which 
cannot be detexmined abs tractly ("Introduction, " Lcinguage 16). 
To help identim the specific properties of the elocutionary field and its markets, my 
discussion of coniext focuses on the aspirations of the rniddling ranks to secure increased 
cultural capital through educationd, rather than inherited. means. "Educationaln here refers 
to a wide range of modes through which people acquire cultural capital, from forma1 
schooling to self-improvement to participation in activities such as learned societies, public 
lectures, and the eighteenth-century 'print culture" (Kernan 16-23). As Roy Porter explains, 
"most eighteenthcenniry learning went on outside officially designated systerns of 
instruction. . . . Most education was learning for living, in particular for earning a living" 
(English 15 8). For the middling ranks of eighteenth-century British society , education in 
this large sense offered possibilities for social advancement to people with relatively linle 
inherited cultural capital. This perspective applies to both the consumers and the writers of 
the elocutionary treatises: learning bodily deconun is a possible path to greater social 
prestige; teaching and writing about bodily deconim creates opportunities for cultural (and 
econornic) advancement. 
The late eighteenth-century British social hierarchy contained several distinct levels, 
of which the middle orders formed a significant but diverse group. For example, James 
Nelson in 1753 itemized five main ranks: "the Nobility, Gentry, Mercantile or Commercial 
People, Mechanics, and Peasantryn (Corfield 38). According to Roy Porter, even this five- 
fold categorization does not do justice to the fmeness of the gradations between the links in 
the chah of income and status in British society : 
The English social ladder was indeed fmely graded. The distinctions between 
being a servant in or out of livery, a kitchen maid or a lady's rnaid, below or 
above the salt, lower deck or quarter deck, between king called Mrs or 
Madam, were fme, but they mattered in creating status differentiation at their 
own levels as much as the pecking-order between baronets and earls, 
marquises and dukes. . . . AU these nice distinctions, and the supercharged 
snobbery which they provoked and which sustained them, shaped a social 
order whose gross inequalities were landscaped in a gentie dope rather than 
in steps. There was no iron curtain of law or blood between bondman and 
freeman, made and land, commoner and noble, as there was in some parts of 
Europe. (Englirh 49) 
However, E. P. Thornpson cautions against overstathg the "gentle slopen that comected the 
highest and lowest ranks. According to him, eighteenth-century British society was 
characterized by division into the two polarized groups of "pamciansn (or "the gentryn) and 
"plebsn (or "the poorn) (16-17). Although 'no iron curtain" divided these groups, there 
existed an "immense distance between polite and plebeian culturesn (85). Within this 
polarized order, the emergence and consolidation of the growing middle orders in terms of 
numbers, wealth, and cultural presence was slow and complex (88). And while the cultural 
and economic capital of these diverse rniddling orders may have increased significantly as 
the century progressed, this does not mean that basic polarisations in society as a whole 
were sofiened (go).' 
Therefore, the oppominities for social mobility which the elocutionary field 
presupposes and encourages are not applicable to al1 levels in society but confined to the 
rniddling and upper ranks. Given this important proviso. the sloping gradation of status 
permitted the emerging middle orders to acquire social distinction through educational as 
well as other means. In particular, the status of 'gentieman" was not legally futed but 
negotiable, depending as much on wealth and liberal behaviour as on birth. Porter cites the 
views of a Frenchman, Guy Mièrge, who maintained that "the title of gentleman is 
commonly given in England to al1 that distinguish themselves fiom the common sort of 
people by a good garb, genteel air or good education. wealth or learningn (Porter, English 
65). Yet an overemphasis on the opportunities for and frequency of upward social mobility 
would be misleading. As Porter notes, although "[pleople could quite easily rise towardr 
7 John Brewer notes the diversity of the middle orders: ". . . lawyers, land agents, 
apothecaries , and doctors : middlemen in the coal , textile. and grain trades : carters, carriers, 
and innkeepers : booksellers, printers, schoolteachers, entertainers, and clerks: drapers, 
grocers, druggists, stationers, ironmongers, shopkeepers of every son: the small masters in 
cutlery and toy making, or in al1 the various luxury trades of the metropolisn (qtd. in 
Thompson 88). See also Davidoff and Hall, 23. 
the portal of the next status group." acmally crossing the threshold was more difficult (65). 
Lawrence Stone and Jeanne C. Fawtier Stone, for their part, argue that the myth of an "open 
élite" in English society is precisely that: a myth. In reality, they daim, the landed élite 
remained for cenhuies a relatively homogeneous and stable group dominating English 
society. However, while the extensive property and titles that this group owned were not, 
as the myth suggests, easily and frequently purchased by the upwardly mobile mercantile 
class, there did exist an important cultural cohesion between these groups. The cultural 
values and behaviour of the élite were adopted and assimilated by "the middling sonn (423) 
thus creating an impression of comrnunity between the groups. As Paul Langford explains, 
this middling group "was united in nothing more than in its members' determination to make 
themselves gentlemen and ladies, thereby identifying themselves with the upper classn (qtd . 
in Thompson 90). 
The complexity of the social scene in late eighteenth-century Britain also rnay be 
understood in ternis of regional and national differences. As transportation irnproved and as 
the socio-economic boundaries between various regions of England, and between England, 
Scotland, Wales, and Ireland became less fm, people engaged in greater geographic 
rn~bility.~ In this context, London acted as the cultural capital toward which those seeking 
their fame and fortune inevitably gravitated. This meant that the manners of élite London 
society became the cultural nom toward which aspiring social, professionai, and business 
people strove. In Porter's words, London was the "cynosuren for the whole kingdom, 
dominating the nation in size, wealth, and social standards. The growth of provincial 
centres at this Ume did not detract from London's centrality because "polite societyn in these 
centres ernulated the tow and habits set by the capital's élite society (English 39-40). 
Scotland's and especizlly Edinburgh's relationship to London was more complex. 
For example, many members of the eighteenth-century Scottish Eniightenrnent, centered in 
'Sec Porter, English Sociev (39, 19 1-93) on improvernents in uansportation. See 
Colley on the economic and political integration of Britain during the eighteenth century, 
especially 11745 on Scotland and England's relationship. See Colley (154-64) on the 
making of a British ruling class during the last part of the eighteenth cenniry: "Members of 
the Welsh, Scottish, and Anglo-Irish landed élites, who had often in the past been excluded, 
as well as temperarnentally aloof and geographically distant, from the centre of political 
power, now moved or were drawn into itn (156). 
the intellectual circles of Edinburgh, were explicitly committed not only to the development 
of thought and culture but also to economic, commercial, and technological advances in 
Scotiand (McElroy 49,54). This cornmimient suggests a strong national pride and agenda, 
not a simple adulation of the English capital's style and power . However, as Linda Colley 
argues, especially during the second half of the eighteenth century more and more Scots for 
their own benefit ventured south to political and professional careers, helping to establish 
and becoming part of an increasingly "Britishn rather than nationalistically "Scottish" culture 
(Colley 123-126). The entry of Scots into England's political and social élite can be seen as 
a form of active infiltration (not passive assimilation) in which Scottish and English society 
became linked by "cords of mutual self-interestn (Colley 13 1, 144). Success in these 
careers, as Edinburgh's Select Society clearly recognized when in 1761 it launched its 
subsidiary "Society for Promoting the Reading and Speaking of the English Language in 
Scotland," required the ability to speak English according to emerging "British" standards 
(McElroy 55). 
The development of this subsidiary society was directly influenced by the first set of 
lectures Sheridan delivered in Edinburgh (McEiroy 56) and its efforts coincided with a 
general trend making the teaching of English central to formal and informal education in 
Edinburgh (Law 148-161).'O As W. Benzie explains, during this period "there was a stigma 
attached to the 'wlgar' Scottish accent and to Scotticisms in written English, mainly because 
q h e  members of the Seleci 
Alexander Wedderburn, James 
and Lord Karnes, among many 
"Achievement (1745-1770)." 
Society included Ailan Ramsay, David Hume, Adam Smith, 
Burnett , Alexander Carlyle, William Roberston, Hugh Blair, 
others. For more on the Society, see McElroy's chapter 
'('In conjunction with the fust of Sheridan's lecture tours in Edinburgh, the Select 
Society passed the following resolution: 
That it would be of great advantage to this country, if a proper number of persons 
from England, duly qualifed to instruct gentlemen in the knowledge of the English 
tongue, the manner of pronouncing it with purity, and the art of public speaking, 
were settled in Edinburgh; and if at the same t h e  a proper number of rnasters from 
the same country, duly qualified for teaching children the reading of English, should 
open schools in Edinburgh for that purpose. (qtd. in Howell, British 158) 
Ironically , Sheridan was not, as this resolution specified, "from England," at least 
originally . 
of Edinburgh's prestige as one of the intellectual and cultural centres of the world and the 
need for Scots M.P.s to malce themselves understood in London after the Unionn @3). 
While no doubt some nationalistic Scots opposed this effort to "supplant the Scots dialect 
with English," David McElroy argues that the degree of this opposition has been greatly 
exaggerated by subsequent commentators (McElroy 66, 63). Benzie concurs that " [t] here is 
no evidence in contemporary literanire, periodical or otherwise, of any public outcry" about 
this promotion of English (Benzie 26). The desire for instruction in the "proper" 
pronunciation and writing of English reflects cultural ambitions for self-improvement. 
According to John Lothian, '[tlhe records of literary clubs and associations of Scodand in 
the eighteenth century . . . reveal a society animated 'ay an awareness of a need for culture 
and by an intense ambition to improve" (xxxv). The promotion of the "propern 
pronunciation and writing of English reflects this ambition, whether directed toward cultural 
success in London or at home. 
The norms and opportunities of London society also exerted a strong influence on 
eighteenth-century Ireland, though Dublin like Edinburgh was a vital cultural centre and, 
toward the end of the century, traditional Irish language and culture gained increasing 
importance among the country's literati. " According to R. B. McDowell , " [t] hroughour the 
century Irish intellectual, cultural and fashionable life was dominated by England, or rather 
it might be said by London and its outposts" (145). The many Irish immigrants to Great 
Britain fkom the middling ranks included businesspeople and professionals as well as 
writers, painters, actors (such as Sheridan), and politicians "who seem to have found there 
opportunities and stimulus lacking at homen (McDowell 142). The dominance of English 
culture is reflected as well in the common practice of sending Irish boys (of whom Sheridan 
was one) from the middle and upper social ranks to élite English public schools such as 
Eton, Winchester, and Harrow for at least part of their education (McDowell 143). In 
Ireland, as in eighteenth-century Scotland, speaking English with a local accent ("a horrid 
brogue") was deemed by many a source of embarrassrnent (McDowell 146) because, as 
Sheridan put it, it renders the Irish "a perpetual subject of ridicule to al1 English hearersn 
 o or more on Dublin's cultural vitality and the growth of scholarly interest in traditional 
Irish culture, see McDowell, 146-55. 
(qtd. in McDowell 146). The fact that the mjority of the population still spoke Irish, rather 
than English, demonstrates the presupposed exclusivity of the group that elocutionary 
writers such as Sheridan were addressing: these were definitively not 'the plebsn (Thompson 
16). Toward the end of the century, learned societies such as the Royal Irish Academy, of 
which Austin was a member, developed an interest in the Gaelic tradition, but this interest 
was "antiquarian" and did not disrupt the dominance of English as the language of power 
and prestige (McDowell 154-155, 150). Thus, learning to speak and write English without 
the "disgusting tone of an Irish broguen (Sheridan qtd. in McDowell 146) was important to 
advancing or maintainhg social stahis. Given the more tenuous distinctions between the 
upper and middle classes in Irish than in English society and the corresponding greater 
opportunities for upward mobility (Connolly 64), the acquisition of cultural capital through 
education in "proper" English would have contributed significantly to this mobility. 
Within England itself, the increasing infiuence of nonconfonnist comrnunities 
primarily within provincial centres further complicates the cultural dominance of élite 
London society . During the last decades of the eighteenth century , these communities, as 
Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall note, were integral to the shaping of the nineteenth- 
century English rniddle class and its new conceptions of social decorum opposed to 
anstocratic codes (18-21). The development of Dissenting academies during the eighteenth 
century contributed signifcantly to educational reforms directeci more toward those whose 
cultural capital was (to be) acquired than those possessing it by birth and inheritance. By 
contrast with Church of England institutions such as the established public schools of Eton. 
HarrowT and so on, and the élite universities of Oxford and Cambridge, Dissenting 
academies such as Warrington and Daventry blended 'canonical Classical studies with 
'useful' and 'modern' subjects such as geography, shorthand, arithmetic, and sciencen 
(Porter, English 163). Because of these schools and private-enterprise commercial schools , 
"boys fiom the middling orders were getting a more down-to-eaah and applicable education 
than in any previous cenniryn (164). And in at Ieast one Dissenting academy , studies in 
elocution were a part of this "applicable education." According to William Enfield, 
schoolmaster at Warrington and author of the elocutionary textbook The Speaker, leaming 
to speak and act in a competent, decorous manner was an important part of Warrington's 
educational program intended to f o m  'respectable charactersn able to fil1 'their stations in 
society with reputationn (The Speuker iii). 
The general concern in the eighteenth century with the standardization of English-not 
only its pronunciation, but its spelling and other rules of production and 
reception-constitutes an important context for the field of elocution. Sheridan, in particular, 
explicitly associated his project for reviving the ancient art of oratory with a concomitant 
focus on the English language in a refomed British educational system @y contrast with the 
traditional centrality of the classical languages). According to H. Lewis UIman, one key 
aspect of the process of standardking the English language in eighteenthcentury Bntain was 
"the codificarion of the standard in dictionaries and grammars" (26). These practices of 
codification constituted no less than a "growth industryn during the latter half of the century. 
Although the elocutionary handbooks attend to the para-linguistic features of language use, 
their attempts to codio systematically, in writing, these oral features of English usage 
clearly connect this enterprise with the general growth industry of linguistic codifications. 
Indeed, both Walker and Sheridan produced successfül "pronouncing" dictionaries along 
with their elocutionary treatises. I2  
The purpose and effects of this standardization effort reveal a tension between 
opening up the codes of polite language use to more people and reinforcing a new 
exclusionary standard. John Barre11 describes this as the "double valence" of standardization 
which "suppressed the political fieedorns implicit in the heterogeneous utterances of a 
multitude of native dialecu, but paradoxically . . . enabled access to a common language 
with which al1 British subjects could advance their individual fortunes" (Brody 55). Ulman 
stresses the former point by reminding us that the process of standardization involved the 
"displacement of other linguistic f o m "  (26) and that it was a culturally élite undertaking: 
. . . standardization was not a democratic process aimed at choosing a 
common linguistic form that would facilitate comrminication among speakers 
of different dialects and encourage wide participation in public discourse. 
Rather, the advocates and codifiers of Standard English belonged to an 
12These are Sheridan's Complere Dictionary of the English Language (London, 1780) 
and Walker's A Cn'tical Pronouncing Dictionary and Expositor of the English Language 
(London, 179 1). 
educated class and cultivated a standard reflecting their own linguistic fonns, 
communicative practices , and social privileges . (26) 
This cultural elitism is evident, for example, in Sheridan's comment that only the 'court 
pronunciation" of London, which is acquired by 'conversing with people in polite life" 
signals a sociaily respectable status. "Al1 other dialects," he writes, "are sure marks, either 
of a provincial, rustic, pedantic, or mechanic education; and therefore have some degree of 
disgrace annexed to themn (Lectures 30). 
But Sheridan also argues that a national educational program stressing elocution and 
English would help abolish "the odious distinctions s u b s i s ~ g  between different parts of 
these realms" (Critical Reviav 13 1176 11 : 160). As he explains in his Dissenation on the 
Causes of the Dificulties which occur in Leoming the English Tongue, 
The consequence of teaching children by one method, and one uniform 
system of rules, would be an uniformity of pronunciation in al1 so instmcted. 
Thus rnight the rising generation, born and bred in different countries, and 
counties, no longer have a variety of dialects, but as subjects of one king, like 
sons of one father, have one common tongue. Al1 natives of these realms, 
would be restored to their birthright in common language, which has been too 
long fenced in, and made the property of a few. (qtd. in MonthZy Reviav 27 
[1762]: 70). 
It would be naive, however, to assume that Sheridan really means "al1 natives"; in fact, as 
other parts of his work reveal, the rising generation that he has in mind are principally those 
capable of acquiring-if they do not already possess-the status and fortune of gentlemen.'3 
This specification c o n f i  my earlier point that, within the late eighteenth-century British 
social hierarchy , the opportunities for social mobiiity which the elocutionary field 
presupposes and encourages are not applicable to ail levels in society but confined to the 
middling and upper ranks. Given these limits, the example of Alexander Wedderbum 
illustrates the effectiveness of elocutionary instruction for enabling people of the middle 
ranks andlor of Scottish or Irish heritage to augment their cultural capital. Wedderburn, a 
Scottish legal advocate who decided to "seek his fame and fortune as a lawyer in London," 
13 See, for instance, Benzie, 15-17. 
was a keen supporter of Sheridan's project (Howell 156). When Wedderburn fust anived 
in London, he engaged Sheridan for private lessons in elocution to "punSn himself of his 
Scottish accent (Benzie 24). According to Howell, this instruction helped Wedderbum 
achieve considerable political success in the capital, eventually rising to become Lord 
Chancellor (159). 
The possibility of acquiring cultural capital through the educational project of 
standardization applies to its "advocates and codifiers" as well as its practitioners. Ulman's 
defuiition of these codifiers as a sociaily pnvileged class does not sufficiently indicate the 
rnixed backgrounds of these writers and teachers. For example, Samuel Johnson, the best- 
known dictionary maker of the age, derived his culnirai capital from years of hard work as a 
writer and scholar rather than fkom inheritance or from an élite educati~n!~ That Jobnson 
became such a leading figure among eighteenth-cenniry literati shows the socially mixed 
nature of the "educated classn of codifiers during this penod. Despite these differences, 
however, the advocates of codification were joined by the desire to 'fun (Benzie 11) the 
English language according to a uniform standard. 
The project of standardization can be comected with the eighteenth-cenniry concem 
for the development of tasteful speakers, writers, and readers, especially as this is revealed 
in Hugh Blair's belletristic rhetoric.'' Like Blair, the elocutionists wished to dernarcate the 
boundaries of "good sense and refmed tasten so that their readers might be enabled to 
"support a proper rank in social lifen (H. Blair 34). Although Blair described taste as an 
'4Johnson's father was a bookseller who experienced f i c i a l  'business troublesn (Bate 
11). Johnson was educated at Lichfield and Stouridge Grammar schools and subsequently 
attended Oxford for thirteen months as a "cornmonern (a rank below those of 'noblemen," 
"gentlemen-cornmoners," and "fellow-commonersn but above "battelersn and "sewitors" 
[OED 4831) @e could not afford to remain longer) (Bate 87). 
"Belletristic rhetoric in iate eighteenth-century Britain "was based upon the concept that 
rhetoric and related polite arts, pwtry, drama, art, history, biography, philology, and so on 
should be joined under the broad heading of rhetoric and belles lettres. Since these 
disciplines share a common interest in taste, style, criticism, and sublimity, they seek to 
instruct the student to become an effective pracririoner and judge in written and oral 
communication" (Golden and Corben 8, my emphasis) . For more on British belletrism and 
its French antecedents, see Warnick. 
innate or natural faculty "common in some degree to al1 menn (H. Blair 38), the problem of 
establishing a standard for good or refmed taste led to the arguments that taste, though a 
nahiral faculsr, was improvable through cultivation and that the m e  standard of taste was to 
be based on the judgment not of hurnankind in general but rather of "men placed in such 
situations as are favourable to the proper exertions of tasten (H. Blair 45). Primarüy, this 
description of the arbiters of taste indicates their social andlor educational elitism; yet, as I 
have already pointed out, this group did not necessarily exclude "menn whose cultural 
credentials derived less from their backgrounds than from their scholarship in the general 
fields of standardization and polite literature. This suggests the role of teachers and writers 
such as Blair not oniy in preserving exclusive codes of polite leaniing, but aiso in forming 
these codes for a new generation of young men of the middle ranks aspiring to higher social 
stams and in the process redefuiing the nature of refmed taste and polite society. 
Within belletristic rhetonc, the formation of this refmed taste depends as much on 
the ability to judge cultural productions appropriateiy as it does on the ability to perform 
them well. As Nancy Stmever explains, 
[tJhe ability to engage in pleasant and informal, 'polite" argument and in the 
argumentative deveiopment of moral and aesthetic judgment, "taste," 
constitutes a generai receptive competence. . . . Rhetorical discipline is 
reassembled as a new ski11 which is the duty, properq, and talent of a new 
social élite. . . . (qtd. in Wamick 3-4) 
While the elocutionary strand of eighteenth-century rhetoric focuses less obviousiy than 
belletrism on the construction and enforcement of this receptive competence, the 
presumption of a culturally developed refmed taste for discerning and judging the 
appropriateness of one's own or others' bodily performances similarly underlies the 
elocutionary project. And by codifying standards of tasteful conduct in their handbooks, the 
elocutionary writers contributed to the construction of the critical codes of reception through 
which "a new social élite* sought to distinguish itself. 
The elocutionists, then, were arnong the "advocates and codifiersn of standardization 
and the arbiters of taste in eighteenth-century Britain, but they were not therefore from 
backgrounds of great social privilege. Sociaily, the elocutionists tended to occupy middling 
rather than genteel or aristocratie positions. Sirnilady to Johnson and the Burney family as 
well as many other writers of the period, they profited from opportunities in the fields of 
authorship and education to secure cultural capital for thernselves while promising- students 
of elocution profits as well. By contrast with the world of courtly letters, Johnson's era was 
increasingly a "print culturen in which writers developed new identities as professional 
authors no longer dependent on patronage but instead on a broad reading public for their 
cultural and economic status (Keman 102-103). Catherine Gallagher in her snidy of the 
Burney family notes how 'publicatim was thought of as an upwardly mobile strategy" to 
acquire culnual capital-a strategy which the family exploited with considerable success 
(215-216). While the elocutionary writers and their works also illustrate this general 
strategy, the cultural value of their publications and their identities as authors is more 
specifically linked to the field of education and the academic marketplace. 
Their backgrounds of rniddling status are exemplified as follows: Sheridan's father 
was a well-educated schoolmaster in Dublin who sent his son to Westminster school in 
England for a tirne, but was forced to remove hirn because he was unable to continue 
fmncing Thomas' schooling there.16 John Waker left school early to enter "a traden to 
help support his family, and after his mother's death began a career as an actor before 
turning to his educational projects in elocution." Gilbert Austin attended Trinity College in 
Dublin neither as a member of the highest nor of the lowest social group: he was a 
'?homas Sheridan lived from 1719 to 1788. Of al1 the elocutionary writers, his life and 
works have been most fully documented and discussed. In particular, Benzie's The Dublin 
Orator and Wallace Bacon's "The Elocutiouary Career of Thomas Sheridan" provide 
detaiied treatments of his activities as an elocutionist. 
17walker lived from 1732 to 180 1. During his acting career, he perfonned at Dmry 
Lane theatre in London, under the management of David Garrick, and in the Crow Street 
theatre in Dublin, a new rivai to the Smock Alley Theatre which Sheridan had managed 
(WaIker began performing at Crow Street at virtually the same time Sheridan left the Dublin 
theatre scene). Though Waiker never became hugely wealthy through his labours in the 
"science" of elocution, they did enable h i .  to amass "a competent fortunen by the tirne of his 
death (Obituary, Gentleman's Magazine 786). However, at the time of vvriting Elements of 
Elocution, he distinguishes his own precarious f i c i a l  situation from the "leisure and 
liberty of affluence" (Elements xiv). In addition to Elements of Elocution, Waker's 
published works include The Rhetorical Grammar (1785), Melody of Speaking Delineated 
(1787), The Academic Speaker (1789), and A Critical Pronouncing Dictionory (1791). 
"pensioner," which was one class lower than the top class reserved for "sons of the nobility 
and fellow cornmoners who paid higher fees, wore elaborate gowns and were given special 
faveurs," but which was above the lowest and poorest class of students, namely the sizars 
(Robb and Thonssen XV) . James Burgh, €rom Perthshire, Scotland, attended the 
University of St. Andrews with a view to becoming a clergyman, but never cornpleted his 
degree and subsequently entered the linen trade, assisted by an inheritance obtained at the 
death of his brother.lg But as his biographer Kippis notes, "[iln business, however, he was 
not successful" (14). His failure at the linen trade in Scotland forced him to migrate south 
to seek opportunity in London, where his f ~ s t  position in the South was the relatively Iowly 
one of corrector of the press for a printer. From there, he becarne an "assistant ushern in a 
grammar school in Great Marlow, Buckinghamshire before establishing his own school at 
Stoke Newington in Middlesex in 1747. William Enfield came fkom a "poor" background 
yet managed to receive a good education within the growing system of educational 
establishments run by and for dissenters (DM?)." 
The diverse religious and regional backgrounds of the elocutionary writers further 
"~ust in  lived from 1753 to 1837. Although little information is recorded about his 
early years, in their "Introductionn to the facsimile reprint of the Chironomia Robb and 
Thonssen detail his education at Trinity College Dublin and his subsequent career as a 
teacher and Anglican clergyman in Ireland. The Chironomia is Austin's only publication on 
elocution or, as he prefers to cal1 it, delivery. He also published several scientific articles 
and Sermons on Practical Subjects (1795). 
'Qurgh lived from 1714 to 1775. The A n  of Speaking. published in 1761, was his only 
work on elocution. His other publications, which include The Digniry of Hum. Nature 
(1 754), Criru, or Essays on various subjects (1 766), and Political Disquisirions (1 774-75), 
as well as numerous pamphlets and contributions to periodicals, fail more into the category 
of moral and political philosophy. He also wrote an educational tract, Yowh's FriendIy 
Monitor (1756). These publications, combined wiîh his labour as master of his own 
academy, permitted him to acquire by the end of life "a competent, though not a large 
fortunen (Kippis 15). 
2%nfield lived from 1741 to 1797. He conmbuted to the elocutionary movement 
through his popular handbook, The Speaker (1774). Edield's other publications included 
sermons, prayers, hymns , historical writings , literary criticism. "natural philosophy , " and 
submissions to the Monthly Mugaine, the Monthly Review, and the A M S ~ ~ C Q ~  Review
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complicate their social profiles. Sheridan and Austin, for example, were Irish, while John 
Hemes and Burgh were Scottish, and other writers originated not from the cultural centre of 
London, but outlying regions. Walker, for example, came from Middlesex and Enfeld was 
from the Northwest of England. These cultural-geographic origins no doubt increased the 
elocutionists' sensitivity to the social distinctions effected by differences in vocal and 
physical conduct and helped to explain, for example, Sheridan's great popularity in 
Edinburgh, but it also opened them to some ridicule and charges of presurnption. For 
example, Howell cites Lord Campbell's sarcastic comment that Sheridan endeavoured in 
"his strong Irish brogue 'to teach al1 the delicacies of English intonation"' (158), while the 
reviewer of Hemes' Elements of Speech charges that "[ilt is, indeed, a bold attempt in a 
North-Brïton, to erect, in the capital of the kingdom, the standard of the me pronunciation 
of the English language!" (Monthly Review 49 [1773] : 274). 
Although Sheridan and Austin were both rnembers of the established Anglican 
Church, several other elocutionists belonged to Dissenting and other minority 
denominations: for exarnple, Enfeld, Burgh, and Hemes were al1 nonconformists while 
Walker, whose original background was probably a Dissenting one, converted to Roman 
Catholicism in mid-life. And John Wesley, the great populist Methodist preacher, authored 
a tract on elocution-which is ironic, given that writers like Sheridan were trying to inject 
some of the vitaiity that Methodists brought to their preaching into the reading of the 
established Anglican service precisely in an effort to prevent the shift of traditional Anglican 
congregations to Methodism. Although eighteenth-century British society tolerated religious 
diversity, exclusion from the established national church meant real social disabilities, 
especially of profession: "choice areas of the state, such as the [English] universities and 
civil office, were out of bounds to those beyond the Anglican communion," though in reality 
rnany nonconformists becarne "occasionallyconforrningn Dissenters in order to enter these 
realms (Porter, English 17 1). None of the elocutionary writers, then, boasted the social 
prestige and affluence of an aristocratie or highly privileged background, but they al1 
managed to irnprove their cultural and econornic status at least to some extent through their 
work as teachers of and writers on elocution. 
In general, their forma1 educational backgrounds were uneven but quite extensive; in 
their subsequent careers as scholars and educators, several achieved strong reputations but 
none enjoyed the prestige and security of university appointment. held by contemporary 
rhetoricians such as Adam Smith and Hugh Blair. Austin received the most extensive 
fonnal education, securing his M. A. from Trinity College, Dublin in 1780:' Sheridan also 
attended Trinity College, where he was awarded a B. A. in 1738. (He was subsequently 
awarded an honourary M. A. from Oxford following his lectures there on elocution.) 
Although the economic situation of his family was unsteady, Sheridan did enjoy a culnirally 
and academically rich background both because of his father's leaming and because of 
Jonathan Swift's close relationship with the family, a connection which Sheridan later 
claimed strongly influenced his interest in standardking the English language." " Burgh, 
as noted above, attended St. Andrew's University for a tirne, but never completed his 
degree, while Walker never went to university. Likewise, Enfield did not initially attend 
university though he did receive a thorough education at Daventry Academy under the 
direction of Dr. Caleb Ashworth as preparation for entering the Dissenting ministry, and 
later in life he received his LL.D. from the University of Edinburgh. 
In their subsequent careers , the elocutionists participated in the educational 
marketplace in several ways. Many of them worked as schoolteachers at srnail grammar 
schools, part of the "huge expansion" in school places that the cenmry experienced (Porter, 
English 160). Typically , the schools in which they taught and in some cases ran were 
21The level of Austin's education and scholarship is indicated not only by his two 
university degrees, but also by the breadth of learning evinced in the Chironomia and by his 
activities as an amateur scientist. A member of the Royal Irish Academy, Austin published 
at least three scientific articles in the Society's Transactions as well as one letter in the more 
prestigious Philosophical Transactions of the London-based society (see Chapter Four for a 
fuller discussion of these activities). 
*1n addition to being a close fnend of his father's, Jonathan Swift was Sheridan's 
godfather . 
U ~ f t e r  receiving his B.A. in 1738, Sheridan went against his father's wishes that he 
become a schoolmaster and instead launched a career as an actor and theatre manager in 
London and Dublin, although he later claimed that this decision was consistent with his 
long-term objective of becoming an educator of youth: "My Father's Employment was the 
Education of Youth; nor was he arnongst the least eminent in his Profession. As 1 ever 
esteemed that to be one of the most usehl and honourable Stations in Life, 1 resolved to 
make Choice of it for mine" (An Oration, 19). 
situated between upperclass public schools such as Eton and Winchester, and the emerging 
lower-c~ass chanty schoois. The school that Austin ran in Dublin was probably the most 
upper-class establishment of this group. Citing Taylor's History of the Universi0 of Dublin, 
Robb and Thonssen note that Austin "estabfished a school for the education of a limited 
number of the sons of the higher classes in Ireland in which profession he was erninently 
successful" (xv). Other elocutionary writers also worked as schoolmasters, though generally 
in less prestigious establishments than Austin's. Burgh, for example, ran a school at Stoke 
Newington in Middlesex fiom 1747 until his retirement in 1771; Enfield was "tutor in belles 
lettres and rector" from 1770 untii 1783 at Warrington Academy, a dissenting school in 
Northwest England that developed a high repuration; and Walker, afier leaving his career on 
the stage, in 1769 established a boys' school with James Usher at Kensington Grave1 Pits for 
the instruction of Catholic ~ 0 ~ 1 t h . ~ ~  ZS As Porter notes, the profession of schoolmaster in the 
eighteenth century was cypically a low-status service employment, well below that of (the 
relatively few) university teachers (English 91). And it was-like many other 
professions-open and unregulated, without the requirements of specific "academic training, 
exarns and paper qualifications, without codified professional ethics" (9 1). This openness. 
while it may have mitigated against the developrnent of a f d y  respectable cultural stanis 
for schoolteaching, simultaneously made the profession a space of opportunity. 
In addition to their work as schoolteachers, the elocutionists addressed the 
educational market through private tutoring , publication, and public lecniring . Sheridan is 
the best example of an efocutionist who developed a career as an educator without ever 
teaching in an established school, despite his indefatigable promotion of a national 
24Burgh's school seems to have been fairly successful. especially given that he moved to 
larger quarters at Newington Green in 1750 because of an increase in the number of his 
students (Kippis 14). 
=This was the same academy where Joseph Priestly had been "tutor in languages and 
belles lettresn fiom 1760 to 1767 (Howell, Eighteenth-Century 632). Enfield received his 
LL.D. from the University of Edinburgh in 1774. m e n  Warrington Academy dissolved in 
1783. he becarne rector of the Octagon Chape1 in Norwich and cornbined this with private 
nitcring in his home. The pupils he received at his house included Denman, who later 
became Lord Chief Justice, and Maltby, who became Bishop of Durham (DM). 
educational prograrn in elocution and his repeated cal1 for masters and establishments 
dedicated to teaching this artsz6 M e r  leaving his profession of actor and stage-manager, he 
developed a career that combined prolific publication with an exhausting schedule of 
lectures." 
According to John Feather, the expansion of the book trade in the eighteenth century 
was linked directly to concurrent growth in the educational industry (33). The elocutionary 
publications, many of which cornbined theoretical and scientific treatment of the principles 
of elocution with instructions for proper practice, took advantage of this market for 
educational books in two ways: as part of the growing made in "instructional manuals" and 
textbooks (Porter, Engiish 160; Belanger 19; Feather 34) and of the increasing popularity 
among educated members of the reading public in scholarly works of philosophy, science, 
history, belles lettres, and so on? How much economic capital the elocutionary writers 
accumulated through their publications is difficult to ascertain, especially given the nature of 
the eighteenthcentury publishing industry which. despite its rapid growth in the second half 
' m e  closest Sheridan came to opening his own school was following his campaign in 
Dublin in 1757 for support to open an academy modeled on the educational principles 
elaborated in British Educahn (1756). On Decernber 6th, 1757, he delivered an oration to 
the Irish "nobility and gentryn in which he described his plan to open an academy intended 
to teach the Irish student of respectable background how 
to make a figure proportionable to his Talents, in whatever Profession or sphere of 
Life he shall rnake his Choice, or into which his lot shall have cast him. Whether it 
be the Pulpit, the Senate-House, or the Bar; whether he seeks for glory in the Field. 
or prefers the quiet of a rural Life. (An Oraion 23) 
As well, Sheridan's proposed academy was to educate the student "in al1 the 
Accomplishrnents of a Gentleman to make a Figure in polite Life, and to assist him in 
acquiring a just Taste in the liberal Artsn (24). Despite initial support for his scheme, 
Sheridan's position as the president of the proposed academy was thwarted by those who 
claimed that an actor was unfit to act as its head. The Rev. Dr. Thomas Leland was chosen 
as the new president, but the academy remained open for only a few years (Benzie 17-1 8). 
"For more on Sheridan's career as a public lecturer and on his elocutionary 
publications, see Benzie . 
2 8 ~ o r  a discussion of the popularity of philosophical texts, see Price. On books of 
science, see Rousseau; Kemp; Knight, "Illustrating . " On history , biography , and belles 
lettres, see Fergus, 189 and Kaufman, 121. 
of the cenniry, frequently saw authors surrendering their copyrights to publishers for 
relatively small lump sums or sometimes no payrnent at al1 (Belanger 21). Sheridan, for 
one, strove to ensure the financial viability of the Lectures by soliciting subscriptions from 
people who attended their oral delivery. Further, the more substantial elocutionary books 
were not cheap, ranging from four shillings for Herries EZemenrs of Speech to rwelve 
shillings for both volumes of Waker's Elements of Elocution. As well, we know that by the 
end of their lives, Walker and Burgh arnassed "competent fortune[s]" (Gentleman's 
Mugaine 1807: 786; Nichols 265): in Walker's case as a direct result of his publications in 
elocution and lexicography; in Burgh's case, as a result of his authorship of moral and 
political as well as educational texts, and of the school that he "conducted . . . with great 
reputation and successn (Nichols 264). Prior to the publication of his Lectures, Sheridan's 
family experienced a "constant lack of adequate funds" (Benzie 22). However, this and 
subsequent publications as well as other enterprises such as "Attic Eveningsn of polite 
entertainment combined with a yearly govemment pension of £200 provided him with a 
cornfortable income in later years (Benzie 29)." 
Public lectures, which were "another new venture in free-market instruction" (Porter, 
English 164), offered another avenue for the promotion and instruction of elocution. This 
fonn of education-in which Sheridan, Walker, and Hemes participated-contributed 
significantly to the development and promulgation of the doctrines of elocution across 
B~-itain.~' It also allowed the elocutionists to capitalize on the commercial opportunities 
proffered by the growing "culture traden (Porter, English 239). Sheridan, for example, 
charged attendees at his lectures in Edinburgh one guinea per course of eight lectures while 
for an additional half guinea, they could subscribe to the forthcoming publication of the 
Lectures for half the price that it was to be sold to the general public. (However, the 
2%or a description of Sheridan's "Attic Evenings," see Benzie, 55-78. 
'('Between 1756 and 1762, Sheridan gave public lectures on elocution across Britain, 
including Dublin, London, Oxford, Cambridge, Bristol, Bath, and Edinburgh (Benzie 20- 
34). Walker's Elements of Elocution is based on two series of lectures which he delivered 
at Oxford. The DNB mentions that he also lectured successîully in Scotland and Ireland. 
Before publishing EZements of Speech, Hemes gave courses of lectures in Dublin, Glasgow, 
Oxford, and London (Kassler 504). 
published Lecrures ended up being sold not for a whole guinea but a haif guinea. which was 
the same price charged to the original attendees)? Michael Shortland explicitly links the 
elocutionary movement with the commercial culture of the lecture circuit: "in the mid 
eighteenth century, church halls, assembly roorns and market places in large cities and small 
towns throughout Britain would probably have received a visit from someone 
grandiloquendy calling himself a ' Professor of Elocution'" (639). In Shortland's view, the 
publicity generated through these lectures and presentations conmbuted significantly to 
rnaking many of the elocutionary treatises into "best sellers" (639). Indeed, the mmber of 
editions that some works went through (Burgh's the Ar t  of Speaking, for example, had seven 
British editions by 1792 and at l e m  four Arnerican editions by 1804 [Robb 351) testifies to 
their popularity . 
The cultural capital that the elocutionists acquired through participation in the late 
eighteenth-cenniry educational market did not include stable university affiliations-despite 
their aspirations to foster such connections-but it did include for several connections with 
scholarly communities. Both Sheridan and Walker, for exarnple, gave lectures at Oxford 
and Cambridge, a fact highlighted by Walker as a source of ethos in the "Preface" to 
Elemenrs of Elocurion. Herries, seeking the approbation of any person boasting university 
credentials, dedicates his work to al1 "the honourable and leamed members of the 
universities of Great Britain and Ireland" (Hemes, "Dedicationn). Although the fact that 
Sheridan received an honourary M. A. from Oxford indicates the institution's respect for his 
educational efforts, a cnticism of his pretensions to a university position in a contemporary 
review suggests how far he and other elocutionists were fiom achieving such status: "We 
fmd very linle in this Discourse," writes a reviewer of the lectures at Oxford and 
Cambridge, "either to applaud or censure: it being a mere declamation, calculated to 
recommend the study of oratory ,-under so able a professor as it is insinuated Mr. Sheridan 
would prove to be, if placed in either University, and encouraged by a handsome salary" 
(Month4 Review 21 [1759]: 167). 
Several elocutionists did , however, achieve 
 or more on Sheridan's subscription method, 
(1761): 390. and Scots Magazine 24 (1762): 481. 
cultural statu as members of forma1 and 
see Benzie, 35, Scots Magazine 23 
informal learned communities. Sheridan, for example, lectured in Edinburgh at the 
invitation of the Select Society (Benzie 23) and he was for a time a member of Johnson's 
celebrated literary circle. However, according to Boswell, their fnendship ceased after 
Johnson commented on Sheridan's pension, "'What! have they given him a pension? Then it 
is thne to give up mine'" (Boswell, Life of Johmon qtd. in Benzie 30):~ Walker, the writer 
of his obituary tells us, was "honoured with the patronage and friendship of Dr. Johnson, 
Mr. Edmund Burke, and mmy other of the most distinguished literary and professional 
characters of the agen (Gentleman's Magazine 1807: 786). James Burgh belonged to "a 
weekly society of some fiiends to knowledge, virtue, and liberty, among whom were several 
persons of no small note in the philosophical and literary world" (Nichols 267). And 
Gilbert Austin was an active member of the Royal Irish Acaderny, a learned society that 
combined interests in literature and science and that, like the London Royal Philosophical 
Society, published transactions of its proceedings. 
Given these features of the eighteenth-century educational market through which the 
elocutionists secured varying degrees of ~~1tUral capital, what can be said about the specific 
readers of their works? With the exception of Sheridan's listeners and readers, little 
concrete information is available about contemporary individual readers of the elocutionary 
works. However, based on general information about the nature of the reading public in the 
second half of the eighteenth century and on the nature of the works themselves, it is 
possible to make several safe assumptions . 
First of all, as researchers of the eighteenthcentury publishing industry and 
readerships show, there was a substantial increase in the number of books published and 
purchased during this period (Belanger 19; Keman 69). As well, the development of 
circulating libraries helped foster an expanding and increasingly diverse readership 
(Belanger 20; Fergus 158). Significifntly, this readership was not lirnited to the "srna11 
group of gentlemen" presumed by earlier writers such as Milton and Dryden (Kernan 69), 
but instead ranged from the lower to upper classes. However, as Jan Fergus argues, the 
popular assumption that "servantsn and "apprentices" constituted a major component of the 
321ronically, Sheridan had been instrumental in securing Johnson's pension some years 
earlier (Kernan 106). 
new reading public is not borne out by her study of Samuel Clay's provincial library and 
bookshop (186). She also notes that her study does not strongly support the "widely 
accepted cliché that the growth of the reading public in England during the last half of the 
eighteenth century occurred largely within the 'middle class ' (1 86) : 
. . . neither Clay's bookselling activities nor even his library indicates that 
the middle class had corne to dominate the reading public. Tradesrnen and 
women were a good deal more conspicuous as patrons of the library than as 
buyers of substantial books, but even as borrowers . . . they were not pre- 
eminent. Both as borrowers and buyers, traditional readers-the gentry and 
professional classes-remained the largest and most active group of customers 
served by Clay. (191) 
In his general conclusions about the provincial market for books, Feather largely agrees 
with this analysis, but he stresses the middle rank cornponent more: "book buying was 
essentially a middle- and upper-class pursuit, in which a small minority of the population 
made a disproportionate number of purchasesn (42). Discussing specifically the eighteenth- 
century reading public for rhetoric texts, ULman stresses that the kind of literacy this group 
enjoyed was not a "basic literacy" but rather one 'associated with the communicative 
practices of a socially privileged class, practices among which we rnight count philosophy 
and the discourses of belles lettres, the senate, the bar, and the pulpitn (28). 
The partial list of subscribers that precedes Sheridan's Lectures confhns these 
general conclusions: judging from the titles of the people who made up his audience, they 
ranged from the middle to upper ranks, including many professionais and a few members of 
the aristocracy (see Chapter Two for a more detailed discussion of this list). Although the 
elocutionary treatises clearly have a mainly male audience in mind (especially for those 
works designed for Young, not adult, sadents), women did make up a small but noteworthy 
portion of Sheridan's adult audience. Many of the femde names in this list rnay be from the 
specid set of lectures that Sheridan held for the "ladiesn in Edinburgh following his highly 
popular fxst run. Signifcantly . however, Sheridan rnodified these lectures to suit the 
different educational levels and narrower sphere of activity of his female audience: his 
advertisement promised to retrench al1 passages that called for an appreciation of "the 
learned languages" as well as those sections directed toward 'such only whose professions 
cal1 on them to speak in publicn ( S c ~ s  Magazine 23 [1761]: 390). 
In addition to the information provided by Sheridan's List of subscribers, we know 
that both he and Walker addressed learned university audiences who rnay well have made up 
part of their subsequent readership. For Burgh. Austin, and Enfield, their own young male 
pupils constituted a further audience for the instruction on which their publications are based 
and also , presurnably , for the publications themselves . Austin's pupils apparently came 
from the upper-classes; Enfield's work, however, confirms the significance of elocutionary 
manuals for the largely rniddle-class Dissenting community. As Feather notes, the 
dissenthg acadernies were an important market for educational textbooks geared toward 
practical and commercial subjects (34-35). The elocutionary manuals fit this category in the 
sense that they provided practical instruction in conduct that could assist the speaker in his 
commercial activities. Perhaps most significantly, the prices of the elocutionary texts 
precluded their purchase by the lower classes (for whom inexpensive newspapers, 
chapbooks. and broadsheets were much more likely purcha~es)?~ those without sufficient 
income to buy rnight have borrowed them ffom circulating libraries, but as Fergus' study 
shows, the lower classes did not constitute a significant part of library borrowers, perhaps in 
part because library membership was itself an expense (158). Further, the nature of the 
33~heridan's Lectures sold for 10s. 6d., Walker's Elements of Elocution (2 vols .) for 
12s.. Burgh's nie A n  of Speaktng for 4s. 6d., Enfield's The Speaker for 6s., Herries' 
Elements of Speech for 4s. 1 have been unable to discover the price of Austin's 
Chironomia, but its length and steel-engravings aimost certainly would place it at the high 
end of the price range for elocutionary manuals. Pat Rogers' and Kenneth Levine's 
summaries of book pnces in literanire during the eighteenth and very early nineteenth 
centuries indicate the middling cost of most elocutionary rnanuals within these general 
ranges: "As for book prices, they ranged from sixpence or a shilling for a pamphlet of 32 
or 64 pages. through 2s. 6d. or 3s. per volume for novels with about 250 pages in each, to 
5s. or 6s. for a long book. . . . Nine volumes making up Warburton's edition of Pope 
(1751) were pnced at 27s. the set. Books meant to make something of a splash came out in 
impressive quarto volumes, and would cost up to a guinean (50). By the beginning of the 
nineteenth-century, 'the cost of copynghted books was very high: a three-volume novel 
averaged 16s. in 1815, while a leading author like Sir Walter Scott commanded 25s. for The 
Lay of the k t  Mimtrel(1805) . . . ." -vine 90). The cheaper literature of "weekly or 
fortnightly part-worksn sold for as little as 6d. However, even cheaper books were "minor 
luxuries" which "mainly benefited the middle classesn (Levine 90). 
elocutionary texts themselves and the kinds of readers they imply make the educated rniddle 
to upper ranks the obvious audience for these works. 
By "implied readers," 1 mean the kinds of readers whom the elocutionary writers 
address through the rhetorical construction of their works. This is the "hyporhetical" 
audience "whorn the author wants to read and understand her textn (Glenn 59). These 
implied readers are likely sim.ar to but not identical with the actual or "flesh-and-bloodn 
(Glenn 69) readers of the elocutionary treatises. An analysis of the elocutionary writers' 
implied readers, though it cannot speciQ the "flesh-and-bloodn audience, can help us 
understand the kinds of people that the writers hoped would purchase and read their works. 
This analysis both confirms and cornplicates what we know about the actual readers and the 
histoncal context of publication. The remainder of this snidy will analyze this implied 
readership in detail as part of its exploration of the writers' rhetorical motivations and 
strategies for addressing their markets of publication. To introduce this fuller analysis, 1 
will sketch here the mai .  feanires of the " hypotheticaln audience addressed b y the 
elocutionary works . 
Most imponantly . the mix of genres found in Sheridan's, Walker's, and Austin's 
works implies a mixed readership. Partly theoretical-scientific dissertations and partly 
practical instruction manuais, these books simultaneously address two main groups: a 
culturally élite group of scholarly judges and a broader market of snidents of elocution. 
These groups correspond in general to the dual readership that Ulman identifies for 
eighteenth-century rhetorical treatises: "fint, a philosophical and cntical community within 
the larger culture, a community defmed by its cntical study of language and discourse, and, 
second, a broader community in which it became important to read, write, and speak 
according to standnrds codifed by members of the first groupn (32). Aithough the frs t  of 
these groups is smaller than the second, its culmral exclusivity makes it an important market 
for the elocutionary texts since its approbation will confer cultural status on the writers and 
theu productions. As Austin explains, in providing substantial scholarly authority to 
suppon his own ideas about delivery, he is looking for "the approbation of the liberal 
scholar" (vi) . 
' But Austin's treatise, he tells us, also is addressed to his current and former "pupils," 
whom he anticipates will read his work "with a degree of partialityn (xi). The students of 
elocution thus comprise the second significant group of implied readers. Though more 
numerous than the "philosophical and critical communityln this implied market possesses 
Iess cultural status than the former. The market of students can be divided further into two 
main components: a market of adult aspiring speakers addressed prixnarily by Sheridan's 
work, for whom the study of elocution is an autodidactic form of education, and the younger 
pupiis for whom Walker's, Austin's, Burgh's, and Enfield's books are designed. The 
implied audience of youthful pupils presumed by these latter works points to another 
category of readers, situated between the learned comrnunity of liberal scholars and the 
young students of elocution. This is the audience of potential teachers of elocution, the 
schoolmasters whom the elocutionary writers encourage to purchase and employ their 
textbooks. 
In addressing both the adult and youthful components of their implied student 
readership, the elocutionary writers primanly presuppose a male audience, though at the 
time of the publication of his Dictionaq, Sheridan argues for the instruction of "al1 children 
of these realms, whether male or femalen in the art of reading and speaking with propriety 
and grace (Monthiy Reviao 63 [1780]: 246). And, as 1 have already pointed out, his adult 
audience in actuality included a number of women. The presupposition of primarily male 
students d e s  sense given the main occasions of speaking that the study of elocution 
implies. These situations include the traditional dl-male forums of the senate, bar, and 
pulpit-what Austin calls "the great theatres of public eloquencen which he envisions his 
students entering "by profession or by rank" (xii). 
However, in addition to these traditional oratorical situations, the eighteenth-century 
study of elocution addresses new public and private occasions that correspond to the 
interests of the growing middle ranks and the formation of a new polite society. In this 
way, the elocutionary writers expand the potential market for their works by clairning that 
the study of elocution is significant not oniy for "the great theatres of public eloquence," but 
also for everyday speech in business and leisure activities. For example, James Burgh 
stresses that it is 
. . . of important advanrage for al1 that part of youth, whose station places 
them within the reach of a polite educaion, to be qualified for acquitting 
thernselves with reputation, when called to speak in public. In parliament, at 
the bar, in the pulpit, at meetings of merchants , in cornminees for managing 
public afiairs, in large societies, and on such like occasions, a competent 
address and readiness . . . is what, 1 doubt not, many a gentlemen [sic] would 
willingly acquire at the expence of half his other improvements. (164) 
Similarly, Enfield argues that the utility and importance of good elocution stems from its 
everyday nature in public and private spheres: 
Every one will acknowledge it to be of sorne consequence, that what a man 
has hourly occasion to do, should be done well. Every pnvate Company, and 
almost every public assembl y, affords opportunities of remarking the 
difference between a just and graceful, and a faulty and unnatural elocution; 
and there are few persons who do not daily experience the advantages of the 
former, and the inconveniences of the latter. (1) 
The inclusion of the pnvate domain within the scope of elocution further underlines 
the connections between beletrism and elocution, to the extent that both were concerned 
with cultivating tasteful and "innocentn forms of leisure and entertainment that could Save 
one "from the danger of many a pernicious passion" (H. Blair 35). To this end, many of the 
elocutionary treatises included selections from English and classical 'polite literature" (H. 
Blair 35) that the student practised reading out loud to improve his delivery. The study of 
elocution also contributed to the speaker's ability to converse politely in the private domain, 
an ability important for women as well as men aspiring to genteel status. 
Whiie the opening up of the occasions for effective elocution beyond the traditional 
situations of oratory addresses the commercial and social interests of the aspiring middle 
ranks in late eighteenth-century British society, this opening up does not meet with the 
approval of al1 readers. Perhaps expressing a widespread concem about the diverse ranks 
and types of people that the new field of elocution encompassed, the author of a letter to 
Lloyd's Evening Post and British Chronicle considers the spread of elocutionary snidy 
beyond the traditional domains socially inappropriate: 
I am a real fnend to an improvement in the art of delivery . . . . The Clergy 
will do well to correct, as much as possible, any defects in their elocution. 
The younger ones especiaily, and such persons as are designed for the Senate 
or the Bar, should endeavour to acquire, in early life, a just and pleasing 
manner of composition, pronunciation, and action. But what reason can there 
be for the Ladies, and for Tradesmen, to run in shods to Sheridan's 
Lectures? Do Haberdashers and Mercers want to leam a better method of 
recommending the* wares to their customers? (10 117621 : 323) 
These cornplaints show that there was some resistance to the expansion of elocutionary 
study beyond traditional domains, but they also indicate the appeal of elocution to a diverse 
audience of middling status including "Tradesmen, " "Haberdashers , " and "Mercers, " and to 
"Ladiesn excluded from public speaking but not from the social art of "privaten conversation. 
The mixed nature of the readerships and occasions of speaking that the elocutionary 
treatises address indicate the mixed nature of these writers' entrepreneurial motivations: the 
larger market of adult and youthful students to whom they appeal suggests the incentive for 
acquiring economic capital by selling their publications to as many people as possible, while 
the more exclusive audience of scholarly, discerning readers whom they hope to impress 
suggests their desire to secure cultural capitaI for themselves and their project. In the 
following study, a more detailed analysis of this mixed implied audience will contribute to a 
fuller understanding of the rhetorical purposes, occasions, and structures of Sheridan's, 
Walker's, and Austin's works and it will help to explain the tensions and incongmities that 
these texts contain. 
CHAPTER TWO 
OPENINGS: STRATEGIES OF DISCIPLINARY AND 
PERSONAL ETHOS 
In publishing their treatises, the elocutionary writers perform rhetorical actions that 
sirnultaneously address and constnict a socially-historically situated "fieldn of "specific 
stakes and interests" (Bourdieu, Sociology 73). Their works attempt to defme the field of 
elocutionary smdy as a contextually significant space of scholarly and practical interest. As 
they attempt io secure cultural capital through these efforts, the elocutionists face the 
problem of making their "linguistic utterances" (Le., their treatises) acceptable and valuable 
to the particular Iate eighteenth-cennuy market which receives their publications (Bourdieu, 
Language 18), but which their publications also help to create. 
To understand how the elocutionary writers negotiate this problem, the subsequent 
chapters analyze some of the rhetorical strategies they use to shape their utterances "in 
anticipation of their likely receptionn (Bourdieu, Language 19). In this chapter, 1 look 
specifically at the strategies of ethos which the elocutionists use, in their opening sections. 
to negotiate the problem of disciplinary deconim as they strive to secure hcreased cultural 
capital for thernselves and their publications through the demonstration of the scholarly and 
educational value of their subject matter. Given the traditional neglect and devaluation of 
delivery within the discipline of rhetoric, and given their own rniddling stanis as scholars 
and educators, the elocutionary writers through strategies of ethos work to alleviate the 
po tential irnp ropriety of their rhe torical actions. These include the disciplinary imp rop riety 
of asserting the sigmficance of delivery by cornparison with the other canons of rhetoric, 
and the more general scholarly impropnety of presupposing that the sociallydevalued 
domain of bodily conduct warrants extensive, systematic enquiry . 
The classicai persuasive appeal of ethos ernphasizes the persuasive effects of the 
speaker's "personai character" as this character is comtructed and represented within a 
speech (I . Baudin xv) . An effective construction of ethos will make the audience inis t the 
speaker and therefore what the speaker says. In Aristotle's definition, ethos means 
esublishing credibiliry: "Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's general character when the 
speech is so spoken as to make us think hixn crediblen (Rhetonc 1356a). In this sense, an 
analys is of the elocutionisc ' strategies of ethos means examining the rhetorical moves they 
make to constnict themselves as credible, or ~ t w o r t h y ,  speakers. These strategies occur 
most saongly and most obviously in the opening sections of their ueatises, where they 
attempt to conciliate and gain the respect of their readers for their enquines into elocution. 
Aristotle's de f~ t ion  of ethos stresses the persuasiveness of stylistic techniques 
within the speech itself; Cicero, however, notes that in addition to how the speech itself 
depicts the speaker's character, the audience's goodwill may be 'won over by a man's 
merit, achievements or reputable life" (De Ormore 2.43). This distinction benveen what I 
would cal1 "internaln and "externain &os highlights the interactivity of the credibility a 
speaker or writer has established prior to the specific rhetorical event. and the credibility 
created through the event itself. Unlike the types of orators presupposed within most 
classical rhetorical theory (e.g . , important and well-known civic leaders or renowned legal 
advocates), the elocutionary writers bring to their publications less impressive and. quite 
simply, less well-known "external" characters. This phenornenon is attributable partly to 
their relatively unprestigious social positions and backgrounds, and partly to the effects of 
addressing their readers through print and within an increasingly print culture. To some 
extent, the practice that a number of elocutionisu followed of giving public lectures prior to 
pr inting their works provided opportuaify for es tablishing a public reputation ' external" to 
the printed text. This is especially the case with Sheridan, whose extensive lectures across 
Britain helped CO establish his reputation as the leading (though not always admirai) 
advocate of elocution prior to the publication of A Coune of Lectures on E~OCUZZOII. 
However , as Alvin Kernan argues, in late eighteenth-century culture the idea of a 
Iistening, public audience and of a private, reading audience are not interchangeable. 
Increasingly , author and reader become, at l es t  physically, isolated from each other 
(Keman 220-221). From the point of view of the persuasive appeal of ethos, this means 
that the character of the writer consûucted within the text itself gains prominence. 
Similarly, while actual "flesh-and-blood" (Glenn 69) readers ultimately determine the 
success of the elocutionary writers' appeals, each writer's "internaln characterization of the 
kinds of readers to whom he addresses his words contributes strongly to the credibility and 
persuasiveness of his unerance. This is because such characterizations not only anticipate 
but in part d e  his audience and market, in the sense that Kernan argues Samuel Johnson's 
"commen reader is not just a reflection of an actuai historical audience of readersn but an 
"audience-making " technique (234). However , the relative isolation of flesh-and-blood 
author from flesh-and-blood reader in the Iate eighteenth-century context of a rapidly 
expanding reading public means that the audiences whorn the elocutionary writers address 
are more diverse and less predictable than, for example, in the situations of classical oratory 
or of "counly lettersn (Kernan 4). The writers' sense of the diversity of their actual readers 
is demonstrated by the mixed profdes of their implied readers that they constnict, profiles 
which partially predict and shape the actual consumers of their texts. 
The distinction between oral and print delivery constitutes one notable difference 
between the typical context of classical ethos and that of the elocutionary treatises. But the 
genres differ in other ways as well. Although Sheridan's treatise does contain strong 
deliberative elements, the elocutionary works cannot be classified according to the three 
principal class ical genres of deliberative, forensic, and ceremonid oratory . Rather, the 
works that 1 am analyzing (as 1 have aiready discussed in Chapter One) tend to combine the 
genres of academic-scientific treatise and instruction manual. This heterogeneous genre, 
which irnplies a rnixed target readership ranging from "the most liberal and enlightened 
persons in the different professionsn (Austin, Chiroriomia xiii) to young pupils, introduces a 
complexity to the forms of ethos constructed in the opening sections of the elocutionary 
works. Because the writers' cultural aspirations cause them to 'look forward with 
cons iderable anxiety to the judgmentn of enlightened scholars (Austin, Chironornia xiii) , 
they must create an erhos that simultaneously asserts the high scholarly value of their field 
but does not indecorously overstate the academic worth of their individual productions nor 
overtly disrupt the disciplinary hierarchy of rhetoric in which delivery figures as the fifth of 
five parts. This appeal to an academicaily prestigious readership of "enlightenedn judges 
dominates the opening sections of the treatises, but it is internvined with a more muted 
appeal to potential users who must be convinced of the practical value of the elocutionary 
publications in helping them to overcome their weaknesses as public speakers. The 
contextual reality of this tension between the scholarly and practical significance of 
elocutionary study is indicated by the following comments contained in a review of John 
Rice's The A n  of Reading (1765): 
. . . we must be permittecl to Say, that we do not hold the art of oral delivery 
in so low an estimation as the learned sometimes affect to do. A proper and 
expressive mode of delivery , whether in speaking or reading , is a polite, if 
not a scholastic accomplishment; and, though it be not necessarily 
accompanied with profound erudition, it is not altogether so superficial and 
insignificant as is irnagined. (Monrhly Review 32 [1765]: 445) 
In terms of the standard classical form of oration, the persuasive appeal of ethos is 
particularly important in the exordium or "introduction to the subject on which the orator 
has to speak" (Quintilian 4.1.1 .). The key function of the erordium, according to 
Quintilian, is "to prepare our audience in such a way that they will be disposed to lend a 
ready ear to the rest of Our speech" (4.1 3. To the extent that one way of making the 
audience receptive is by giving it "a good impression of your character" (Aristotle 3.1415b), 
strategies of ethos obviously play an important part in the introduction. But, as 1 shail 
argue, the construction of ethos in the opening sections of the elocutionary treatises occurs 
primarily through the writers' efforts to establish the credibility of their subject matter or 
field of enquiry . These efforts, which 1 label "disciplinary ethos," correspond to the 
exordium's function of making the audience attentive by showing the importance of the 
matter the speaker is addressing, as well as its relevance to the audience (Aristotle 3.1415b). 
By contrast, the construction of each writer's personal ethos tends. especially in 
Walker's and Austin's cases, to take place more within their introductory narratives about 
their own processes of composition and motivations for writing. In a sense, these narratives 
correspond to the classical part of the mrratio or statement of the case. As James Kinneavy 
and Susan Warshauer explain, 
The ethos of the speaker is also strengthened indirectiy by a speech's 
organization and use of narrative, since 'the narrative should be of moral 
character, and in fact it will be so, if we know what effects this. One thing is 
to make clear Our moral purpose; for as is the moral purpose, so is the 
character, and as is the end, so is the moral purpose" ([Aristotle] 3.1417a). 
Aristotle conceives of the narrative as either part of or immediately-following 
the introduction, and these are, indeed, the most apt places to emphasize the 
ethical character of the s p k e r .  The end of the speech is too late to establish 
ethos because by then the audience will have already formed a judgment 
about the speaker's character. ( b e a v y  and Warshauer 181) 
Rather than clearly following after the exordia, the elocutionists' narratives of their 
composing processes-which ernphasize their moral purposes and diligent nature-weave 
through their introductions and hence occur as part of their opening attempts to make 
readers receptive to their utterances. 
Thus, the introductory sections of the elocutionary treatises work to defuse the 
suspect disciplinary character of elocution by constructing it as a legitimate field of enquiry. 
The personal characters of the writers depend on and emerge fiom the larger disciplhary 
ethos of elocution-in this sense, the writers present themselves and their publications as 
"representatives of a disciplinen (Cahn 64). However, the modest, even deferential identities 
that their narratives constmct also counterbalance the potential presumptuousness of the 
grand claims they make about the scholarly and educational importance of the field of 
elocution. The differences between the forms and effects of disciplinary and personal ethos 
in the opening sections at once create instabilities in the elocutionists' representations of 
their subject matter, and they function to ease the problem of making their field of study 
socially acceptable and respectable within their market. In particular, the different strategies 
of ethos address the problem of the writers claiming too much cultural capital for themselves 
and hence opening themselves to the charge of cacozelia (Kaster 9). 
Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson's discourse model of politeness offers a 
useful framework for understanding the structures and relationships of these two forms of 
ethos. Working fiom the assurnption that many common speech acts contain potential 
threats to the 'face" ("the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself") 
(61) of the speaker andlor hearer, Brown and Levinson identiS, a series of linguistic 
politeness strategies which speakers typically use to diminish or redress these threats. The 
two basic forms of "positiven and "negativen politeness in their model correspond, 1 suggest, 
to the dominant strategies of disciplinary and persona1 ethos enacted by the elocutionists. 
The t e m  "positiven and "negative" derive fiom the concepts of "positiven and "negativen 
face. Essentially, positive face refers to a person's desire for approval and appreciation by 
others, while negative face means the desire to maintain "personal preservesn by being free 
of imposition fiom others (61-62). 
Strategies of positive politeness, therefore, generally operate through what Kenneth 
Burke would cal1 a rheroric of "identification" (Magnusson 397): speakers diminish the 
threat of their actions by claiming cornmon ground or uconsubstantialityn (Rhetorîc of 
Motives 2 1) with their hearers , for example by presupposing and indicating that the speaker 
and hearer share the same desires and values, by using "in-group identity markers" that 
stress cornmon membership in a group or category, by offering the listener rnaterial goods 
or other gifts, and by showing the speaker's interest in or sympathy with the hearer's 
presupposed concerns through the technique of exaggeration or overstatement (see Brown 
and Levinson, 101-129).' In the opening sections of the elocutionary treatises, the writers 
employ forms of positive politeness prirnarily to construct the disciplinary ethos of their 
project. For example, they presuppose the shared values of classical authority and of more 
contemporary scholarly domains such as the philosophical-psychological study of human 
nature and grammatical-linguistic enquiries; they consuuct "in-group" membership through 
the specialized languages of these fields of enquiry and through the patriotic appeal to 
British supenority; they implicitly or explicitly offer the study of elocution as a source of 
salvation for the communal deficiencies of British speakers; and, especially in Sheridan's 
'~ccording to Brown and Levinson, in-group identity markers inciude the use of 
familiar address fonns and specialized languages. For example, the use of a non-honorific 
form or pronoun (e.g. the French "tun rather than uvuwn) to a non-familiar or distant person 
makes a ciaim of solidarity between speaker and hearer, while the use of in-group 
tenninology-such as slang or jargon-can evoke shared associations and attitudes (107- 
11 1). Making an offer or promise, or acnially giving a rnaterial or nonmaterial gift to the 
hearer, further work to create familiarity and common ground between the speaker and 
hearer because they stress the speaker's good intentions toward the hearer (125, 129). The 
technique of exaggeration or overstatement can work to establish cornmon ground between 
the speaker and the hearer by showing the speaker's intense interest in or sympathy with the 
hearer's presupposed concerns. In their study of a Tamil community, Brown and Levinson 
illustrate this positive politeness strategy with expressions that use intensiQing modifiers, as 
in "What a fantastic garden you have!" and "How absolutely devastating!" (104). 
case. they tend to exaggerate the necessity and benefits of reviving the neglected art of 
delivery . 
Strategies of negative politeness, on the other hand, emphask the distance and 
differences between the speaker and hearer in order to redress the imposition of the face- 
threatening a ~ t . ~  For example, negative politeness employs tactics of indirection. 
irnpersonalization, and deference; it preserves the boundaries between interactants by 
avoiding the presumption of too much cornmon ground and by molli@ing any criticism or 
disagreement that may be present (Brown and Levinson 129-210). The use of hedging 
words or phrases, which inuoduce a sense that the speaker's question or statement is only 
partially or possibly me, in particular diminish the speaker's presumption of excessive 
common ground with the hearer's desires and values? The linguistic realization of 
deference, according to Brown and Levinson, occurs in two ways: the speaker humbles and 
abases himself or herself, or the speaker elevates the hearer's status? The technique of 
impersonalization-for instance through the agentless passive and the replacement of singular 
persona1 pronouns, such as "In and "you," with the impersonal "one" or the plural 
%en-further preserves the social distance between speaker and hearer by avoiding the 
'This corresponds to Burke's ideas of "division" and udistinctness,n which are the 
necessary counterparts to a rhetoric of identification. As he explains, identification 
ambiguously presupposes difference and division between people: 'Here are ambiguities of 
substance. In being identified with B, A is "substantially onen with a person other than 
himself. Yet at the same t h e  he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he 
is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and cowbstantial with anothern 
(RhetoRc of Motives 21). In a sense, this condition of separation, of "distinctness," 
exemplifies what Brown and Levinson cal1 "negative face." 
'For example, the indirect and hedging request, "There wouldn't 1 suppose be any 
chance of your being able to lend me your car for just a few minutes, would there?" 
exemplifies a high degree of negative politeness by contrast with the direct imperative, 
"Lend me your car" (Brown and Levinson 142-143). 
4For instance. when serving a meal, the speaker abases himself or herself by saying, 
"It's not much, I'm afiaid, but it'll fil1 Our stomachs," whüe one way that the speaker can 
elevate the hearer's status is by using honorific forms of address such as "Sir" or "Dr. " 
(Brown and Levinson 178-185). 
presumption of familiarity.' These general techniques of wgative politeness figure, 
alongside strategies of positive politeness, in the introductory sections of the elocutionary 
treatises, especidly in Walker's and Ausm's constructions of their own modest characters 
and discipliuary ambitions. 
Together, then, tactics of positive and negative politeness allow the elocutionists 
simultaneously to reach out and c l a h  disciplinary property for themselves, and decorously 
to disclaim-or at least qualifj+their full entitlement to this property by pointing out their 
personal inadequacies. The disciplinary deconim that they thus consauct for their project 
addresses the potential impropnety of their cultural aspirations and responds to the mixed 
profiles of their implied readerships. The fact that their opening constructions of 
disciplinary decorum are not wholly coherent indicates the instability of delivery's status in 
the discipline of rhetoric as well as the writers' own middling scholarly positions and 
credentials; it also reflects tensions and differences within the backgrounds and interests of 
their irnplied readers . 
To establish the ethos, or credibility, of elocution as a field of study in the openhg 
sections of their treatises, the elocutionists employ various forms of positive politeness. 
Most irnportantiy, they assert the worth of their new field by associating it with more 
established domains and "images of cultural authority" (J. Baumlin xxix): in particular, they 
identiQ their field with the authority of classical culture and of contemporary philosophical 
and linguistic enquiries. These positive, ocwionally exaggerated identifications, which 
address primarily a market of "enlightened," cultured readers, paradoxically permit the 
elocutionists to claim a distinctive disciplinary space for their own field which they boldly 
proffer as a cure for national deficiencies in public speaking. 
'~n example of an agentless passive would be "It is regretted that" rather than "1 regret 
thatn; an example of the impersonalkation of pronouns, 'One shouldn't do things like thatn 
rather than "You shouldn't do things like thatn (Brown and Levinson 197-202). 
Eighteenth-century admiration for classical culture, though ubiquitous, is complex 
and variable, ranging from idealkation of Periclean Athens and Augustan Rome earlier in 
the century to nostalgia for primitive Greece and Rome in the latter part (Butler 17). As 
James Sambrook argues, the tendency to refer to the whole of the century as the 'Augustan 
Agen is inadequate and misleading, but this does not mean that classical models and ideals 
were unimportant (Sambrook 208). For the elocutionary writers, the invocation of classical 
authority takes two main forms. First, in accordance with the rhetorical tradition as 
conceived in the eighteenth century, they argue for the validity of their field as one of the 
five parts of classical rhetoric. Second, they appeal to the glory of classical culture in 
general to argue for the importance of reviving this culture through the art of speaking. 
The significance of classical authoriv within eighteenth-century rhetoric figures most 
obviously in neoclassical rhetorics such as John Holrnes' n e  An of Rhetoric (1739), John 
Ward's A System of Oratory (1759) and John Lawson's Lectures Concerning Oratory (1758) 
which "draw conspicuously from Greek and Roman modelsn and reinstate the traditional 
five-part classical division of rhetoric into invention, arrangement, style, memory, and 
delivery (Goodwin 28). But even in the so-called 'new rhetoric" (Howell, British 441) of 
writers such as Hugh Blair and George Campbell, which diverge from the classical 
formulation of rhetorical theory in noteworthy ways, classical authority retains an important 
statu and continues to play a significant role. James Golden and Edward Corbett describe 
these rhetorics as a "response to the classical tradition" which "endorsed some ideas but 
modified and rejected othersn (8, 1 2 ) ~ ~  Like the 'newn rhetoricians of eighteenth-century 
Scotland, the elocutionists endorse and modify the classical tradition. In arguing for the 
snidy of delivery as a valuable contemporary field, they c m  draw on the neoclassical 
disciplinary representation of the five parts of rhetoric while also benefitting from a 
disciplinary ethos supportive of new approaches to the study of rhetoric. However, to 
preserve disciplinary decorum, the elocutionists present the importance of the neglected fifth 
6For further discussion of what Blair and Campbell endorsed, modified, and rejected 
from the classical tradition, see Golden and Corbett 12-17. 
canon of delivery in arnbiguous terms, on the one hand stating its unequivocal primacy and 
on the other equating or subordinating it to the other four canons. 
Through the metaphor of delivery as a "branch" of oratory, elocutionists such as 
John Mason and James Burgh (whose elocutionary manuals were fmt  published near mid- 
century) claim the significance of their subject matter based on the assumption of the 
cultural authority of a classical conception of oratory. Mason, for example, begins his short 
work by stating that 'Elocution is a branch of Oratoryn (3). Here, the metaphor of oratory 
as a tree with various branches combined with the preposition "of" indicate a spatial 
relationship of possession, namely that oratory possesses or contains within itself elocution. 
In making this daim, the writer presupposes that his readers already accept and value 
"Oratoryn as a legitimate, desirable discipline. The classical origins of this discipline are 
conFrnecl by the chronicle which follows of its historical lineage in ancient Rome: "mt was 
much cultivated by Quintilian, and before him by Cicero, and before hirn by M. Antonius; . 
. ." (3). Burgh sirnilarly represents elocution as a 'branch" of oratory in his introduction, 
but he arnbiguates its significance by positively asserting, initially, that delivery '5s of the 
utrnost importancen but then qualioing this c l ah  by saying that this importance "seems 
unquestionable" (l), not is unquestionable (my emphasis). This small ambiguity suggests 
Burgh's uncertainty about the propriety of making excessive cl- about the value his field 
of enquiry. 
In the introduction to Chironomia, Auslln-for whom the ancients merit "respect 
almost mounting to venerationn (22Flikewise explicates the classical conception of the part- 
whole relationship between delivery and the larger discipline of rhetoric to justiQ his field 
of enquiry : 
The management of the voice, the expression of the countenance, and the 
gesture of the head. the body. and the limbs, constitute the external part of 
oratory; and relate to the personal talents and efforts of the public speaker, in 
like manner as the other divisions of rhetoric, invention, disposition, choice 
of words, and memory, relate to those of his understanding. (1) 
In this passage, Austin asserts the position of delivery as one part of oratory, and he 
identifies the "other divisions" which cornplete the whole art. In this sense, he irnplies that 
the status of delivery is neither greater nor lesser than that of any other part. However, this 
passage also establishes a different concepnial relationship between delivery and the other 
parts of rhetoric: in this figuration, delivery is one of only two divisions-it constinites the 
fust or "the external part of oratory ," whereas "invention, disposition, choice of words, and 
memoryn may be grouped together as a second part dealing with the internal operations of 
the "understanding." By making delivery one of two parts of the whole art of rhetoric, 
Austin amplifies its status; it represents, he suggests, a full 50% of the whole m. As well, 
his enurneration of the sub-parts of delivery (e.g., management of the voice, expression of 
the countenance, and so on) further increases the distinctive domain of this part relative to 
its internal counterpart. On the other hand, the relegation of delivery to the outside, to the 
"externaln world of the body, potentially diminishes its value by comparison with the 
privileged identification of the other divisions of rhetoric with the mind, or the 
"understanding." This devaluation suggests Austin's acceptance, despite his focus on bodily 
persuasion, of what Porter calls the "old hieruchies." Even though Austin seeks to "rescue 
the body from neglect or disrepute" (Porter, "History" 206), he does so in a way that 
characterizes physical delivery in the debased terms of the "externaln or the superficial. 
The second main argument for the credibility of elocution on the basis of classical 
authority ranges beyond the specific disciplinary issue of delivery's statu as one of five 
parts of rhetoric to the grander c l a h  that a revival of the art of speaking will reinstate the 
glory of classical culture in eighteenth-century Britain. This daim, advanced repeatedly and 
untiringly by Sheridan in virtually al1 his works, presupposes a market admiring of an 
idealized form of classical culture and, more importantly, one anxious to re-enact the 
ostensible glory of this culture within its own time and context. Appealing to sentiments of 
national pride, Shendan uses the positive politeness strategy of exaggeration to argue that a 
revival of the classical art of speaking will enable Britain not only to Unitate but to surpass 
the greatness of classical culture.' Although within the elocutionary works this argument 
'~lthough Shendan glorifies classical culture as the perfect mode1 for reviving the art of 
speakuig as an essential component of eighteenth-centus, education, his attitudes toward the 
study of classical languages is much more cntical. He advocated educational reform that 
would make the study of English, rather than classical languages, dominant. However, the 
manner in which contemporary Britain should snidy and teach its own verbal and non-verbal 
languages should, Sheridan argued, be modeled on the classical snidy of oratory. He 
elaborates these arguments most strongly in British Education and in A Dissertation on the 
supports the writers' claims about the value of their particular field, the general form of this 
paradoxical argument was common to late eighteenth-century European culture. Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe, for example, notes the "historical double bind" implied by Johann Joachim 
Winckelmann's late eighteenthcenniry view that "[tlhe only way we can become great, and, 
if this is possible, inimitable, is by imitating the Anciensn (Lacoue-Labarthe 236). 
For Sheridan, reviving classical oratory is essential to this process of making the 
British nation and its civic leaders "Uiimitable." Unlike Austin, for instance, Sheridan's 
association of elocution with oratory is so strong that he frequently seem to equate the two 
by shifting, without explamion, between using the words "oratoryn and "elocution." 
Because the equation is implicit, however, a precise accusation of inappropriate substitution 
is difficult to make. By associating his proposed program for the study of elocution in 
eighteenth-cenniry Britain with the idealized culture of classical Greece and Rome, he 
transfers the latter's greatness to Britain's future. This slippage allows him not only to 
authorize his project on the basis of its classical ongins, but to appeal to his audience's 
patriotism by affinning the ultimate superioriry of Bntain over the great cultures of Greece 
and Rome. In his "Introductory Discourse," he explains the value of the ancient "culture of 
the language of nature, the living speechn to the progress and "perfectionn of contemporary 
British society: . 
Their arts are essentially necessary to render the noblest discoveries in 
modern philosophy , practically useful to society . Their arts, are essentiall y 
necessary, to diffise those benefits thro' al1 ranks of people, which such a 
religion, and such a constitution as our's [sic], are in their own nature 
capable of bestowing. In short, their arts, are essentidly necessary, to our 
making a right use of al1 those blessings, which Providence has showered 
down with a more liberal hand, on this country, than on any other in the 
world. Now they had no arts whatsoever, in which they excelled us, that did 
not take their rise, either irnmediately, or consequentially, from the pains 
bestowed upon the culture of the language of nature, the living speech. What 
is there wanting then amongst us, but to apply ourselves with industry to the 
Causes of the Dzflculties which Occur, in Learning the English Tongue. 
same means, in order to attain the same ends? (xiv).' 
Far from displaying any hesitation, the hyperbolic style of this passage-indicated; for 
example, in its climactic anaphora, its repetition of the redundantiy emphatic phrase 
"essentially necessary ," and its use of superlative words and phrases (e.g . . "noblest," "dl 
ranks , " 'all those blessings," "more . . . than on any other," "no arts whatsoeverJ')- 
emphatically a f f m  the value of the snidy of "the living speechn for ancient and, therefore, 
for contemporary society . 
Sheridan's figuration of the relationship between classical and contemporary society 
stresses the proximity, rather than the distance, of the two. Both culnires, he implies, aspire 
to the same communal ide& and should be judged according to the same standards, though 
the precise name of these ideals and standards remains strategically vague. In this way, he 
transfers the glorification of the past to the present, in the potential of contemporary British 
oratory. His appeal to classical authority also feeds his audience's sense of national pride. 
According to Quintilian. this strategy of appealing to a "sense of pauiotism" is an effective 
one for securing goodwill in the exordium (4.1.7) and it is one which Sheridan empioys 
repeatedly. For example, at the beginning of Lecture 1, he claims that, for the British, 
"good public . . . speakingn is a matter of the utmost importance to the state, and to society" 
(1). But having associated the past with the present to effect this transfer of value, Sheridan 
inserts a distinction which pennits the value of the present to rise above that of the past, and 
which therefore allows his audience the satisfaction of perceiving themselves-at least 
potentially-as superior to classical culture: Britain, because of her superior religion and 
constitution, has the potential to exceed, not merely to match, the greatness and glory of 
classical culture. This greatness, according to Sheridan, is derived exclusively from "the 
culture . . . of the living speech." In this way, Sheridan further aggrandizes the 
eighteenth-century project of elocution and motivates his readers to lend it their support. By 
elevating the question of elocutionary study into an essentially 'serious moral considerationn 
*~n less  otherwise stated, al1 parenthetical references to Sheridan's work refer to A 
Course of Lectures on Elocution. 
%hn Hemes, in the introduction and conclusion to Elemenrs of Speech, makes a similar 
argument. 
(Quintilian 4.1.7) about how to make a right use of the blessings of Providence for national 
improvement, Sheridan allows his audience to conceive thernselves, if they support the 
study of elocution, as engaged in the virnious, selfless pursuit of enhancing the moral@ and 
civility of their sociecy generally, though he also appeals to the more self-interested, 
personal desire for irnproved social status. Support for the snidy of elocution, he argues, 
should stem from 'such powerfûl motives, as a sense of duty, of honour," but personal 
"promotionn also "is sure to attend even a moderate share of mentn in the art of speaking 
(1). 
The actual success of Sheridan's exaggerated claims for the value of the study of 
elocution in contemporary British society were, judging fiom the critical reviews of his 
works, only partial at best. Most reviewers of A Course of Lectures on Elocurion as well as 
his earlier works British Education and A Discourse Being Introductory to A Course of 
Lectures on Elocution and the English Language agreed that his general scheme to make the 
study of elocution an important part of contemporary education was "practicable and 
praiseworthy" (Critical Review 14 11762: 170). However, many also accused 
him-sometimes gently, sometimes not-of absurd overstatement about the alleged social and 
moral benefits of this study. For example, as the review of the Lectures in the Scots 
Magazine noted, 
. . . he is rather too sanguine in his expectations, and lays too great a stress 
upon the efficacy of declarnation. . . . He has studied the subject until he is 
grown warm in the pursuit. and kindles into a degree of enthusiasm, which 
sometimes humes him to the borders of extravagance. One would imagine, 
by reading these iechues, that he considers elocution as the consummation of 
al1 earthly perfection; and that even the virtues of the heart depend. in a great 
measure, on the utterance of the tongue. and the gesticulations of the body. 
(Scots Magazine 24 [1762]: 481). 
Clearl y, Sheridan's assertive and hyperbolic characterization of the po wers of 
elocution (or oratory) opens hirn to the charge of indecorous self-assertion and exposes him 
"to the ridicule of disceming readersn (Month& Review 27 [1762] : 202). Ulman, however, 
reminds us of the intentionally deliberative nature of Sheridan's own oratory as he publicly 
campaigned for his educational project (Ulman 158). Indeed, the initial oral delivery of 
these lectures should be kept in mind: as a practised actor, no doubt Sheridan delivered his 
lectures with ail the force and passion which he advocates for Britain's public speakers. 
Such a powerful style of delivery would have been well-suited to the hyperbole of his verbal 
text. In its printed format, however, the Lectures lack the persuasive influence of "the 
living speech" and hence Sheridan's words appear exaggerated and inappropriate. Further, 
these contemporary criticisrns are directed principally at the conclusions Sheridan draws 
from his premises; they do not take issue with his basic assumptions about the greatness of 
classical culture and its significance as a mode1 for eighteenth-century British society. 
6) Association with Contemporary Scholarly Pursuifs 
Although classical authority serves as the most crucial and prevalent culrural value 
which the elocutionary writers exploit to legitimate their field of study, the association of 
their field with more recent, 'modern" (Austin, Chironomh, title page) forrns of enquiry 
also exemplifies the positive poiiteness technique of asserting common ground between the 
writer's interests and those of his "discerning readers." The titie page of Austin's 
Chironomia demonstrates this tension between the representation of delivery as valuable 
because of its classical heritage and also because of its association with new scientific 
approaches in scholarship. Interestingly, this attempt to reconcile the old with the new 
reflects the mandate and composition of the Royal Irish Academy, in which Austin 
participated actively as an arnateur scientist. Formed in 1785, this society merged two 
previously distinct groups : the "Paleosophers , " who concennated on ancient learning , and 
the "Neosophers ," who focused on science and modern literature (Gilbert 227-28). In 
seeking the approbation of the cultivated 'liberal scholar" for his treatise (vi), Austin seems 
to have in mind the kind of Iearned community that the Academy composed, with its 
combination of interests in the ancient and the innovative, in literature and in science. 
Austin's title page immediately identifies his work of 1806 with a classical heritage, 
most obviously in his selection of the Greek term 'chironomian as his main title.1° Later in 
'O~eaning, for Cicero, "the law of gesture" though Austin extends it to "name die whole 
art of gesture and delivery" on the authority of Coelius Rhodiginus (xii). 
the 'Preface," he justifies the use of this title because it is "strictly classicai" and "of the very 
earl iest and highes t authority , " an authority defined through its dissociation 'from. the 
affectation of modern fabrication" (xii). This particular attempt to keep the high classical 
language "strictlyn apart from the low or affected "modernn vocabulary suggests that Austin 
presumes his community of readers have considerably more regard for the solidity of 
classical authority than for the insubstantiality of "modern fabrication." It also implies that 
Austin in general wishes to represent his work in terms of a purely classical ethos, as 
opposed to a modern ethos. However, the full title and sub-title of his work constnict an 
equivalence rather thao an opposition between ancient and modern: 'Chironomia; or a 
Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery : C o q  rehending Many Precepts, Both A ncient and Modem, 
for the Proper Regulmion of the Voice, Countenonce, and Gesture, Together wirh an 
Invesrigation of the Elements of Gesture. and a Nèw Mmhod for the Notation ntereof." 
Austin begins by  affirrning his work's classicd origins, but toward the end of his sub-title, 
the modern scientific representation of his treatise rakes over. Finally, he counteracts the 
presumptuous modernity of his "new method" by placing the title and sub-title on top of two 
Latin quotations, from Book 1 of Quintiiian's Imtitutio Oratoria and Book I I I  of the 
Rhetoricu Ad Henenium. These quotations, the first of which explains the meaning and 
importance of 'chironomy" and the second of which describes the magnitude of the task of 
expressing physical movements in writing, reaff-rm the foundation of classical authority for 
his modern "investigationn of delivery . l' But if the classical ethos takes precedence at the 
ouuet of Austin's treatise, the modern approachsafely fiamed by this opening appeal to the 
classical-becomes dominant later in the book. 
In the introductions of their treatises, Sheridan and Waiker more emphatically 
associate the study of elocution with the contemporary scholarly domains of philosophy and 
"The firs t quotation cornes from Quintilian's Imtitutio 1.1 1.17: There can be no 
justification for disdaining to learn what has got to be done, especiaily as  chironomy, 
which, as the name shows, is the law of geme,  originated in heroic times and met with the 
approval of the greatest Greeks, not excepting Socrates himself, while it was placed by 
Plato among the virtues of a citizen and included by Chrysippus in his instructions relative 
to the education of children." The second is fiom Rhetorica ad Herrenium, 3.15.27: "1 am 
not unaware how great a task I have undertaken in trying to express physical rnovements in 
words and portray vocal intonations in writing." 
grammar, respectively . These associations, which presuppose a communal recognition of 
the significance of the contemporary domains out of which the writers claim to derive their 
own preserve, helps to consmct the credibility of the elocutionary field. However, in 
creating a scholarly identity for the field of elocution, this positive politeness saategy must 
also allow the elocutionists to distinguish their exclusive disciplinary space. 
Sheridan opens his "Inuoductory Discourse" by situahg the study of elocution 
within the domain of "speculative philosophyn about the psychological and epistemological 
nature of human kind, a domain in which, according to Sheridan, John Locke holds an 
undisputed position of leadership. Given the common perception in the eighteenth century 
of Locke's status as one of Britain's foremost "intellectual giantsn (Sarnbrook 47) combined 
with the accessibility of philosophy to the "well-infomed reading publicn (Sambrook 46), 
this association seerns well-formulated to appeal in a meaningful way to a majority of 
Sheridan's readers. But having effected this authorking association of his own work with 
that of Locke, Sheridan points to a lack in Locke's scholarship, a lack which Sheridan 
intends to fill. Thus, his opening sentence confidently rehearses the "neo-classical slogan" 
(Bemie 35) that, "There has been no maxirn more frequently inculcated, or more generally 
assented to, than that human nature, ought to be the chief study of human kind . . ." (v). By 
wnting in the past tense, Sheridan gives this maxim greater weight because he extends its 
validity back in time, while the use of the passive voice and an expletive phrase increases 
the sense of his claim's objective, impersonal tmth. His paraphrashg of Pope further 
indicates that his implied readenhip is familiar with the "polite literaturen of the age. 
The composition of Sheridan's actual, 'flesh-and-blood" readership is indicated by 
the partial list of "subscribersn which precedes his work; it supports the view that they 
included people who possessed both the cultural capital of birth and social position, and that 
of education." These "subscribersn were members of Sheridan's original audiences during 
his lecture tours; by paying to attend the lectures, they became "subscribers" to his 
publication." As the reviewer of the 1761 set of lectures in Edinburgh notes, Sheridan's 
12~his  list contains over 600 names. but according to Sheridan "not less than seventeen 
hundred" attended his course of lectures (Lectures xv). 
13see Chapter One, p. 44 and note 41 for more on Sheridan's subscription method. 
course was "anended by more than 300 gentlemen, the most eminent in this country for their 
rank and abilitiesn (Scots Magazine 23 [1761]: 390). Judging fiom the names and- tities in 
this prefatory list, Sheridan's original audiences typically included a rnix of the rniddling 
professional and merchant orders with some members of the landed gentry and peerage, and 
ranged from the highly learned to the polite reading public. For example, the numerous 
titles of "Mr." and "Rev." indicate mernbers of the middle orders, while members of the 
landed gentry-fewer in number but still considerableare revealed by the titles "Esq." and 
"sir. n 14 The titles of "Countess," "Lady" and "Hon. Lord," which figure infrequently but 
noticeably, suggest the status either of full peerage or, at least, membership in the family of 
a peer . l5 
Sheridan himself seems anxious to impress new readers of his published lectures 
more with the inherited social rank than with the acquired cultural capital of his original 
audiences, since he feels cornpelled to explain why "so few m e s ,  of persons adorned with 
titles, or dignified by station, [occur] in the list of subscribers" (the reason, he says, is that 
the list is "utterly unsollicited") (xv). But narnes such as "Mr. Campbell," "Dr. Fordyce, " 
"Hon. Lord Kaims," and "Dr. Smithn probably indicate the presence at Sheridan's lectures 
of an irnpressive component of the eighteenthcentury scholarly and literary community 
whose cultural capital stems more from their "abilities" than their inherited social "rank." l6  
Finally , the names 'Mr. Burghn and "Mr. Masonn suggest the importance of Sheridan's 
14Many non-first born sons from the upper ranks entered the profession of the church 
because of the system of primogeniture. This means that their professional and economic 
status may have k e n  lower than their inherited cultural status. 
"See Donald Greene, The Age of Exuberance (53-55) for an expianation of the complex 
system of titles for the eighteenth-century peerage. 
'6[ am assurning that these names likely refer to George Campbell, James Fordyce, 
Henry Home (Lord Kames), and Adam Smith. This assurnption is supported by the fact 
that they were al1 members of the Scoaish Select Society, which was responsible for inviting 
Sheridan to speak in Edinburgh. Whether his lectures atnacted the same quality of scholars 
in other areas of Britain is more difficult to determine; however, we do know h t  he was 
"well-received" when he gave earlier, htroductory lectures at Cambridge and Oxford, 
though John Cowper, the brother of William Cowper, found Sheridan's discourse "insipid 
to the last degree" (Nichols, Literary Anecdotes 563). 
views for other eighteenth-century eloc~tionists.'~ In mm, the mUc of audience members 
shown in the prefatory list suggests a market for Sheridan's work that included bofh those 
actively engaged in "the critical study of language and discourse" and a broader communiry 
of those concerned with leamhg to speak "according to the standards codijed by rnembers 
of thefirst group" (Ulman 32). By situating the study of elocution within the culnirally 
prestigious field of enlightenrnent philosophical-psychological enquiry , Sheridan daims 
common ground at once with those who possess a sound, critical knowledge of this field and 
those impressed by but less leanied in this specialized discourse. 
If Sheridan begins his discourse by associating his own snidy with the prestige of 
Lockean philosophy, he subsequently distinguishes the elocutionary field from Locke's 
domain: Locke, he States, has successfully delineated one part of human nature (the 
"understanding"), but at least zwo parts ("the passionsn and "the imagination" [hl) remain 
unexplored. Thus, Sheridan divides the "whole" snidy of human nature into three parts, and 
he stakes out for himself at least one, and possibly two, of those parts (he clearly 
appropnates "the passions" as his own property, but he does not clar8y whether he also 
means to include "the imaginationn). Contradictorily, he fust comrnends Locke's work and 
then points out its limitations. Despite their apparent incompatibiiity, both these moves, as 
they occur in sequence, contribute to the construction of Sheridan's own disciplinary ethos. 
Importantly , the association of elocution with "speculative philosophyn legitimates this field 
more because of its theoretical atiention to the nature of human passions and imagination 
than because of it focus on practical instruction in bodily conduct. But according to some of 
his critics, Sheridan's opening attempt to situate the study of elocution in the realm of 
philosophy was pretentiously absurd and disregarded the important work of other scholars in 
this area: 
It is difficult to determine, whether vanity or absurdity is most conspicuous in 
what he advances on this head. To suppose, that the passions h u m  or 
dangerous to society may be suppressed, and that those of the nobler and 
social kind may be brought fonuard, invigorared, and carried into due 
''This is based on the assumption that "Mr. Masonn refers to John Mason and "Mr. 
Burghn to James Burgh . 
exenion, by any thing that language or Oratory can perform, while human 
nature continues in its present circumstances, is, certainly, one of the wildest 
notions that c m  possibly enter into the thoughts of the wildest enthusiast. 
What he says concerning those two other important parts of our 
interna1 nature, with regard to which the world is at this day, as much in the 
dark, as they were with respect to the whole, previous to the publication of 
Mr. Locke's Essay, is, to us, perfectly unintelligible. It is natural to ask-has 
Mr. Sheridan discovered any new faculties in the human mind? . . . Have 
the writings of Butler, Hutcheson, Smith, Hume, &c. lefi us as much in the 
dark, with regard to the passions and imagination, as mankind with regard to 
the undersranding , before the publication of Mr . Locke's Essay? (Monthly 
Review 27 [1762] : 203-204) 
hplicit  to this reviewer's invective is the view that Sheridan's efforts to establish elocution 
as a significant field of snidy would be much better served by focusing on the practical, 
instructive nature of his program rather than its "speculative," philosophical dimension. 
Walker, for his part, avoids Sheridan's grandiose associations of elocution with the 
whole study of human nature by claiming common ground between his area of enquiry and 
the culturally respectable discipline of grammar. The general eighteenth-century concern 
with the standardization and codification of language use, in which the study of grammar 
figures prominently, offers fertile ground for establishing the disciplinary ethos of elocution. 
According to Benzie, the elocutionists' attempts to establish and teach standardized 
pronunciation were part of "a new interest k ing  taken in language during the second half o f  
the centuryn (105). Along with the increase in texts on elocution during this period, 
publications on grammar grew dramatically .18 Indeed. Sheridan as well as Walker 
developed this dimension of elocutionary study at length, especially in thei. later, well- 
respected dictionaries of pronunciation. As Benzie notes, "the rapid advance towards a 
standardized system of spelling and pronunciation in English during the last years of the 
18"~ccording to Sterling Leonard, 'fewer than fiS writings on grammar. rhetoric, 
critical, and linguistic theory have been listed for the first half of the eighteenth cenniry, 
and still fewer for al1 the penod before 1600,' but the publications in the period 1750-1800 
'exceeded two hundred titles ' " (Benzie 105). 
18th century was chiefly due to the existence of Sheridan's D i c t i o m ~  and others like itn 
(108). I9 Waiker's dedication of Elernems of Elocution to the great dictionary-&er of the 
age, Samuel Johnson, shows a strong desire to associate this work on elocution with the 
larger project of regulating language use. 
Although the increase in grammatical and elocutionary publications may have 
occurred more or less simultaneously, the way in which Waiker characterizes the association 
of these two fields in Elements suggests the primacy of grammar as a recognized discipline. 
As well, his use of the specialized tednology of grammar to discuss the field of elocution 
implies a readership to whom this discourse is already familiar. In identifying the study of 
elocution with the study of grammar, Walker helps to develop credibili~ for his field but 
this identification drastically limits the domain of non-verbal delivery since it is necessarily 
linked, in Walker's representation, with the grammar of sentences. However, like 
Sheridan's sequential association and dissociation of his field h m  Lockean philosophy, 
Walker's explanation of the connections between g r m  and elocution is sufficiently 
uneven and ambiguous to imply a distinctive disciplinq space for the latter while at the 
same tirne decorously preserving eiocution's position as one part of the larger, culturally 
validated field of grammar. 
Grammar, Walker claims, is "the basis of rhetoric and oratoryn (1: 4). Nonetheless, 
the relative positions of elocution and grammar seem to shift in the course of his openuig 
narrative. His opening association of elocution with 'pronunciation" indirectly establishes 
the elocution-gramrnar connection, since elocution, he explains, refers specifically to 
"pronunciation of words, connectecl into a sentence" (1: 1). According to this definition, 
elocution consthtes one part of the larger domain of pronunciution (which includes the 
pronunciation of individual words as well words arranged into sentences). But then, 
incongruously, Waker claims that elocution 'may have elements or principles distinct from 
those of pronunciation" (1: 2), suggesting that elocution is not wholly contained within the 
larger field of pronunciation. 
Next, Waiker identifies elocution with "the art of readingn which he distinguishes 
'%en Walker's Crirical Pronouncing Dic t io~ry  appeared in 179 1, ir apparently 
overtook Sheridan's in popularity (Benzie 106). 
into two modes: reading in a grmunatical way and reading in a rherorical way. While his 
description of the latter clearly validates it above the fonner (rhetorical reading gives "force, 
beauty, and variety," whereas grammatical reading 'only expresses the sense of an author, 
so as to be barely understoodn [l: 2]), he subsequently daims that grammar, and 
grammatical reading, are foundational and necessitate f ~ s r  attention. Within the general 
domain of grammatical reading, the specific part of punctuarion requires greatest attention; 
however, punctuation, like reading, can be divided into two parts, or modes: grammatical 
punctuation, and rhetorical punctuation (1 : 4). A question arises: does Walker mean that 
rhetorical punctuation falls under the heading of grammatical reading, or does it fa11 under 
the heading of rhetorical reading? Or perhaps he wishes to mean both? 
In the remainder of the "Introduction," Walker simultaneously pursues the distinction 
between grammatical and rhetorical punctuation, and emphasizes the necessary connections 
between grammar and rhetoric. In the former case, he assures his readers, and in 
particularly the more learned members of this group whose scholarly approbation he seeks, 
that "it is far frorn rny intention to introduce a new system of grammatical punctuation" but 
rather "to make the best use of that which is already establishedn (1: 6). We might have 
expected him next to claim that it ir his intention to constmct a new system of rhetorical 
punctuation, as distinct from grammatical punctuation. Instead, he irnplies that "the whole 
doctrine of rhetoncal puncniationn (1: 6 ,  my emphasis) that his treatise will outline 
originates from the principles of grammcltt*cal punctuation. In this way, he reassociates the 
two domains, but leaves unclear the precise nature of the connections between grammar and 
rhetoric. Elocution and pronunciation, meanwhile, have b e n  lefi back at beginning of the 
"Lntroduction"; already lirnited in its scope at the outset, elocution has by the end of this 
brief chapter been reduced to a doctrine of (rhetorical?) punctuation. All told, Walker's 
articulation of the connections and distinctions between grafnmar and elocution leads to a 
disciplinary ethos that emphasizes the complexity and scholarly Iineage of his field of 
enquiry, yet that also severely circurnscribes its temtory and appears umecessarily 
intricate . 
This tension, 1 suggest, reflects Walker's aspiration to secure scholarly space and 
presiige for his work by decorously representing it within the previously validated t e m  of 
linguistic study and codification. But at the same tirne, Waiker needs to defme the 
distinctive contributions of elocutionary study to eighteenth-century linguistic scholarship: 
he must show the borders of the evolving order of linguistic regulation to be permeable 
enough to accept new undertakings in elocution, but these new undertakings rnust support, 
not disrupt, the primary order. Thus, Walker's narrative seems mainly to fit the field of 
elocution within the domain of linguistic study rather than asserting a whole separate space 
for enquiries into non-verbal eloquence . 
c) The Distinctive Gift " of Elocution 
By identifying their new and potentially suspect field of study with classical authonty 
and other fields of contemporary scholarship, the elocutionists construct a foundation on 
which to build their own "personal preserves" (Brown and Levinson 62). The positive 
politeness strategy of claiming common ground with culhxraliy valued sites of authority 
permits the elocutionists to assert the separate boundaries of their particular project. Their 
rhetorics of identification create space for tactics of distinction. The order of these 
strategies is significant, however: the opportunity to distinguish their field of study depends 
on their @or success in establishing its derivation from respectable origins. 
One important way in which the elocutionary writers defme the distinctive features 
and benefiu of elocutionary study is by offering it as the answer to the problem of national 
deficiency in public speaking . In this way , they employ the positive politeness strategy of 
offering the listener material goods or other gifts; as well, they show concern for the 
audience's presupposed concem about these deficiencies (Brown and Levinson 125-129). 
But offering elocution as the remedy for national deficiencies is a potentially threatening act 
because the elocutionists must assume an imperfect condition of lack within their cornmunity 
in order to justify the presumption of their utterances. 
The precise nature of this lack varies from writer to writer, but in general it has two 
dimensions. First, there is the disciplinary lack of theoretical investigation in the field of 
delivery. This lack is characterized primarily as a neglect of the classical canon of delivery 
within current studies of rhetonc, and to a lesser extent as an absence within more 
contemporary scholarly fields (e.g., Sheridan's c l a h  that only one part of human nature had 
been properly studied; Walker's argument that the doctrine of rhetorifal puncniation 
requires more attention). One result of this lack, articulated best by Sheridan, is that the 
British educational system is deficient because its teachers are not properly trained in the 
principles of elocution and hence students do not receive a proper education in the art of 
speaking. The inadequacy in this case resides primarily in the academic and educational 
cornmunity, the community of scholarly critics and codifies with whom the elocutionists 
wish to be associated. Secondly, the elocutionary writers identiQ a deficiency in the 
practices of British public speakers, especially by cornparison with the idealized models of 
classical orators. In this case, the problem rests not in the cornmunity of theorists and 
codifiers, but in the broader community of those who wish to speak "properly." 
By locating the cause of the deficiencies of British public speakers in educational and 
scholarly shortcomings, the elocutionists partly redress the threat of their accusation against 
those who desire the cultural capital afforded by the practice of proper elocution. The 
writers also dirninish the threat of their accusation by drawing on extemal authorities for 
this charge: for example, they cite or allude to Addison's and Steele's cornplaints about the 
sorry state of British public speaking, as well as those of other modem writers, to justi@ the 
charge." In addition, by presenting the charge of guilt as a cornmonplace, they presuppose 
that their readers are already familiar with it and take it for granted. For example, Sheridan 
does not even bother to cite extemal authorities but simply begins "Lecture In with the 
following statement: "That a general inability to read, or speak, with propnety and grace in 
public, runs thro' the natives of the British dominions, is acknowledgedn (1). Austin 
similarly refers to "the reproach of fngid indifference which is charged against Our public 
speakersn ( x i ) ,  though he backs up his clairn by q u o h g  the authority of Addison, James 
Fordyce, and Sheridan himself (6-8). Sheridan's and Austin's agentless passive 
consmictions further displace the authority for the charge away from themselves and into an 
unspecified, impersonal source. 
The elocutionary writers further diminish the threat of their accusation by 
characterizing it as a national, not individual, problem suffered, in Sheridan's words, by al1 
"the natives of the British dominions" (1). The snidy of elocution, therefore, offers a path to 
"~ust in,  for example, cites Addison Spectator 407, Sheridan's Lectures, and James 
Fordyce on the sorry state of public speaking in contemporary Britain. 
national improvernent, though we should keep in rnind that the community addressed by the 
revival of the art of elocution is not in reality all the "natives of the British dominions," but 
rather an exclusive group of middling to upper rank people for whom, at the least, a "polite 
education" is within reach (Burgh 5). This approach helps to make the writers' "gift" 
acceptable because it allows the audience to configure its interest in elocution as a selfless 
concem for the progress of learning and as the patriotic desire to improve the standards of 
British public speaking in general. As well, for those low on the scale of eloquent delivery 
(which, according to Sheridan, is virtually everyone), the principle of hierarchy encourages 
commitment to the ideal of public speaking at the top of the hierarchy, and hence an 
endorsement of the hierarchy itself. As Burke argues, 
even the dispossessed tends to feel that he %as a stake in" in the authoritative 
structure that dispossesses him; for the influence exerted upon the policies of 
education by the authoritative structure encourages the dispossessed to feel 
that his only hope of repossession lies in his allegiance to the structure that 
has dispossessed him. ( A ~ t u d e s  329-330) 
While the newly authoritative field of elocution characterizes the "nativesn of Britain 
as the "dispossessed" in terms of skills in speaking, this current dispossession is 
counterbalanced by an assertion of the potential for future repossession. British speakers 
currently may be deficient but through the study of elocution they have the potential to 
become as great as the classical models. Indeed, as we have seen in the analysis of 
Sheridan's association of contemporary and classical culture, the purported superiority of 
British society in areas other than oratory means that her citizens have the capacity not oniy 
to equal but even to outdo the consumrnate speakers of classical culture. In this way, 
Sheridan and other elocutionary writers make critical accusations about current practices the 
basis for a glorious vision of the nation's future, through the medium of a motivating ideal 
located in the past. 
The argument, advanced most strongly by Sheridan but irnplied by ail elocutionary 
wnters, for the importance of establishing a national educational program in elocution 
further suggests the instability, but desirability, of the "physical capital" that might be 
acqhired in this way. Bourdieu's concept of "physical capital," according to Shilling, refers 
to "the development of bodies which are recognized as possessing value in social fields" 
(127). This capital can in turn be converted into other forms of capital, such as economic, 
social, and cultural. But physical capital, unlike for example economic capital, "cannot be 
directly transmined or inherïted" (142). As well, although social class has a great influence 
on the development and specific forms of physical capital, it is not entirely reducible to class 
or rank. This rneans that each new generation must, to some degree, labour to achieve the 
physical capital appropriate to its position in the current social classification. 
While the elocutionary writers presuppose that some if not al1 their readers wish to 
increase their own physical capital in the immediate context, they also emphasize the 
signifcance of developing the study of elocution for the sake of future generations. This is 
particularly the case with Sheridan's lectures addressed to an adult audience who, he 
explains at the beginning, rnay be concerned about the establishment of a national 
educational program in elocution "either on their own or their children's account" (xv). If 
Sheridan is correct that this audience is anxious to set up the means for cultivathg polite 
bodily practices in their sons to ensure that the next generation's physical capital suits its 
economic and social capital, then his plan for a national educational prograrn warrants 
support. The comments of contemporary reviewers reveal the general approval for such a 
program, though Sheridan was never able to carry it out? More than a generation later. 
therefore, writers like Austin continue to produce isolated guides to the study of delivery 
emerging out of their own teaching practices, not out of a standardized, national prograrn. 
The difference between what the contemporary study of rhetoric should, ideally, 
include and what it, in fact, neglects, together with the resulting gap between what British 
speakers. ideally, could be and what they, in fact, are, create a space for the field of 
elocution and its distinctive educational "gift." Thus, by strategically identiQing theu 
emerging enquiries with established, authorkitive fields of scholarship, the elocutionists 
mark a new space for themselves within eighteenth-centwy scholarship and hence work to 
fulfil their cultural aspirations. Necessarily, the naming of this new temtory reconfigures 
the established disciplinary order, though not to the extent of wholly subverting it. With the 
21For comments on the usefulness of Sheridan's plan, see The Critical Review 14 (1762): 
170; Lloyàs Evening Post and British Chronicle 10 (1762): 322; Monthly Caralogue 13 
(1761): 161; Monthlj Review 27 (1762): 69; Monthlj Review 27 (1762): 201; Scors 
Magazine 24 (1762): 60 1. 
exception of Sheridan, the elocutionists represent their undertakings as parts which 
conmbute to larger, pre-established uwholesn and they avoid the presumption of positively 
privileging delivery , or elocution, above other parts. Like the individual statu aspirant to 
whom their handbooks appeal, they aspire as a group to disciplinary credibility by becoming 
incorporated within, and at the same t h e  preserving, culturdly-valued structures. 
In addition to shaping the credibility of their general field of enquky, the opening 
sections of the elocutionary treatises enact what 1 cal1 a persona1 ethos: an ethos based on 
the character of the individual &ter and his work. By contrast with the prominence of 
positive, presumptive tactics in the construction of their communal, disciplinary ethos, 
tactics of negative politeness take precedence in the creation of their personal ethos. This 
ethos is most noticeable in the introductory parts of Waker's and Austin's texts; Sheridan, 
by contrat, does not display tactics of deference and modesty and, as we have seen, 
contemporary critics judged him guilty of excessive assertion. In general, Sheridan 
confiates his personal ethos with the disciplinary ethos by elevating his individual credibility 
into the larger, presupposed credibility of the general field of enquiry . For Waiker and 
Austin, however, tactics of deference, indirection, and qualification counterbalance the 
assertive daims that they make about the value of elocution as a general field of enquiry. 
By characterizing their individual works as possessing limited value within the larger, newly 
established discipline of elocution, they diminish the threat of thei. actions. Despite their 
positive c l a h  that elocution is an important and even necessary field of study for 
eighteenth-cenniry British society, for the most part they avoid the indecorous self-assertion 
that their own particular works fully meet the ideals that inform their disciplinary erhos. 
The construction of theû personal ethos enacts the traditional features of modesty 
and deference recommended by classical rhetoricians for establishing the speaker's good 
character in the erordium. As Quintilian explains, "even in a case where there is no room 
for doubt the confidence of the speaker should not reveal itself too openly. For as a rule the 
judge dislikes self-confidence in a pleader, and conscious of his rights tacitly demands the 
respecthl deference of the oratorn (4.1.55). While the elocutionists are not literdiy situated 
in a corn of law pleading before a judge, they are figuratively placed before an implied set 
of judges whose approval they seek. Austin's opening phrase, for example, immediately 
introduces this situation: his work, he writes, is "here submitted to the judgement of the 
publicn (iii), though shoaly afterward the nature of the particular members of this "public" 
whose approbation he most desires becomes clarified through reference to the figure of the 
"liberai scholarn (vi). If the elocutionary writers can please the latter kind of superior judge. 
then the approval of the wider reading public should follow because being likened to such a 
figure is flattering. But given the culturally desirable nature of the idealized "Iiberal 
scholar," Walker and Austin are careful not to display an excessive self-confidence that will 
impinge on "the rights" of the judge. 
If the construction of personai ethos tends to downplay the fuial value or success of 
the elocutionary publications, Walker and Austin do not simply present their work in this 
negative light. Rather, they introduce a distinction between the representation of their final 
producl and the description of their processes of composition that leads up to these products. 
This distinction allows them to validate in a more positive manner at least one dimension of 
their work. By narrating their processes of composition, they present the reader with an 
unusual "statement of the casen-a statement intended to demonstrate the laudability of the 
persona1 intentions and industriousness which act as the relevant background to the 
publications their readers are about to peruse. They thus make a case for the value of their 
work based as much, if not more, on the value of their processes of production as on the 
actual productions themselves. In particular, they validate these processes based on the 
personal virtue of diligence (as Austin explains, "1 tmst 1 shaii be found to have done as 
much as will prove my diligencen [v]), as well as their intention to provide practical or 
useful works. By focusing on these values, rather than the theoretical. scholarly ment of 
the f m  productions, Waiker and Austin increase the distance between themselves as 
cultural aspirants and their implied distinguished audience of scholarly judges. Ironically, 
this distance establishes a greater proximity and homology between the characters of the 
writers and those of the implied student-users of their handbooks. 
a) Pmcess of Composition 
In anempting to secure the audience's goodwill and respect by narrating their 
processes of composition (and thus providing a kind of narrutiu to their subsequent 
demonstrations of elocution), Wallcer and Austin foreground the personal trait of diligentia. 
Diligentia, according to Richard Enos and Karen Schnakenberg, constitutes one of three 
essential character traits that together fonn the Ciceronian conception of ideal erhos or 
dignitas (201). The other traits are ingeniwn and prudentia. Diligentia results from the 
synthesis of a speaker's "passion, industry , and sense of duty :" passion or intensity of 
feeling toward a cause combined with industry in pursuing that cause reveal a rhetor's sense 
of oficim, or duty (200-201). In particular, Waiker and Austin highlight the sub-trait of 
Nidustiy, a characteristic that also foreshadows the nature of the ideal student of elocution. 
Along with their diligence, the elocutionary writers stress their laudable intention to produce 
works that are useful and practical, a goal related to the importance of these texts as 
practical handbooks for aspiring speakers, not only as scholarly or theoretical disquisitions. 
This tension between the texts' academic efhos and the practical, user-oriented ethos 
surfaces in the difference between the logic of the writers' narratives of disciplinary origins 
and the chronology of their narratives of personal composition. 
For example, Wallcer's opening narrative of his cornposing process for Elemenrs of 
Elocuriun consmcts a personal ethos that emphasizes the trait of diligentia dong with his 
intention to produce a work of great practical utility. His description of his initial 
motivations for devising his system of elocution stresses his sense of duty to the original 
audience for his lectures that formed the basis for his current publication. He situates the 
origins of his work in an extemal "invitation" from "the Heads of Housesn at Oxford to give 
private lectures in their colleges. The language in which he describes his response to this 
"flattering invitation" represents him as energetic, hard-working, and conscientious: 
So flattering an invitation made me extremely anxious to preserve the 
favourable impression I had made, and this put me upon throwing the 
instruction I had to convey into something that had the appearance of a 
system. Those ody, who are thoroughly acquainted with the subject, can 
conceive the labour and perplexity in which this task engaged me: it was not 
a florid harangue on the advantages of good Reading tbat was expected from 
me, but some plain practical rules in a scholastic and methodical fom, that 
would convey real and useful instruction. (1 : vii-viii) 
Rather than being self-motivated, Walker here decorously figures himself as responding to 
the expectations of others, who through their leading positions at Oxford boast a 
significantly more prestigious stams thm he does. No wonder Waiker represents himself as 
anxious to meet their expectations. In a subtle way, he performs the negatively polite tactic 
of humbling himself while acknowledging the status of his original audience. In addition to 
pleasing his superior audience, however, this invitation affords Waiker an oppominity to 
increase his own stature by preserving "a favourable impression." In this way, Walker 
recognizes that his desire to please those above hirn also may function to irnprove his 
personal situation; as well, his reference to this invitation and to his efforts to create a 
"favourable impression" on nis prestigious original audience funcrion to impress the readers 
of his published treatise. 
The anxiety that Walker describes indicates the precariousness of the "favourable 
impression" he both wished and wishes to cultivate. This impression, he suggests, could 
only be maintained through great diligence directed toward the production of a tnily useful, 
practical system of elocution. One way in which he atternpts to distinguish his efforts, and 
hence himself, is by dissociating his work fkom the "florid haranguesn of preceding 
elocutionists. By contrast with these "harangues," Walker's system is intended to provide 
"real" instruction. In this hierarchy of values (a hierarchy which Waiker presumes his 
readers share), "realn instruction may be equated with what is "methodical" and therefore 
"useful. " Though he does not name Sheridan directly , the allusion is clear. However, for 
all that Walker wishes to distinguish himself and his work fkom Sheridan's "florid 
harangues, " these promotional harangues laid essential groundwork for later elocutionary 
writers . 
The remainder of Walker's 'Prefacen narrates the stages of his process of 
composition, a process which he renders as a difficult journey of labour and discovery. 
Initially , this journey leads him through the chaotic maze of "a thousand puuling 
distinctionsn to the discovery of the single, "precise and d e f ~ t e n  distinction of the bpward 
and downward sliden (1: x) on which to found his whole system of elocution. Once 
discovered, this distinction provides a stable ground on which to begin the second main 
stage of labour, that of constructing the new system: "Here then commenced my system; 
infinite were the difficulties and obscurities that impeded my progress at fust, but 
perseverance, and, perhaps, enthusiasm, has at last brought it to a period" (1 : xi). Walker's 
personal industriousness cannot, within the terms of this narrative, be doubted but the 
passion or zeal he feels for his work is more doubtfûl. 
Like Walker, Austin recounts his personal motivations for, and process of, 
composing the Chironomia. And, based on this introductory narrative, he explicitly asks 
his readers to judge the value of his work in terms based at least as much on his "diligencen 
in composing it as on his f m l  accomplishrnent (v): 
The laborious duty of teaching declamation . . . incited me fust to devise 
some permanent marks, by means of which I might be enabled to record, and 
to communicate in writing, with breviq and precision, my own idea as to the 
manner of delivery proper to be adopted on certain occasions. Having, as 1 
conceive, fallen upon a fertile principle, as will be found explained in the 
work, 1 succeeded by considerable labour in the invention and arrangement of 
a notation applicable to my purposes; and proved its advantages by the test of 
my own experience. In the course of my investigation 1 was also induced, 
and, by means of the permanent marks, in some measure enabled to examine 
more rninutely the various requisites for perfect rhetorical delivery. And no 
longer limiting myself to my original intention of relieving merely my own 
labour, I extended my views and enquiries not only to the elementary 
principles of rhetorical action, but also to whatsoever appeared to me most 
intirnately connected with the improvement and perfecting of public speaking 
in general. (iv-v) 
Austin's narrative of the origins and progress of his work star*; by ampliQing his sense of 
duty because this sense, he says, is not oniy the result, but also the ongin of his process of 
composition: the initial "laborious duty" of teaching motivates him to the next laborious duty 
of composing the Chironomia. A similar technique of amplification occurs in the remainder 
of his story, as each stage of his composition process extends the scope of his "enquiries." 
This amplification involves Austin moving from the specific, limited plan of "relieving 
merely my own labourn to the much larger objective of studying "whatsoever appeared to 
me most intimately connected with the irnprovement and perfecting of public speakuig in 
general." However, he mitigates the potential presumptuousness of his enlarged objective 
through the passive voice and choice of verb ("1 was induced"), which implies that an 
extemal force was responsible for this enlargement, and by qualifiing his c l a h  to success 
in meeting this objective ("in sorne measure enabledn). 
This narrative of Austin's composition process figures the personai domain of his 
teaching experience as a primary motivation for his labour. The explanation of this 
motivation enhances the credibility of his enquiry by showing his work to be based on fust- 
hand experience teaching declamation and by revealing his dutifhl concern for his snidents' 
well-being. At the same t h e ,  though, it reinforces the distance between his own relatively 
modest and laborious position as a schoolteacher and the higher, more leisured cultural 
position of, for example, a university professorship. It also orders the evolution of Austin's 
persona1 composition differently from the logical order of the narrative of origins which he 
tells for the discipline as a whole. That is, in constnicting hîs personai ethos Austin situates 
his "own ideasn and his "own labourn as a teacher first, and then moves fiom this basis to a 
consideration of "what had been done by others" (for exarnple, classical authorities) (v). By 
contrast, his narrative of disciplinary ethos figures the ancients* views on delivery as the 
primary motivation, and foundation, for contemporary enquiries like his own. This tension 
indicates the mixed nature of the opening appeals that Austin employs to fulfil different 
functions of the exordium: the logic of the narrative of disciplinary origins fulfils the 
function of stressing the general significance of his subject matter, whiie the chronoiogy of 
his narrative of composition demonstrates his "good character" especiaily by highlighting the 
trait of diligence. 
The quatities and values that Walker and Austin attach to their fml texts differ fiom 
those they assign to their diligent, laudable processes of composition. Aithough the 
repiesentation of their f d  products continues to emphasize the writers' desires to produce 
useful works, their confidence in the actual success of this effort is Iimited. Walker and 
Austin carefully circumscribe the fW value of their publications. modestly 
the imperfections of their products . This qualified characterization presents 
ackno w ledg ing 
them as 
decorously modest about their abilities and achievements. But in addition to appealing to 
the reader's goodwill, such a characterization rnakes the wnters less accountable for their 
handbooks' possible lack of success in teaching a truly practicable system of elocution. 
Waiker's description of his final text is conventionally modest. Despite the great 
labour of his composition process and the irnpressive sanction that his early efforts received 
from the "Heads of Houses" at Oxford, he carefully circurnscribes the value of his product. 
The rnotivating t e m  for Walker's text is "system:" his ideal is to produce a complex, yet 
coherent, system of instruction in elocution. However, he destabilizes this ideal in his first 
use of the term on the first page of his "Preface:" "this put me upon throwing the instruction 
1 had to convey into something that had the appearance of a system" ( 1  : vii, my emphasis) . 
Rather than claiming that his treatise develops a m e  or real system. Waker presents his 
work as the mere appearance of a system, and he further reduces its worth through the 
indefinite t e m  "something." Thus, the beginning of Walker's treatise suggests that his work 
is much Iess than what, in its ideal fom, it should be-narnely, a real or m e  system. This 
representation reinforces die sense of anxiety that Walker has already noted about his 
abilities to preserve his "favourable impression" on his superior judges. In acniality, Waker 
seems to have succeeded very well in preserving this impression, judging from the praise 
his work received in nie Monthty Review: "The Author of these Elernents appears to us, to 
have been particularly successfùl in his attempt to reduce the principles and niles of 
elocution into a system; and, in the course of his work, to have advanced many things, 
which ment attention on account of their originality as well as their utiiityn (Monthiy 
Review 65 [1781] : 81). Unlike Sheridan's confident, extravagant assertions of the value of 
his field of snidy which drew charges of excess and absurdity fiom contemporary cntics, 
Walker's polite understatement of his work's merit paradoxically helps to establish its 
credibility . 
The close of Walker's "Preface" further disclaims the success of the treatise in its 
f M  ,published fom. These disclaimers , however , succeed more positive arguments about 
its importance. In this way , the negative disclaimers and qualified language counteract the 
presumption of the preceding statements : 
Unassisted, therefore, and unpatronized, the work is at length completed: 
without any breach of rnodesty, it may be asserted, that the general-idea is 
new, curious, and important: and, without any faise humility , I am ready to 
allow, that the m e r  of treating it has a thousand faults and imperfections. 
It wants that strength and correcmess of the college, united with the ease and 
elegance of a court, which is found in several of the present productions; and 
it partakes of that haste, that interruption, and want of finishing , which must 
necessarily accompany a life of labour and uncertainty: for though nothing 
but long practice, in actual tuition, could have enabled me to construct such a 
system, it required the leisure and liberty of affluence to produce it to the best 
advantage. (1 : xiv) 
In this passage, Walker negotiates the conflicts between, on one hand, commending his 
labour and resulting product, and, on the other, humbly acknowledging its imperfections. 
His initial positive daim is carefully deferred with a modiving clause that introduces the 
key term "rnodesty," and with passive constructions ("the work is . . . completed," "it may 
be assertedn) that obscure Walker's role as agent of this "new, curious, and important" 
action and that give the impression of an objective, rather than subjective, judgment of its 
worth. As well, the modal auxiliary "mayn makes this positive judgment politely tentative. 
By contrast, Walker voices his acknowledgement of the work's deficiencies in the first 
person, suggesting greater proximity between the composer and the composition in this 
case. But if he is "ready to allown an overstatement of the defects ("a thousandn) resulting 
from his persona1 execution of "the general idea," this formative idea maintains its 
credibility regardless of its flawed execution. 
These disclaimers also can be read as justifications of his work (e.g., "the want of 
finishingn has been caused by factors beyond Walker's control and, given these 
circumstances, he has done the best he cm), as well as a veiied criticism of those who do 
enjoy "the leisure and liberty of affluencen and who do not, therefore, "labourn in "actual 
tuition." In closing the "Preface," then, he retums to the key virtue of diligentia to consauct 
the ethos of himself and his work: his diligence as a teacher, combined with his labour as a 
writer, have given him the authority, he now suggests more codidently, to "consûuct such a 
system." By contrast with his initial expression of anxious desire to impress the superior 
judges of the domain of the "coilege," the authority that Walker daims for himself at the 
close of his "Preface" is constructed more through the dissociation than the identification of 
himself and his work with this privileged world. Instead of presumptuously claiming to 
being able to meet the high cultural standards of "strength and correctness of the college," 
let alone the socially élite standards of "the court," Walker limits his authonty to the world 
that he inhabits and knows best: that of the hardworking, non-affluent schoolteacher. 
Austin's "Preface," like Walker 's, also negotiates the problem of claiming some 
positive value for his f m l  product while decorously qualiSing these claims. Thus, for 
example, the fust two sentences of the "Prefacen seek to establish the credibility of his 
treatise by making positive claims about its value, but Austin counterbalances these 
potentially presumptuous claims with tactics of negative politeness: 
The work here submitted to the judgment of the public will be found to be 
constructed of materials, some of which have been long in their possession, 
and some of which are new. As to the reception of the former, provided I 
shall be found to have selected and arranged them with any degree of 
judgment, 1 cannot doubt that it will be favourable; they have been always 
approved, however not always duly obsened: as to the latter, 1 should hope, 
that not only their novelty but also their utility in an important depanment of 
literature may serve as their recommendation. (iii-iv) 
Most obviously, this passage invokes the unquestioned authority of the past to validate 
Austin's present enquiry, while at the same t h e  justif'ying his assenion of a new system of 
gesture. The order in which Austin introduces these two dimensions is signifiicant: he 
reduces the imposition of the "novelty" by placing it afier. or in a secondary position to. the 
safe ground of the traditional materials." 
In representing his final product, Austin at once defers to his reader's judgment and 
tells his reader what s h e  should think. This confiict suggests the mixed nature of his 
implied readership: he is appealing both to the broader reading public (whom he may feel 
*~owever, this ordering of the product, as we have aiready seen, differs from the order 
of the narrative of composition Austin is about to tell, in which he explains how he frst  
developed his new system and subsequently examined the opinions of ancient authorities. 
cornfortable directing to think in certain ways) and to a more exclusive audience of "the 
most liberal and enlightened persons" (xi) (to whom he defers). Austin's repeated-use of the 
agentless passive permits him both to distance hirnself from the presumption of his action 
(e.g., he does not idenm who submits "The work") and to avoid making any direct 
reference to the readers whose judgments he requests but also attempts to defme (e.g., "will 
be found," "shall be found," "approved," "observedn). He further diminishes the threat of 
his action by qualiwing its defuitive value. For instance, he makes the favourable reception 
of the mcient authonties conditional on his own ability to select and arrange these sources 
appropriately, and he makes the wonh of the new materials tentative through the modifjhg 
phrase "1 should hope" and the modal auxiliary "may." If indeed these new materials are 
accepted it will be, as other elocutionary writers argue, on the basis of their "utility." 
Austin's explanation of his process of composition follows from this opening 
recornmendation of his work on the basis of its solid construction out of materials both old 
and new. After this narrative of composition, he elaborates the opening division into old 
and new materials by describing more specifically how these form his product. For 
example, he draws the reader's attention to the "copious exuacts" he has made from ancient 
writers for "the ornament and support" of his work (vi) and to the "numerous engraved 
figures" which illustrate and clarify his novel system of gesture (vii). This detailed 
characterization of his work leads the reader to anticipate a full, yet carefully arranged, 
composition. Ultirnately, Austin recornrnends his final product based on its value in rnaking 
a new contribution to an ancien? discipline: "My object in this work is therefore to 
contribute my share of labour towards the completion of the rules for the better smdy and 
acquisition of rhetorical delivery . . ." (x). Austin's statement of his main purpose is heavily 
qualified. He does not clairn to be constructing a whole new and independent system, but 
instead contributing to an established discipline. The nature of this contribution is imprecise 
and modest. Austin does not Say defhitively that his work completes the rules for delivery, 
but more indirectly and tentatively claims that he has laboured toward this objective, an 
objective which is itself qualified as merely "better," not "bestn or ideal. Like Walker, then, 
Austin emphasizes the value of his labour or industry, rather than his fmal 
acco~plishments , in cons tnicting the ethos of his publication. 
By confirming a respectful distance between themselves and the culnirally superior 
audience of "the most liberal and enlightened persons in the different professionsn (Austin 
xi), the strategies of negative politeness that writers like Wallcer and Austin use help them to 
avoid offending diis important segment of their irnplied readership whose approbation they 
desire. Ironically , however , these same strategies create a homologous relationship between 
the characters of the writers and those of their implied readership of users, namely those 
seeking practical instruction rather than academic speculation from the elocutionary texts. 
By characterizing themselves as writers, the elocutionists also in an indirect manner 
characterize the kind of person best suited to the practical, laborious study of the 
elocutionary systems they are about to articulate. 
Like the elocutionary writers, the merit of this figure, as the subsequent systems of 
instruction make clear, lies less in his f m l  success or achievement than in the diligent 
"pains" (Sheridan 18) he takes in leaming the basic aspects of delivery. For both groups 
(writers and users), the decorous limits of the envisioned scope of achievement combined 
with an emphasis on the value of diligence confinns their socially or culnirally aspiring 
status. Although they may aspire to slightly higher statu in the classification system, this 
aspiration is stmctured by the social order whose hierarchic gradings and principles are 
accepted by those operating within it. The limited, decorous aspirations of the elocutionary 
wnters and users indicate their social "sense of limits, a practical anticipation of objective 
limits acquired by experience of objective limits, a 'sense of one's place' which leads one to 
exclude oneself from goods, persons, places and so forth from which one is excludedn 
(Bourdieu, Distinction 471). 
But knowing the positions from which one is excluded also means knowing what 
aspirations are achievable, and within the late eighteenth-century British context of social 
flux and mobility, significant aspirations were achievable, as the elocutionary writers 
themselves demonstrate (e.g . , Walker and Sheridan moving fkom the semi-respectable world 
of the theatre to become the leading authorities in elocution and ortheopy of the day; Burgh 
rising fkom the position of "corrector of the press" to that of well-respected school principal 
and moral-political author). Further, just as Frances Burney was able to capitalize on the 
more limited cultural achievernents of her father (Gallagher 216), Sheridan's son Richard 
Brinsley exceeded his father in status aspirations and achievernents. The elocutionary 
argument that the immediate generation can achieve only so much improvement whereas the 
rising generation has the potential to arrive at true greatness coincides with the contextual 
reality that not only could individuals of the middling ranks augment their cultural capital 
significantly within their own lifetimes, but that this capital could be improved upon by 
subsequent generations . 
Nonetheless, the elocutionary writers are careful to circumscribe their immediate 
users' aspirations by preparing them to focus more on the value of their diligent efforts in 
learning good delivery than on the potential success of these efforts in transforming them 
fiom weak and awkward to strong and graceful speakers. Although Sheridan does not 
characterize himself and his work in the same modest, tentative te= as do Walker and 
Austin, his explanation of the scope and objectives of his current instruction in relation to 
his immediate audience of adult speakers captures well this sense of limited expectations and 
deferred achievements. In Sheridan's vision, the educational reforms that he advocates have 
the potential to "wholly subvertn current "bad habits" so that the greatness of the powers of 
classical oratory becomes the birthright of Britain' s "rising , and funire generations" (1 8). 
However, the objectives of his immediate work are much more lirnited, in a m e r  that he 
designates as suitable to the immediate adult consumers of his instruction: 
But as a scheme of this kind [Le., of complete educational reform] . would be 
of benefit only to the rishg generation, and as my present object is, the 
improvement of such as are more advanced in life, 1 shall in the progress of 
this course, endeavour to point out a method, by which the adult may get the 
better of bad hzbits, and at the same time lay down such rules to guide them, 
in acquinng a just and natural delivery, as will enable them to cornpars their 
end, provided they take suifable pains. . . (18, my emphasis) 
Strategically, Sheridan validates the reduced objectives of his current work by stressing the 
appropriateness of this reduction to the character of his audience. At the same tirne, he 
situates this limited approach within the larger framework of the potential achievernents of 
the "rising generation," a potential which depends on his audience's support for his 
educational reforms . 
In general. the elocutionists' decorous sense of their own limits is revealed by their 
not claiming too much authoriry and success for their fml productions, preferring instead to 
highlight the virtue of their diligence in the process of composition. This deconun sets the 
stage for an irnplied user whose aspirations are similarly Iimited and whose effort for its 
own sake constitutes the main payback of practising the elocutiomry systems. In turn, the 
limited expectations and middling statu of the implied user provide an indirect rationale for 
the focus of these systems primarily on the basics or rudiments of elocution, not the higher 
powers of delivery. As well, they help to justify, if necessary, the possibility that the 
student, despite al1 his laborious efforts, may not achieve in the end any noticeable success 
but stiil remain prone to "a thousand faults and imperfections" (Waker 1 : xiv). 
Despite the validation of elocutionary study on the basis of its inspiring classical 
precedents, the eighteenth-century treatments of delivery and bodily deconun tend to 
reinforce the lirnited ideal of the competent speaker who can manage the basic 'elements" of 
elocution much more than they constnict a consurnmate speaker whose powers of persuasion 
are irresistible. As Burgh explains, his treatise is designed for "al1 that part of youth, whose 
station places them within the reach of a polite education , to be qualified for acquitting 
themselves with reputation, when called to speak in publicn (164). This characterization of 
the implied user of his handbook ernphasizes the reader's socially aspiring position ("within 
reachn), but it suggests that achieving the status of politeness means at best evading the 
charge of guilt ("acquitting themselves"), not gaining the power of persuasion. Thus the 
positive ideal of the cowmmate speaker, which figures saongly in the development of 
elocution's d i s c i p l i .  ethos, becomes displaced @ut not erased) by the more negative, 
lesser ideal of the competent speaker. 
MIDDLES: THE LOGOS OF THE ELOCUTIONARY 
TECHNAI 
From the opening sections of their treatises, which foreground strategies of 
disciplinary and personal ethos, the elocutionary writers move to the development of their 
systems of mies for proper delivery. The order of these sections is significant because the 
legitimation of delivery as an acceptable subject matter through its associations with 
established fields and cultural values predisposes the reader to accept the novelty of the 
s ystems which follow the introductions. S imilarly , the self-deferential sûategies of negative 
politeness that precede the articulation of these new (and as yet unauthorized) systems of 
elocution diminish the risk that the elocutionists will be charged with excessive presumption 
in attempting to transform the study and practice of delivery from mere "chance" to an art of 
"known ruies" and settied principles (Sheridan 2 1). Within the overall structure of the 
treatises , therefore, the introductory sections provide an authorizing frame for the 
elocutionists' subsequent explications of their new systems for studying delivery. 
In developing their systems, the elocutionists boldly attempt the difficult, 
paradoxical, and perhaps impossible task of expressing "physical movements in words" and 
portraying "vocal intonations in writingn (Rhetorica ad Herennium 3.15 .D). In thus 
verbalizing the non-verbal, they present delivery as a knowable and teachable techne. As 
Michael Cahn explains, 
[tlechne designates first of all a craft, but in a broader sense it also applied to 
the rhetorical handbook. For Plato the concept referred to the codification of 
an activity, which, "with a specific teachable rnethod, is directed towards a 
specific end, and thus left neither to mere nanual endowment nor to 
uncontroIlable inspiration." In the strict use of the term, it designates the 
ability of a form of knowledge successfully to direct action, the ability to 
master it through the formulation of rules. Therefore techne is fundamentally 
ambivalent. It belongs to two domains at once: to both method and action. 
(72) 
The middle sections of Sheridan's, Walker's, and Austin's works demonstrate 
precisely such a desire not only to formulate practical rules for correct action but also to 
define and thus make knowable the principles of the art of elocution. Together, these 
dimensions advance the practical utility of the elocutionary crafi while also raising it to the 
status of scholarly discourse. The former dimension addresses primarily the implied 
audience of students of elocution, while the theoreticai principles and methods are addressed 
mainly to the "enlightened" (Austin xi) scholars whose approbation the elocutionary writers 
seek. This mked address responds at once to the writers' disciplinary aspirations to 
establish their field of enquiry as "high" (Cahn 72), scholarly discourse and to the status 
aspirations of their implied users, for whom the practical set of conventions provides an 
explicit "repertoire of rules" that may substitute for the lack of their practical mastery of a 
"highly valued cornpetence" (Bourdieu qtd. in Whigham 5). 
Whereas the appeal to ethos dominates the opening sections, the appeal to logos 
figures most strongly in the middle arguments for and expositions of the new elocutionary 
systerns. Rather than focusing on the credibility of the writer's character and field of 
enquhy, these sections emphasize the rational and logical value of the methods of elocution 
that Sheridan, Wallcer, and Austin propose. In this sense, these sections contain the proof, 
or confirmafio, of the elocutionary discourses where persuasion is produced principally 
from the reasonableness of the speaker's arguments and from "the facts themseIvesn 
(Aristotie 3.1403b). These are the parts in which Sheridan, Waiker, and Austin attempt to 
demonstrate the validity of their cases for treating the art of delivery at systernatic length 
and in methodical detail. 
To do this, they employ two main kinds of logos, narnely logos as reason or 
argumentation and logos as logic. According to George Yoos, logos as reason means the 
logical appeal "to reasons presented as prernises, warrants, evidence, facü, data, 
observations, backing, supports, explmations , causes, signs, comrnonplaces , principles, or 
maxims. Insofar as the emphasis is on logos as reason, logical appeal is to the substance of 
premises and/or presumptions and not to . . . logical form" (41 1). Logos as formal 




terms (410). In the articulation of their systematic technes of elocution, Sheridan, Walker, 
and Austin combine these two generai types of logos: the former occurs mainiy in the 
reasonable arguments that they make for why systematic treatises and rules for the smdy of 
elocution should be developed; the latter, primarily in their exposition of these systems. 
whose categories, rules, and notations strive to bind and relate in a consistent, orderly 
manner the various elements of elocution. In this way, their coaflfmations integrate two 
modes of proof, the explicitly argurnentative premises and reasons for their systems and the 
irnplicitly persuasive logical exposition of these systems. As Edward Corbett explains, 
"[tlhe use of the term confinnation . . . may suggest that this division figures only in 
persuasive discourse. But if we regard confinnacion or proof as the designation of that part 
where we get down to the main business of our discourse, this terni c m  be extended to 
cover expository as well as argumentathe prose" (Corbett 300). 
Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's reconfguration of classical theories 
of argumentation provides a useful set of analytic tools for examining the structures and 
effects of these two main forms of logos in the rniddle sections. Their distinction between 
argumentation and the classical concepts of demonstration and formai logic correspond for 
the most part to Yoos' categories of Iogos as reason and logos as logic. Formal logic, 
explain Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, constructs axiomatic systems whose validity 
depends on the internal consistency of its rules and symbols rather than "rational evidencen 
extemai to the system: 'Any consideration that has to do with the origin of the axioms or 
rules of deduction, with the role that the axiomatic system is deemed to play in the 
elaboration of thought, is foreign to logic conceived in this manner" (13). Argumentation, 
by contrast, uses rational evidence and discursive techniques to induce or increase the 
audience's adherence to the writer's or speaker's position (4). In argumentation, 'it is no 
longer possible to neglect completely, as irrelevancies, the psychological and social 
conditions in the absence of which argumentation would be pointless and without resultn 
(14). 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca divide the techniques of argumentation into four 
main categories: quasi-logical arguments, arguments based on the structure of realiw, 
arguments that establish the structure of reality, and techniques of dissociation.' In this 
chapter, 1 will draw on the first three categories to explicate the structures of argumentation 
in the elocutionists' confirmations; the technique of dissociation will help to elucidate the 
rhetoric of their closing sections, discussed in Chapter Five. 
Quasi-logicd arguments take advantage of "the prestige of rigorous thought" by 
claiming 'to be similar to the formai reasoning of logic or mathematicsn (193-194). This 
similarity gives them "a certain validity owing to their rational appearancen (26 1). Because 
of this emphasis on the formal aspects of proof, quasi-logical arguments correspond to logos 
as logic; however, as f o m  of argumentation, the upsychological and social conditions" 
which influence their production are relevant to their persuasiveness. Although they 
resemble fonnal demonstration, they are not identical to it: "What characterizes quasi- 
logical argumentation . . . is its nonformal character and the effort of thought which is 
required to formalize itn (193). 
Arguments based on the structure of reality are persuasive not primarily because of 
their formal or operational features, but instead because of their substantive c l a h  'to be in 
agreement with the very nature of thingsn (191). In this sense, they correspond to Yoos' 
category of logos as reason. Generally, these arguments work by positing sequential 
relationships, such as causeeffect sequences or relationships of CO-existence, such as those 
which are accepted as existing between people and their actions. The rhetor's appeals to 
these basic structures of reality "establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and 
others which one wishes to promoten (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 261). Arguments that 
establish the structure of reality also, in a mamer, claim to agree with 'the very nature of 
things," but this "naturen or this "realityn is a new rather than established one. Thus, for 
example, an argument by anatogy attempts 'to reconstruct certain elements of thought in 
conformity with schemes admitted in other domains of the realn (191). The 'newn reality 
established by the analogy depends on the accepted reality to which it is compared. In this 
way, arguments that establish the real are closely connected with arguments based on the 
real because the former canot be establisbed without recourse to the latter. For the 
'By 'reality," Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca mean not "an objective description of 
reality, but the manner in which opinions conceming it are presentedn (262). 
elocutionists, especiaily Sheridan, this connection between the two kinds of arguments 
provides an argumentative strategy for establishing the validity of their new field of enquiry 
(Le., a new 'domain of the real") while simultaneously seeking solidarity between accepted 
judgments and the ones they wish to promote. 
The logical appeal of the elocutionary systems in the middle sections of Sheridan's, 
Waiker's, and Austin's treatises works through the interplay of logos as reason and logos as 
logic. On the one hand, they make a reasonable case for the development of these systems 
based on accepted "structures of reality"; these substantive arguments allow them to 
establish a solidarity between accepted domains of the real and the new structure of 
elocutionary reality. On the other, they present methodical f o m  of instruction for 
elocution whose persuasive power derives from their quasi-logical appearance. Specifically , 
Sheridan, whose case for the developrnent of a knowable and teachable method of elocution 
is the most fully articulated, employs an argument by dysanalogy and based on the co- 
existence of 'the person and his actsn (ix) to establish the new structure of elocutionary 
realiry; arguments based on the CO-existence of "the person and his actsn and on the 
sequential relationship of means and ends underlie, in various ways, al1 three of Sheridan's, 
Walker's, and Austin's systems; and the quasi-logical division of the whole into parts 
dominates the exposition of their techmi of bodily decorum. For the sake of clarity, in the 
following analysis 1 will highlight, first, arguments that establish a new structure of reality 
by k ing  based on existing structures and, second, quasi-logical forms; 1 shall also, 
however, indicate ways in which different kinds of arguments interact since, as Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca emphasize, a single statement can "be regarded as capable of 
expressing several schemesn at once and as addressed to different audiences (188). 
Using these main forms of logical argumentation, Sheridan, Waiker, and Austin 
argue for the importance of the study of elocution, defme the scope and elernents of this 
study , and enumerate methodical niles for its proper practice. These arguments, as the 
following analysis will show, are motivated by an ideal of cornpetence that simultaneously 
makes the study of elocution accessible to an aspiring audience and ensures the preservation 
of disciplinary and social limits. By focusing on the "rudimentsn (Sheridan 93) of elocution, 
the eiocutionists avoid the impropriety of claiming to be able to make knowable and 
teachable the full art of delivery. They explicitiy define parts and detail rules for basic 
cornpetence but preserve some of the social mystery surrounding bodily communication by 
leaving the more powerful and more moving aspects of delivery largely unexplicated and 
hence uoavailable for mastery through the formulation and application of rules. 
The mixed nature of the implied audience for these treatises can help to clarify the 
role that this ideal of the competent speaker plays in the logical appeals of the elocutionary 
systems. The logos the middle sections addresses itself not only to the obvious implied 
audience of aspiring speakers who can "benefit from prescriptive guidance in matters of 
taste, grammar, and elocution" (ULman 35). Just as importantly, the logos of arguments 
based on the structure of reality and of quasi-logical schemes addresses the implied audience 
of scholarly judges whose approbation the elocutionary writers desire. In fact, the latter 
group of readers are those implied most strongly by the initial arguments of the middle 
sections. These arguments, which both elaborate the general claims of the opening sections 
and introduce new rationales, are concemed less with the practical application of the 
elocutionary systems than with establishing elocution as a systematic "depamnent of 
knowledge . . . considered as an organized whole" (OED). SpecificaIIy, these arguments 
attempt to prove the significance of elocutionary study based on its relationship to the 
accepted "reality" of written or verbal language, and they provide the appearance of 
rationality through the quasi-logical whole-part definition of elocution's disciplinary 
domain. Logical appeals to the implied audience of students emphasize the practical 
application of the systems. They do so primarily through the ends-means and person-act 
arguments (particularly in the method of self-vigilance recommended to aspiring speakers) 
and through Walker's and Austin's quasi-logical enumeration of complex rules for bodily 
decorum which appeal to those who require a 'repertoire of rules" (Bourdieu qtd. in 
Whigham 5) to be able to 'discriminate and imitate signs of statusn (Hariman 152). 
This mixed readership and the inherent social and disciplinary risks of the 
elocutionary project suggest contextual reasons for the tensions and inconpities in the 
logical appeals of the rniddle sections. These are the risk of focusing on the "seemingly 
most insignificant details" of bodily practices (Bourdieu, Outline 95) as a means of 
providing aspiring speakers with increased opportunities for social mobility, and the risk of 
disrupting the traditional hierarchy of rhetorical study in which delivery figures as the least 
important component as a way of securing increased cultural capital for the elocutionary 
writers. The tensions of the elocutionary systems are not, therefore, strictly intemal or 
logical. Rather, they reflect the complexity of the project's rhetorical situation. If these 
texts are responses to a context, then this context offen delivery as an undeveloped temtory 
for profitable mining. However. it demands circumspection in explicating the ostensibly 
"insignificant" domain of bodily practices and in aligning elocution with other areas of 
study. Further, while the situation opens up possibilities for both the elocutionary writers 
and their readen to increase their cultural capital, the exigencies of decorum constrain these 
opportunities by requiring the avoidance of excessive self-assertion which might offend 
more powerful members of the social and scholarly hierarchies. Given these situational 
complexities, the following analysis of the techniques of argumentation at work in the 
development of the elocutionary systems will reveal the places where the logics of the 
writers' technai fiay as well as the rhetorical tactics they employ to negotiate these 
inconsistencies . 
Logical Appeals to Scholarly Readers 
Even though the systematic rules and codes of elocution developed by Sheridan, 
Walker, and Austin are designed to make the practice of bodily deconim teachable and 
leamable, these systems also appeal to an audience concerwd more with the theoretical 
elaboration of a new "department of knowledge." This appeal, as 1 have already discussed, 
presumes and draws on the contemporary contextual interest in the methodical 
standardkation and codification of language use, an interest fostered by "a philosophical and 
critical communityn whose study of language makes reading, writing, and speaking 
according to these scholarly standards important to a broader community of leamers (Ulman 
32). By relating the elocutionary project to this existing "structure of reality," Sheridan 
rnakes a reasonable case for the study of elocution as a new department of knowledge. The 
persuasiveness of this case is enhanced through Sheridan's, WaJker' s , and Austin's quasi- 
logical d e f ~ t i o n  of elocutionary lcnowledge as a series of distinct parts which together make 
up their whole field of enquiry. However, the argumentative process of negotiathg a 
legitimate and distinctive, but not excessive, disciplinary space for elocution entails 
ambiguities in the relationships these writers assert between existing and new structures of 
and in the exhaustiveness of the parts into which they divide their field. 
Arguments ReWng the New Field of Elocution with Existing Structures of Red@ 
In twentieth-century discussions of the elocutionary movement, Sheridan fiequently 
is described as the founder of the socalled "naairal" school of elocution. By "natural," 
recent critics mean primarily delivery that is not regulated by a methodical set of mechanical 
rules. Although in the Lectures Sheridan does advocate a "natural" conversational style of 
elocution and although his work does not develop a detailed or methodical set of rules for 
proper delivery, this description of his approach as spontaneously "naturaln ignores his 
forceful advocacy of a systematic prescnptive method for making the art of elocution 
knowable and teachable. Critics of his own era recognized and valued this advocacy as a 
key argument for establishing the contemporary significance of elocutionary study , even 
though some noted that the acnial method explicated by Sheridan in the Lectures was not 
fully developed. Critics cornmended the practical uusefÙlnessn of his plan to develop "a 
well-digested system of rulesn (Monthly Review 27 [1762]: 201, 208) to teach elocution, but 
dso commented that "F]e has this defect, however, in common with most didactic writers, 
that after having set forth in general terms the utility of his art, his pupils are left to 
themselves, to proceed secundum artemn (Scors Magazine 24 LI7621 : 60 1). 
To establish the desirability of developing a system of niles to regulate public 
speaking, Sheridan draws a dysanalogy between the existing 'realityn of the art of written 
language and the art of spoken language (whose significance he wishes to reestablish). 
This dysanalogy, which presupposes the contexnial importance of standardizing and 
codiQing language, appeals primarily to a scholarly audience concerned with regulating and 
judging the practices of writers and speakers. To justifj his advocacy of systematizing the 
study and practice of elocution, Sheridan argues that, 
'For more on Sheridan and the "natural" school of elocution, see Robb, Fria, Ehninger, 
Vandraegen, and Shortland. See also the uConclusionn to this study . 
. . . it is a disgrace to a gentleman, to be guilty of false spelling, either by 
ornimg, changing, or adding letters contrary to custom; and yet it-shall be 
no disgrace to omit letters, or even syllables in speaking, and to huddle his 
words so together, as to render them utterly unintelligible. . . . The reason 
for the unequal judgment past by mankind in this case, is that written 
language is taught by rule, and it is thought a shame for any one, to 
transgress the known mles of an art, in which he has been instmcted. But 
spoken language is not replarly taught, but is lefi to chance, imitation. and 
early habit: and therefore like al1 other things Ieft to chance, or unsettled 
principles , is liable to innumerable irregularïties and defects. (2 1) 
According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, arguments by analogy "attempt to 
reconstruct certain elements of thought in confomity with schemes admitted in other 
domains of the realn (191). In the above passage, Sheridan presents the "known rules" of 
written language as an existing "stmcture of reality" to which the new structure of 
elocutionary reality may be compared. However, because Sheridan higNights the 
differences, rather than the similarities, between the current States of written and spoken 
language, this passage constructs a dysanalogy. Clearly, though, the main intent of this 
dysanalogy-which provides a rationale for why these two domains of the "realn are valued 
unequally-is to demonstrate why spoken language requires the same kind of settled 
p ~ c i p l e s  and known rules that currently regulate the art of written language. In this sense, 
Sheridan's dysaaalogy implies an analogy between the separate spheres of written and 
spoken language. 
This dysanalogy, rather than taking the most common formulation of "A is to B as C 
is [not] to D," follows the pattern of 'A is to B as A is [not] to Cn (Perelman and Olbrechts- 
Tyteca 372, 376). In other words, Sheridan argues that rules and settied principles are to 
written language as rules and settied principles are (not yet) to spoken language. Such a 
pattern indicates the proximity between Sheridan's argumentative scheme of analogy and the 
scheme of example. Indeed, it is possible to analyze the above passage as an instance of 
what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca cal1 examples of a hnivenal system of law" (374). In 
this scheme, the existing rules of written language and the desired rules for spoken ianguage 
would each constinite 'entire systerns" whose resemblance stems from their equal subjection 
to the universal law that 'it is thought a sshame for any one. to aansgress the known rules of 
an art, in which he has been instmctedn (21). Because this argumentative structure posits 
the application of a general 'lawn to a new example, it p r m e s  that both the existing and 
new examples belong to "a single domain" of reality (374). This scheme of argumentation 
therefore establishes the importance of developing a systematic set of rules for spoken 
language by classifying spoken language, in its potential, as a new example of the domain of 
'reaIityn already exemplified by the art of wrinen language. The "known rulesn of wrirten 
language thus take precedence over the desired rules for spoken language not only 
chronologicaily but also logically . 
This argument of precedence appeals to the community of critical scholars implied 
by the elocutionary neatises because it decorously associates the snidy of elocution with the 
established domain of written language. However, Sheridan's typical representation of the 
relationship between written and spoken language confiicts with this argument that spoken 
language is simply another example of the 'realityn aiready well-exemplified by written 
language. Rather, Sheridan's main presumption-both in the Lectures and in other works-is 
that spoken language is more important than, not logically inferior or even simply equal, to 
the art of written language. Thus, for example, he argues that the development of an exact 
method of articulation is "of much more importance" in speaking than exact spelling is in 
writing since, in the former w e ,  the speaker may be addressing 'many hundred hearersn 
whereas the 'writing of a gentleman is submitted but to one reader at a tirne" (21). More 
generally, Sheridan repeatedly assem the superiority of spoken over wntten language by 
defining the former as 'the gift of Godn and the latter as "the invention of man" (xiii). These 
definitions lay the foundation for an anaiogical relationship because they distinguish the two 
kinds of language into separate spheres, a distinction "essential for the existence of an 
analogyn (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 375). In light of Sheridan's recurring argument 
for the superiority of spoken over written language, the above passage can be read as a 
strategic way of sirnultaneously asserting the logical precedence of written language and the 
(potential) superiority of spoken language. Explicitly, Sheridan asks his audience to accept 
the logic that a methodical system for teaching and judging proper elocution is important 
because, like the rules of written language, such a system dlows polite society to distinguish 
between disgraceful and graceful practitioners. But the implicit conclusion of his 
argument-a conclusion entailed by Sheridan's surrounding claims about the greatness of 
spoken language compared to written ianguage-is that the development of settled principies 
and exact rules to regulate spoken language will make this distinctive sphere of reality not 
only equal to but greater than the art of written language. 
Through this dysanalogy, Sheridan seeks adherence to a new structure of reality, 
namely the systematic explication and regulation of elocution according to its own 
distinctive principles and rules. A key element in this appeal shows how the category of 
arguments based on the structure of reality can interact with those that establish a structure 
of reality: Sheridan employs a person-act argument, based on a relation of CO-existence, to 
strengthen his analogical case for the significance of a system of elocutionary instruction. 
By arguing that failure to follow the "known rules" of written language disgraces gentlemen, 
Sheridan posits a person-act relationship. The person in this case is the "gentlemann and the 
"act" is the practice of correct written language. A gentleman, Sheridan presurnes, can be 
defmed by his ability to enact the rules of written language properly . Conversely , the 
disgrace of not abiding by these rules threatens the person's identity as a gentleman. By 
analogy, Sheridan argues that a gentleman's identity should likewise be detennined 
according to whether his practices of elocution conforrn to an established mode of 
instruction. 
The "personn of the gentleman in Sheridan's argument can be considered not only as 
"the author of a series of actsn but perhaps more importantly as 'the object of a series of 
appraisals" (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 295). That is, the assertion of the co-existence 
of the gentleman with the actions of proper writing and speaking provides a standard for 
discrirninating between those who do and those who do not act according to these definitions 
of gentlemanliness. The person who wishes to be ideniified by others as a gentleman 
becomes the object of a moral appraisal that depends on his abilities to act competently in 
terms of "known rules." As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain, typically "the notions 
of responsibiiity and of guilt or merit are related to the personn while "the notions of nom 
and of rule are primarily concemed with the actn (296). The words "disgrace," "guilt," and 
"sharne" in Sheridan's argument demonstrate the moral nature of the appraisal to which the 
person of the gentleman is subject, while the acts that identi@ him are categorized as n o m  
and rules. However, this dissociation between the person and his acts is "partial and 
precariousn since "if niles prescribe or prohibit certain acts, their moral or juridical 
significance resides in the fact that they are meant for personsn (Perelman and Olbrechts- 
Tyteca 296). 
Because this argument foregrounds the person of the gentleman as an object of 
appraisal, it appeals mainly to an audience of external judges-those whose interest lies in 
developing, teaching, and enforcing standards of socially polite linguistic behaviour. For 
aspiring speakers, the appeal of Sheridan's argument is doubIe-sided. By affirming that the 
practice of proper writïng and speaking according to an explicit set of mles is a distinctive 
mark of gentlernanliness, Sheridan offers opportunities for status aspirants to increase their 
cultural capital. Importantly, these opportunities address the late eighteenthcentury British 
context of social rnobiiity by basing the achievement and maintenance of gentlemanly status 
on capital acquired through education, not birth. Sheridan does not, however, claim that 
writing and speaking properly are alone sufficient for a person to be identified as a 
gentleman. Rather, he argues, negatively, that not possessing these abiiities will seriously 
darnage any gentiernanly identity the person already possesses. This negative argument 
counters the implicit appeal of social opportunity by foregrounding the problem of 
transgressing "known rules." If indeed it is a universal law that failure to act according to 
such rules necessarily brings shame on the person of the gentleman, then the development of 
an explicit method of instruction in elocution increases the possibilities for transgressing the 
standards of gentlemanly behaviour as much as it enhances opportunities for status 
augmentation through educational means. 
In addition to the argumentative schernes of dysanalogy and person-act coexistence, a 
crucial premise underlies Sheridan's rationale for the importance of developing a regulated 
techne for elocutionary study. This is the implicit premise that the art of written language is 
in truth wholly settied and regular, a premise which Sheridan presupposes 'the judgment of 
mankind" accepts without question. The logic of his contrast between the current defective, 
irregular condition of the art of spoken language and its potential to become an 
unambiguously methodical techne that will "successfÛ1ly . . . direct actionn (Cahn 72) 
depends on the truth of his assumption that written language has already achieved this ideal 
condition. 
This assumption, however, is debatable, not only from a modem perspective but 
within Sheridan's own context. Despite the strong contextual interest in standardizing and 
codifying language, at least one leading rnember of the community of critical schdars 
engaged in this pursuit acknowledged the great diffxulty, even the fulllit., of discovering 
and articulatirtg any fully settled principles or absolute rules to regulate language use. 
Samuel Johnson, whose D i c t i o ~ r y  perhaps best exemplifies the eighteenth-century British 
effort to limit, order, and fix language "in an authontative wayn (Kernan 184), candidly 
describes in the "Prefacen to the D i c f i ~ ~ s >  how his initial optimisrn about the possibility of 
bringing language under control was uansformed into an acknowledgment of the fùtility of 
this ideal: 
Those who have been persuaded to think well of my design, will require that 
it should fuc Our language, and put a stop to those alterations which tirne and 
chance have hitherto been suffered to make in it without opposition. With 
this consequence 1 will confess that 1 flattered rnyself for a while; but now 
begin to fear that 1 have indulged expectations which neither reason nor 
experience can justi@. . . . m i t h  justice may the lexicographer be derided, 
who being able to produce no example of a nation that has preserved their 
words and phrases from mutability , shall imagine that his dictionary can 
embalm his language, and secure it fiom corruption and decay. . . . [Slounds 
are too volatile and subtile for legal resuaints; to enchain syllables, and to 
lash the wind, are equally the undertakings of pride, unwilling to measure its 
desires by its strength. (Johnson 255) 
As a member of Johnson's literary circle until the dissolution of their fnendship in 
1762, Sheridan presumably was familiar with Johnson's views. However, such an 
admission of the impossibility of controllhg the mutability of language and restraining its 
volatile sounds would undermine the ethos of Shendan's whole project. Despite 
contemporary criticism that his expectations conceming the benefits of systematic 
instruction in elocution were "over-sanguinen and "most extravagantn (Monthky Review 27 
[1762]: 202), the persuasiveness of Sheridan's case relies on his consistent, unequivocal 
assertion that the development of "a welldigested system of rulesn taught by a "a suficient 
number of skilful rnastersn (17) is both feasible and essential to the nation's moral and 
political stature. Such a position cannot afford to admit that the systematic regulation of 
eiocuuonary practice ma). be as impossible as Johnson's effort to presewe verbal lan,-e 
from murabdiry. But wen hou@ Johnson's 'Preface" shows the debagbiliy of Sheridan's 
fundamentai premise char wrinen ianguage is subjea ro precise re-Won. the 'Preface' 
w n f j  the contexmai derzre to achieve this kind of regdation. The logic of Sheridan's 
argument. tberefore. appeals to an important communal desire even if the presumption rbat 
this desire can be fulffled is hi-dhly debatable. 
The reality of late eighteentkenniry British 'prht culture" (Kernan 16) M e r  
reinforces the contexnial appropriateness of Sheridan's argument that the an of elocution. to 
achieve disciplinary and social starus, requires methodical explication in words and prinr. 
The v e q  nature of print. accorda to Keman. creates a logical form conducive to the 
systematic ordering and reduction of language use. Johnson, he argues. 'came to 
understand that the order conferred on laquage bg a dictionary is a prinr-derived 
rationalistic system imposed amid and upon a chaotic scene of actuai living speech and 
writing" (185). Paradoxically, the elocutionary writers exploit print's 'logic of system" 
(Kernan 187) to try to fix and enurnerate methods of non-verbal delivery or. as the author 
of Rhetoncil ad Herennium puts it, to express 'physical movements in words" and 'vocal 
intonations in writing" (3.15.27). This paradox highiights the basic arnbiguity of the 
relationship between the existing "reality" of written (or printed) language and the new 
'reality" of spoken language's non-verbal expressions. While Sheridan asserts the absolute 
distinctiveness of the latter sphere, claiming that the expression of the passions in non- 
verbal delivery c o n ~ t i ~ t e ~  'a language of [its] own. utterly independent of words" (xi), he 
also argues for the subjection of this language to a kind of systernatic logic proper to the 
sphere of written language and print culture. 
For later elocutionary writers such as Walker and Austin, this subjection of non- 
verbal delivery to the logical forms of written language and print culture becomes more 
pronounced. Walker, for example, addresses the problems of disciplimry decorurn by 
presenting an ambiguous relationship between his system of elocution and the more 
established, respected dornain of verbal and written language. On the one hand, his 
systematic and extensive detailing of rules for elocution realizes Sheridan's dream that this 
canbn of rhetoric achieve the sarne status as the art of written language through the 
articulation of settled principles. "known rules," and regularized teaching . Importantly , the 
inscription of an orthodox techne of elocution permits not only the identification of 
acceptable speaking practices, but conversely the marking of unacceptable forms,. just as the 
grammatical rules of written language allow a gentleman "guilty" of transgressing these mies 
to be clearly disthguished from someone who does not. In this sense, Walker's system, 
Iike Sheridan's, irnplies a khd of analogous relationship between the rules of wrirten 
language and those of non-verbal elocution: the implicit argument is that elocution may 
achieve a status similar to the art of wntten language to the extent that it shares salient 
features with this "knownn and "settied" art. 
However, Waker also represents the relationship beween verbal and non-verbal 
language in a more explicitiy hierarchical fashion: in this case, verbal language acts as the 
dominant fonn which non-verbal language serves and supports. From the outset, Waker's 
system presupposes that al1 proper elocution occurs within the boundaries of verbal and 
gramrnatically correct language. The entire purpose of elocution thus becomes the 
development of the speaker's ability to correctly comrnunicate verbal and grammatical 
meaning; elocution should support and clariQ, but in no way exceed the confines of 
grammar. To help preserve this decorous representation of elocution's (sub)disciplinary 
status, Waiker engages in periodic manoeuvres of negative politeness intended to minimize 
the imposition of his new system of rhetorical punctuation. For instance, he reassures his 
scholarly readers that "when I contend for the propriety , and even necessity , of pausing, 
where we fmd no points in writing or printing, 1 do not mean to disturb the present practice 
of punctuation: 1 wish only to afford such aids to pronunciation as are actually made use of 
by the best readers and speakers. . ." (1: 17). In this passage, the adverb "not" negatively 
a f f i  Walker's non-threatening, modest intentions, while the adverb "ody" characterizes 
his own area as significantly lesser and more modest than the established field of 
grammatical practice. Although he clearly fmds established doctrines of grammatical 
punctuation woefully inadequate to his art of elocution, he tactfully refrains from stating this 
directly . 
This polite subordination of the art of non-verbal communication to the pre- 
established domain of verbal language compounds the sense of elocution's limited scope. 
Wallcer's reductive definition not only permit. him to obviate the potential disciplinary 
impropriety of attending to the subordinate art of elocution in so much detail (since he 
justifies this attention by the importance of the higher form it serves, narnely verbal 
language); as well, this definition suits the social position of his implied students, whose 
acceptance within higher culture paradoxically depends on their ability to serve this culture 
in a deferential, inoffensive mamer. Walker's whole system of elocution, with its limited 
conception of the scope of this art combined with its emphasis on obsewing intricate rules 
and boundaries, constructs a speaker who does not "disturbn but supports the established 
order, 
b Quasi-logical Definitions of Elocution 's Scope 
The appeal of logos as reason which characterizes Sheridan's rationale for why 
elocution requires systematic regulation enhances the scholarly and social significance of 
this new "department of knowledge." Because his argument foregrounds the gentlemanly 
speaker as an "object of appraisal," it addresses mainly an implied audience of critical 
judges, narnely the community of scholars concerned with setting and enforcing social 
standards of language use for a broader community of leamers. In Sheridan's as well as 
Walker's and Austin's treatises, this use of logos as reason to address their implied audience 
of "liberal scholar[sJn (Austin vi) interacts with the appeal of logos as logical form primarily 
through their quasi-logicai whole-part definitions of the elocutionary field. The 
persuasiveness of these defmitions stems rnainly fiom their forma1 appearance rather than 
from "the substance of premises and/or presumptionsn (Yoos 41 1). These proofs, 
therefore, appear closer to logical demonstration than to argumentative debate. They "lay 
claim to a certain power of conviction in the degree they c l a h  to be similar to the formal 
reasoning of logic or mathematics . Submitting these arguments to analysis , however , 
immediately reveals the difference between them and f o d  demonstrationn (Pereiman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 193). 
The quasi-Iogical scheme based on the division of the whole into parts operates in 
--- - - 
LWU main ways in Sheridan's, Walker's, and Austin's definitions of the scope of elocution. 
First, Sheridan and Waiker employ the argument of division or partition which enumerates 
the components of the whole field; second, Austin uses a genus-species foxm of division to 
show the different genres of public speaking to which rhetorical delivery is essential. 
Together, these whole-part schemes give an impression of exhaustiveness, depth, and detail 
to the snidy of elocution and thereby enhance its statu as systematic "department of 
knowledge." However, a close analysis of these defuiitions reveals ambiguities about which 
parts or species properly belong within the whole field. 
0 Sheridan 's and Wdker 's Part- Whole D @nitions 
The quasi-logical division of the whole into parts presupposes that the parts are 
"exhaustively enurnerable, but that they can be chosen at will in a variety of ways on 
condition that by adding them up again the given whole may be reconstitutedn (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 235). Fwther, this technique assumes " that the classes formed by the 
subdivision of a set are not arnbiguous" (235). In defining the various p a  that make up 
the whole study of elocution, Sheridan and Waker give an impression of exhaustive 
enurneration which enhances the apparent scope of their discipline. But an analysis of these 
formal divisions indicates ambiguities within the writers' classification schemes and it shows 
that "adding up" the specified parts does not clearly reconstitute the "whole" of elocution. 
The distinction between competent and c o n s u m t e  speaking, 1 suggest, can help to make 
sense of these formal inconsistencies. 
Although Sheridan provides only limited prescriptive guidance to his audience of 
adult leamers in the Lectures, his definitions and classification of the art of elocution into its 
basic parts, combined with a relatively detailed expository explanation of the features and 
boundaries of each of these parts, establish an apparently systematic foundation for the 
transformation of the irregular and defective practices of British elocution into a known and 
disciplined techne. By speciSing and enumerating multiple distinct parts that together make 
up the whole art of elocution, Sheridan's defintions ampli@ the sense of disciplinary 
fullness; however, the slight shifts in these definitions indicate the instability of elocution's 
disciplinary boundaries, while the greater number of divisions accorded to the "rudimentsn 
(Sheridan 95) rather than the higher, more emotionally affecthg elements of delivery 
foregrounds the decorous limits both of elocution's disciplinary property and of the aspiring 
speaker implied by Sheridan's method. 
In the Lectures, Sheridan provides two main divisional definitions of his subject 
matter. It is the second of these that Sheridan figures as the fondation fiom which he will 
"examine the several parts of elocution" (19). "Elocution," he States, "is the just and 
gracehil management of the voice, countenance, and psture in speaking" (19). This 
d e f ~ t i o n ,  in accordance with classical views, includes both vocal and physical delivery , or 
pronuntiatio and actio; however, physical delivery includes two parts of its own (the 
countenance and gesnire), increasing the main parts of elocution to three. Although 
classical writers specified facial expression and especially the expression of the eyes as a 
vital part of delivery, the eighteenth-century enurneration of "the countenance" as a distinct 
part of the field may be attributed to the contextual importance of the science of 
physiognomy which intluenced theories of the expression of the passions in both elocution 
and acting. According to Shearer West, "the issue of M i t e  variety [in late eighteenth- 
century theatre] came to be related to a growing interest in the science of physiognomy , as 
phy siognomy-the way stable extemal features reflect inner character-became 
interchangeable with pathognomy, or the expression of the passions" (138). The contextual 
significance of the science of physiognomy likewise supports the elocutionary link benveen 
interna1 moral character and external physical expressions since it presumes that specific 
facial features convey specific character traits (Shearer 139). 
Sheridan's foundational d e f ~ t i o n  implies that the "whole" of elocution includes 
these three main parts, and that these three main parts together constinite the whole art. 
Therefore, we would expect the subsequent examination of 'the several parts of elocution" 
to follow these three main divisions and give each approximately equal treatment. In fact, 
though, the divisions that Sheridan ends up making, and the relative weight and detail he 
accords each. do not match this preliminary definition. Most notably, his quasi-systematic 
analysis of elocution gives far more "presence" (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 236) to the 
divisions of vocal management (five lectures in dl), relegating the two parts of the 
countenance and gesture to a single lecture. As well, by focusing on the "rudiments" of 
good delivery, Sheridan's examination of elocution shortchanges the mles for acquiring 
truly "gracefuln and impressive delivery in favour of those aimed at merely "good" delivery 
(19). Grace and force in delivery, Sheridan explains, depend on the mastery of tones and 
gesture but these parts are distinct fiom the "rudiments" (95) which everyone requires to be 
included in the category of "gentlemann (21). 
Yet the precise parts of competent, sociaily respectable delivery are complicated by a 
prior d e f ~ t i o n  of elocution, a definition which corresponds less closely with classicai 
authority but which more accurately reflecü the divisions of elocution as Sheridan's method 
conceives them. About half way through kcture 1, he lists the necessary "ingredients" of 
"justn delivery: 
A just delivery consists in a distinct articulation of words, pronounced in 
proper tones, suitably varied to the sense, and the emotions of the mind; with 
due observation of accent; of emphasis, in its several gradations; of rests or 
pauses of the voice, in proper places and well-measured degrees of tirne; and 
the whole accompanied with expressive looks, and signifcant gesture. (10) 
The structural divisions of this passage indicate Sheridan's desire to break down elocution 
into manageable (Le., knowable and teachable) components . The abundance of commas and 
semi-colons conmbutes to this impression of careful distinctions among parts, but the 
inclusion of al1 within one sentence maintains a sense of coherence and comection. The 
diction of this passage (for example, terms such as "distinct," "varied," "several gradations, " 
"well-measured degrees" which connote difference, and words such as 'just, " "proper, " 
"suitably , " and "due" which connote deconun) stresses d@erentiation as the principal 
method for achieving decorous, well-managed elocution. This stress amplifies the rational 
appearance of elocution's disciplinary groperty . In this way , it appeals to a scholarly 
audience interested in the expansion and classification of a "department of knowledgen 
directed toward a refmed appraisal of elocutionary performers. For aspiring speakers, 
though, the enumeration of elocution's many parts clarifies but also complicates the task of 
learning "goodn delivery, since the more parts there are to l e m ,  the longer and harder the 
leamhg process becomes . 
Sheridan's subsequent lectures follow this enumeration of parts quite closely, though 
still with some variation: he begins with a section on "Articulation," then "Pronunciation," 
next "Accent," "Emphasis," 'Pauses or Stops," "Pitch," followed Dy "Tones" and "Gesture." 
Later, however, Sheridan aiters his definiùon of what ingredients really are necessary to 
"just" delivery . In his introduction to "Lecture VI" on 'Tones," he explains that the 
preceding parts are 'fundamentally , and essentially necessary to every public speaker" (93); 
by contrast, the "two remaining articles. " namely tones and gesture, are supplementary-they 
"add grace, or force" to delivery (93, my emphasis). In fact, this inconsistency is aiready 
present in the fust defuiition. Aithough Sheridan claims that "of al1 these ingredients, not 
one cm be spared from a good delivery ," the f i l  clause of his definition describes 
"expressive looks, and significant gesniren as accompanirnenfs-not essential parts-to the 
whole composed of the preceding parts (10). 
By situating the "accompanimentsn of "expressive looks and significant gesture" both 
inside and outside the domain of his system, Sheridan allows these higher, more powerful 
elements to act as motivating ideals to the aspiring student of elocution, while, at the same 
tirne, preserving an appropnate social "sense of lirnits" (Bourdieu, Distinction 471) through 
the exclusion of "grace, or force" from the necessary aspects of competent delivery. Far 
from being a simple example of logical inconsistency within Sheridan's text, the arnbiguity 
of his definitions of elocution cm be read as a rhetorically canny effort to articulate a 
situationally appropriate system: mastering the Iirnited set of ingredients which he clairns are 
fundarnentaily necessary for "goodn delivery offers his irnplied leamers an educational path 
to secure the cultural capital of gentlemanliness (see preceding section); this ideal of 
cornpetence is inferior to the exclusive ideal of tmly graceful and forceful delivery. 
However, by framing the limited ideal of "goodn delivery within the larger, ultimately 
desirable framework of excellent delivery, Sheridan constructs a difference of degree, not of 
kind, between the socially respectable and the socially powerful speaker. In this way , the 
higher ideal of consummate oratory motivates the lower ideal of competency, but the 
technique of differentiating the parts of merely "justn from those of perfectly graceful 
delivery ensures the continued exclusivity of the latter distinction and provides critical 
judges of elocutionary performance with a classification scheme for discriminating between 
the two kinds of speakers. 
Like Sheridan, Walker divides the whole subject matter of elocution into its 
elemental parts. This technique of division amplifies the disciplinary "presencen of his field 
of enquiry by drawing the reader's attention to its interna1 differentiations and away fiom 
the narrow scope of the field as a whole. Walker's d e f ~ t i o n  of elocution, which makes it a 
sub-category of pronunciation and limited to the art of reading, is one of the most reductive 
given by any of the elocutionary writers (see Chapter Two), yet his treatment of this narrow 
field is one of the most extensive and detailed. This tension between the narrowness of 
elocution's exteml boundaries and the copiousness of its intemal differentiation increases 
the impression that a precisely knowable and teachable techne of elocution can be - 
articulated, because elocution has been reduced to a classified, manageable object of study. 
The logical form of Walker's presentation of elocution stresses the intricate details of the art 
and gives an impression of exhaustive analysis. For the implied scholarly reader of his 
treatise, this quasi-logical form foregrounds the significance of elocution as a rich domain 
for analysis and classification. 
Despite the lirnited scope and fme differentiations that smcture Wallcer's system, the 
articulation of this system is, from its outset, informed by inconsistencies. These 
instabilities suggest the great dificulty, perhaps the impossibility, of bringing "the mayhem 
of the body" under precise, systematic control, while at the same t h e  they foreground 
Walker ' s des ire to participate in the eighteenth-century social project to standardize and 
codiv, in an exclusionary manner, "the proper compomnent of the body in a polite societyn 
(Porter, "HistoryJ' 217). For example, in definhg the scope of his subject matter, at the 
outset he clearly limits elocution to the area of vocal delivery. However, in the second 
volume of his treatise, Walker ends up including a iengthy section on gesture (modeled 
closely on Burgh's detailed catalogue), despite the boundaries of his opening definition. 
Walker's division of elocution into its constituent parts or 'elements" (as he calls 
them) is less explicit than Sheridan's. The titles of his chapters indicate the following as the 
main parts of the whole: punctuation, inflexion, accent, and emphasis. These are the 
elements which the "weakn (1: 47) speaker must master to achieve competence. As well, 
Waiker discusses the "modulation" of voice through proper 'pitch" or what he also calls 
"tone," and he concludes his whole work with the unilnnounced lengthy section on "gesture. " 
Waiker seems to present the fust four parts of punctuation, inflexion, accent, and emphasis 
as the necessary elements that a "weakn speaker must master to achieve competence. But he 
contradicts this interpretation by suddedy claiming only part way through his lengthy 
treatment of "inflexion," that "[a] t this point the present treatise might finish" (1 : 158). This 
statement implies that he already has covered the necessary material and that the remainder 
is somehow supplementary and unessential. Instead of stopping at this point, though, 
Waiker continues for more than another 3ûû pages to break down elocution into minute 
particulars. In temis of his implied audience of scholarly readers, Walker's theory of 
inflections constitutes his distinctive contribution to the growing department of elocutionary 
knowledge; although mastery of the other parts of elocution is necessary for asphhg 
speakers, these parts have been treated already by other writers and therefore do not 
constitute the essence of Waker's system. A contemporary review of Waiker's treatise 
corroborates the significance of this part of his work, noting how "he advances many things 
in this part of his work which merit particular attention," especially because "the inflexions 
of the voicen has b e n  "hitherto little regarded by writers on elocutionn (Monthiy Review 65 
[1781]: 8 ~ ) . ~  
The unstable divisions of Waker's techne are rnagnified further by his representation 
of the status of "inflexion" and "punctuation" within his systern. In the "Preface," he infonns 
us that the most important and fundamental element is "Inflexion"-that "precise and defuite 
quality of the voice. . . into which al1 speaking sounds may be resolvedn (1: ix-x). 
Accordingly, he devotes the most space to its elaboration and articulates the greatest number 
of rules for its proper practice. But the arrangement of his text introduces new ambiguities 
into the role and status of inflection in the ordering of his "elements." Instead of beguuiing 
with the "distinctionn that he daims originates and substantiates his system, the fust main 
division of his text examines punctuation. His discussion of inflection follows that of 
punctuation, giving the latter apparently the most elemental position in his system. For 
example, Waiker introduces inflections as accompaniments to the more fundamental 
"pausesn of punctuation: "Besides the pauses, which indicate a greater or less separation of 
the parts of a sentence and a conclusion of the whole, there are certain inflexions of voice, 
accompanying these pauses, which are as necessary to the sense of the sentence as the 
pauses themselves . . ." (1: 112). In one way, this passage equates the role and status of 
punctuation and inflectiom: they are 'besiden each other and each is necessary . However, 
for the cornparison to be effective (infiections are "as necessary" as pauses), the reader must 
already accept the primary necessity of pauses. In this way, the 'element" of punctuation 
'In fact, Joshua Steele's Prosudia Rationalis (1775) had already elaborated a theory of 
inflections, which Waker acknowledges in his "Preface," noting that his own attempt is 
"humbler" than Steele's effort "to bring every word to some part of the musical scalen (xi). 
Subsequent ctitics have accused Walker of "plagiarizingn Steele's views. For a description 
and refutation of these criticisms, see Lamb. 
seems prior to, or more substantial than. the 'elementn of inflectiodespite Walker's 
prefatory figuration of the founding role of inflection within his whole system. - 
ii) Austin 's Genus-Species Division 
Unlike Walker's and Sheridan's treatments of elocution, which focus on vocal 
delivery, Austin's Chironomia centres on gestural delivery. However, Austin positions his 
novel systern of gesture after detailed discussions of the various parts which rnake up the 
whole art of delivery. In the next chapter, I will analyze Austin's extensive system of 
rhetorical gesture; here, 1 will attend to the whole-part divisions of delivery which precede 
his exclusive focus on gesture. 
Like Sheridan, Austin subscribes to the division of delivery into the three main 
components of the voice, countenance, and gesture. Not only does he defme the field 
according to these three parts; he also provides chapter-length reviews of each one, citing 
both classical and modem authorities extensively to support his points. In this way, he 
arranges his treatise so that, initially, it affords an equitable and exhaustive representation of 
each of the main parts of delivery. By basing these reviews of each part on so many 
reputable sources and by arranging his text so that they precede the novel system of gesture, 
Austin bolsters the educated reader's confidence in the breadth and soundness of the 
scholarly background to his new undertaking. As weil, the division of the whole art of 
delivery iuto its various cornponents provides disciplinary amplification, an amplification 
that is augmented M e r  in Austin's subsequent multiple subdivisions of one part of this 
whole, namely gesture. 
In his chapter on "Gesture in Generaln (the third of these three review sections), 
Austin reassures readers who may be concemed that the licentiousness of theamical gesture 
could infect his system of rhetorical gesture by arguing that a system of gesture is valuable 
precisely because it differentiates between the kinds of bodily conduct suitable to different 
places and professions. The explication of these distinctions reinforces, rather than 
dissolves, the boundaries between deconun and indeconun: 
To distinguish the character of the delivery belonging to each profession, to 
discriminate their peculiar manner, force, and expression, and if possible to 
mark the lirnits of each distinctly, lest they should indecorously break in upon 
the bounds of each other, is the proper object of a system of gesture, and one 
of its most arduous labours. (135) 
Austin uses the quasi-logical scheme of genus-species division to dernarcate the 
different genres of delivery. This scheme is sirnilar to the enumeration of parts which make 
up a whole except that the argument by species, unlike the argument by enumeration of 
pans, "presupposes a similarity in kind between the parts and the whole" (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 235). Further, the nature and number of the species included under a 
genus cannot be "chosen at willn nor do they have to be exhaustive (235). For Austin, 
rhetorical delivery is a "genusn which possesses a number of "species." These "species" he 
calls the "modesn of public speaking. They include "Reading, Recitation, Declamation, 
Oratory , and Acting" (188). With the first of these main parts, he develops further sub- 
divisions, distinguishing the mode of reading into a hierarchy of six levels ("1. Intelligible. 
2. Correct. 3. Impressive. 4. Rhetorical. 5. Dramatic. 6. Epicn). Because each mode 
includes al1 three parts of delivery (namely , the voice, countenance, and gesture), each 
possesses "a similarity in kind" with its genus rather than being one incomplete part of a 
larger whole. This division of delivery into its main genres signals a shifi from attending to 
the instruments of delivery (Le., the various bodily instruments that the speaker uses) to 
focusing on the distinct scenes of speaking and the kinds of performances appropriate to 
these contexts. However, for al1 that Austin desires and claims to articulate clear 
boundaries between the various kiods of public speaking that together defme the whole 
genus, in reality this division of the art reveals the ambiguity of Austin's definition of what 
should be induded and what excluded. 
We see this ambiguity most dramatically in the final two chapters of this five-chapter 
section, Chapter VIII: 'Of Actingn and Chapter M: "Of the Ancient Pantomimes."' 
According to Austin's own statements, the subject matter of these chapters does not seem to 
41ronically, Austin includes more extensive treatment of theatrical delivery than either 
Sheridan and Waiker, both of whom worked as actors before embarking on their 
elocutionary careers. Perhaps this indicates Sheridan's and Walker's sensitivity to the 
socially problematic character of their former profession and their consequent desire not to 
have it foregrounded within their elocutionary doctrines. 
fit into his classificatory 
proper public speaking. 
scheme; they appear to uindecorously break in upon the boundsn of 
And yet he devotes two full chapters, at the very centre of his 
treatise, to the fonns of delivery and gesture which he wishes to exclude from his whole 
system. The division of public speaking into its different genres implies "a sirnilarity in 
kind between the parts and the whole." But Austin's emphasis in his chapter on acting on 
the differences, to the point of contrariety, between the modes of oratory and acting shows 
how each species may differ frum othen, while apparently sharing the essence of the 
genus.' He opens with an extended comparison that consrructs the dissimilitude of oratory 
and acting: 
Acting is disthguished from oratory, both by the subject, the character of the 
speaker, and the manner. The actor is seldom supposed to deliver his own 
composition, so that his merit is generally considered separately from that of 
the part, which he sustains. . . . The orator, on the contrnry, appears always 
in his own character. . . . The actor traverses the whole stage; as he is 
moved by passion, or by the circumstances of the scene. The orator is 
limited in the movement of his lower limbs, at most, to an occasional, single 
step, in advancing or retiring, or perhaps merely to a change of position of 
the feet. The gesture of the actor is unrestrained. . . But the liberty of the 
theatre would be licentiousness in the orator, and he is to guard hirnself 
carefûlly against it. (240, my emphasis) 
This comparison reinforces the prescription of selfdiscipline and self-restraint that 
the aspiring speaker must, Austin maintains, vigilantly enact in order to achieve social 
respectability (see next section). Through this comparison between the orator and the actor, 
Austin implicitly warns that even a slight lack of self-restraint, a momentary unguardedness 
may cause the aspiring orator to become guilty of '1icentiousness." The rigorous way in 
which Austin distinguishes the proper gesture of oratory from the proper gesture of acting 
indicates, perhaps, the threatening yet attractive proximity of the latter to the former. 
Certainly, Walker's and Sheridan's backgrounds as professional actors reveal the real 
'BY contrast, the earlier modes were represented as having only degrees of difference 
from oratory ; they lead up to oratory . 
closeness of the two worlds; Burgh and Cockin also demonstrate great fondness and 
admiration for theatricai delivery; and Austin himself indicates his great admiration for at 
least one respectable actor, Sarah Siddons. But the legitimacy of the elocutionq project 
depends on its assertion of a wholly distinct "scenen for itself by conaast with the highly 
popular but socially-suspect world of theatre. His defensive approach shows his 
appreciation of gesture 's questionable status, a status associated with concepts of indeconun 
and 'licentiousness." During the eighteenth century the world of the theatre gained 
increasing respectability by comparison with its Restoration excesses, a respectability due in 
part to Sheridan's strenuous efforts at moral reform while a theatre manager, but more 
panicularly to the influence of leading actors such as David Garrick and Sarah Siddons 
whose own decorous, unimpeachable pnvate lives helped to give the profession of acting a 
more favourable reputationS6 However, as Kristina Straub notes, despite propaganda 
arguing for the social and moral deconim of the profession of acting, decorous actors were 
seen as the exception to the nom while most actors continued to occupy a "liminal positionn 
in the class structure (30, 26). in particular, actors were cbaracterized in tenns of excessive 
sexuality, a sexuality associated with disease, effeminacy , and a lack of dignity or self- 
control (32-33). Given the currency of such cultural representations, Austin's association of 
theamcal gesnire with licentiousness makes rhetorical sense, whiie at the same time his 
obvious admiration for actors such as Mrs. Siddons demonstrates the ambiguous, partial 
respectability of some aspects of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century world of 
the theatre.' 
The chapter on "ancient pantomimes," which Austin does not name in his initial 
division of the modes of public speaking, appears even more incongrnous with the other 
genres of oratory. In the innoductory sub-heads of this chapter, he States quite clearly that 
pantomime should not be associated with the proper domain of oratory (the first sub-head 
reads "The pantomimic art not properly comected with rhetorical deliveryn), yet Austin 
6 ~ o r  more on Sheridan's efforts to reform the theatre, see Bacon, 6-8 and Straub, 102- 
103. 
'For more on the issue of the theatre's moral and social respectabilis, in the second half 
of the eighteenth century, see West, especially 1 1-18, and Woods, 18-24. 
nonetheless chooses to include a discussion of this improper form of non-verbal 
communication. The manner in which he introduces it further confuses its statu. At fust, 
Austin seems to be giving pantomime a kind of foundational stanis and commending its 
great powers of communication: 
If the art of gesture be worthy of cultivation, it would appear that it should be 
cultivated in its highest perfection, and that its perfection must consist in its 
power of communicating the thoughts independant [sic] of language. In this 
view the pantomimic art should be the sole object for the investigation and 
acquisition of those who study the art of gesture; for the pantomimes express 
entire dramas without the aid of words. (251) 
As it nirns out, Austin sets up these premises ody to disregard them, although he 
does not refute them directly. Instead, he simply States that, despite the "extraordinaryn 
powers of the gestures of pantomime, this genre of universal and independent non-verbal 
language "forms hardly any portion of the proper subject of Our present enquiry" (25 1). By 
contrast with the independent significations of the gestures of pantomime, rhetorical delivery 
properly concem itself with "the gesture suited to the illustration and enforcement of 
language, not to the gesture which supersedes its usen (251). The nature of this rhetorical 
gesnire, claims Ausrin, is "altogether different" from that of pantomime (253). A few 
paragraphs later, however, he modifies his introductory statement of the absolute disjunction 
between rhetorical and pantomimic gesnire. He now explains that "although the pantomimic 
art is remote from the main object of this work," stiil it is a subject "in some measure 
c o ~ e c t e d  with itn (253). By alternatively figurhg the distinction, first, as a qualitative 
difference in nature and, second, as a quantitative difference of degree, Austin attempts to 
resotve the incornpatibility of including pantomime as one part of the whole of rhetoncal 
delivery . But these altemations also once again demonstrate the awkwardness that Austin 
experiences in trying, on the one hand, to be tme to the ultimate authonty of classical 
* 
culture (pantomime, he says, "boasts of classic ongins" 12531) and, on the other, to exclude 
perceived impropneties from his system. 
Just as Austin does not explicitly refure the premise that the "perfectionn of gesture 
"must consist in its power of communicating the thoughts independent of Ianguage," neither 
does he openly justiQ his counter proposition that the "proper subjectn of his enquiry is 
"gesture suited to the illustration and enforcement of languagen (25 1). Rather, he presumes 
that his readers, like himself, will take for granted the propriety of focushg on gesture that 
supports and clarifies, but never exceeds, the sense and struciures of verbal language. The 
"wholen of delivery becomes, in this figuration, merely a supplement to the fonns and 
meanings of verbal language. It has no independent status or property fully its own. Yet, 
even though this subordination of gestural language to verbal language necessarily 
diminishes the power and scope of the former, it also amplifies the disciplinary credibility of 
Austin's project because it situates non-verbal gesture as supportive of the established 
'reality" of enquiries and practices in verbal language. And while this chapter on 
pantomime seems out of place in Austin's overall demarcation of the boundaries of oratory. 
it permits hirn to show, QS he rejects it, the "highest perfectionn of gesture which has the 
"power of communicating the thoughts independant of language" (251). In this way, Austin 
simultaneously emphasizes the great significance of his general subject rnatter (gesture) and 
selects its less powerful, more decorous species suitable to the art of public speaking. 
bgical Appeals to Implied Leamers 
The forego ing arguments-that is , Sheridan' s dy sanalogical rationale for the necessity 
of aniculating a systematic method of elocutionary study combined with the quasi-logical 
division of elocution into parts-appeal mainly to an Mplied comunity of critical scholars, 
rather than a broader community of leamers, because they foreground the disciplhary status 
and scope of elocution more than its prescnptive application. In this section, 1 examine the 
main logical appeals of the elocutionary systems to those concerned with leamhg the 
performative applications of these s y stems. Lie the log ical arguments already examined , 
these appeals employ both argumentative schemes based on the structure of reality and the 
formal reasoning of quasi-logical argumentation. Specifically, Sheridan and Austin employ 
a person-act scheme to persuade leamers to follow the general rule of self-vigilance. 
Walker's system demonstrates a further use of the quasi-Iogical whole-part scheme to 
enurnerate the detailed rules of his prescriptive system. (Austin's system employs a similar 
technique, which I analyze in Chapter Four .) Sheridan's, Austin's, and Walker's technai al1 
draw on an ends-means argumentative structure to persuade their implied students-that 
diligentl y following their prescrip tive guidance is worthwhile . This guidance, ho wever , 
makes the leamer's personal diligence as, if not more, important than the rules themselves 
in securing the limited "endn of elocutionary competence. And, paradoxically , success in 
achieving this performative competence depends on the student's receptive competence in 
vigilant self-appraisal and comprehension of complex rules. 
a) nte  Person-Act Argument of Self-vigilance 
The person-act argument, as we have already seen, posits a relationship of co- 
existence between a person and his or her actions, such that one identifies the other and a 
transfer of value can occur between them (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 297). Sheridan's 
general argument, discussed above, is that the desirable identity of gentlernanliness depends 
on a person's ability to follow regulated systems of written and, potentially, spoken 
language correctly. Although the Lectures provide only a preliminary method for teaching 
and regulating the latter domain, Sheridan prescribes the mle of self-vigilance to his adult 
audience as a crucial means for acquiring a 'just" though not excellent delivery. This rule is 
based on a person-act argument in the sense that it presupposes a relationship of co- 
existence between the speaker's socially respectable identity and his actions of self- 
vigilance. Self-vigilance thus becomes a defining feature of the aspiring speaker, not simply 
an externally imposed rule. But this ability to monitor oneself against bad habits 
paradoxically entails a division within the person of the speaker between his performative 
and apprais ing selves. 
Sheridan recommends the foliowing basic method to his adult learners for curing 
themselves of a "vitious articulation," which is virnially the same method he suggests for 
achieving competence in al1 the rudirnentary parts of elocution: 
To cure any imperfections in speech, arising originally from too quick an 
utterance, the most effectua1 method, will be, to lay aside an hour every 
morning, to be employed in the practice of reading aloud, in a manner, much 
slower than is necessary. This should be done in the hearing of a fkiend, or 
some person whose office it should be, to remind the reader, if at any time he 
should perceive him mending his pace, and falling into his habit, of a quick 
utterance. . . . 1 would have him, for some tirne, read the words of a 
vocabulary, in the alphabetical order. In this way, he will soon fmd out, 
what letters and syllables, he is apt to sound too faintly, and slur over. Let 
him make a list of those words; and be sure to pronounce them over 
distinctly , every morning , before he proceeds to others. (27-28) 
Beyond the cornmonsensical advice to make a list of words one has trouble with, to practice 
reading aloud daily , and to have someone monitor this practice, Sheridan offers his adult 
students virtually no detailed guidance, in the form of specific rules and techniques, for 
overcorning years of 'bad habits. " As the review in the Scots Magazine notes, beyond 
general advice, "his pupils are lefi to themselves" (24 [1762] : 60 1). 
In this sense, he does not really succeed in transforming the art of elocution from a 
matter of "chancen into a knowable and teachable techne, whose rules ideally would be as 
explicit, well-known, and settled as those of "written language" (21). But his lack of success 
in producing a fuliy knowable and teachable techne of elocution can be seen as, in a sense, 
situationally-appropriate rather than simply a failure to complete his stated objectives. 
Sheridan's simple method of self-improvement tacitly presupposes his implied reader's 
proximity to, if not yet full inclusion within, "polite lifen and "good companyn (30). The 
kind of person whose actions rnay be "curedn through the method that he recommends is 
someone who already inhabits a sufficientiy respectable social world that this person, or at 
least this person's intimate acquaintances, can differentiate between acceptable and 
unacceptable habits. On the one hand, this presupposition helps to maintain the mystery of 
the established social order by ensuring that only those who already have some habitua1 
knowledge of the forms of social politeness may further improve theu positions. On the 
other hand, access to "good company" and the knowledge of what constitutes polite 
behaviour is not limited to those born into socially exclusive circles. Although Sheridan's 
method for curing imperfections does not provide explicit techniques for discriminating and 
irnitating signs of status (Hariman 152), the eighteenth-century context of social flux 
suggests that many of his adult leamers are close enough to "polite lifen to be able to 
discrimiaate and educate thernselves in these signs even if they do not possess much 
inhented social prestige. In this way. Sheridan simultaneously opens up the study of 
elocution to a relatively wide market of stam aspirants while constmcting a socidly 
exclusive system. 
By basing the method for curing defects on the person's own vigilance or that of a 
close "fiend," Sheridan transfers responsibility for his rnethod's effectiveness onto the 
person of the student: most obviously, he makes the student's diligence in exercise a 
necessary requirement for success. More iùndamentaily, though, he makes proper elocution 
depend on the aspiring, but infected, speaker's ability to correctly appraise his own 
weaknesses. This process of self-criticism and self-control corresponds with Norbert Elias' 
identification of factors crucial to the civilized bodies of modem European society. As 
Shilling explains, Elias' "civilized body . . . has the ability to rationalize and exen a hi@ 
degree of control over its emotions, to monitor its own actions and those of others, and to 
internalize a fmely demarcated set of rules about what constitutes appropnate behaviour in 
various situationsn (1 50-5 1). This internalization of niles and the ability self-consciously to 
monitor oneself as well as others reflects a kind of "reception regime" (Hodge and Kress 4), 
a set of standards for decoding and ranking the meanings of particular bodily behaviours. 
Only if the speaker can properly decode and assess the social appropriateness of his own and 
others' conduct-for example, by distinguishing between correct and incorrect f o m  of 
articulation-will he be able to train himself in a decorous performance regime. 
As bodies become more and more "civiiized," according to Elias, the thresholds of 
social shame and embarrassment correspondingly nse (Shilling 160, 151). This argument 
presupposes a person-act CO-existence, since the person's interna1 experience of shame or 
embarrassment corresponds with his or her external actions. Sheridan's desire to cultivate 
these moral thresholds in the person of the aspiring speaker appears, as 1 have discussed, in 
his argument that the "known rules" of written language dernarcate shameful behaviour from 
polite, gentlemanly conduct. By advocating an explicit repertoire of rules to standardize 
"acts" of elocution, Sheridan similarly desires an advance in the threshold of embarrassrnent 
that the person perfonning these acts will experience. Appropriately, therefore, Sheridan 
advises his adult audience to engage in ongoing practices of "mortificationn to rid themselves 
of the sharneful faults that they have identified in themselves. Burke describes mortification 
as "a kind of governance, an exaeme form of 'self-control'." This extreme selfdiscipline 
entails selfdivision because "the mortified must, with one aspect of himself, be saying no to 
another aspect of himself" (Burke, On Symbols 289). The practices of mortification that 
Sheridan recommends nirn the speaker on himself, always watchiag critically for and ready 
to punish his own transgressions. As well , Sheridan's reference to these selfdisciplinary 
practices of mortification as "taking suitable painsn (18) chillingly rerninds us that "the 
leaming of self-controls . . . is never a process entirely without pain; it always laves scarsn 
(Shilling 165). To avoid slipping back into conditions of disgrace requires constant self- 
vigilance because, Sheridan rnaintains, the original "bad habitsn of his audience of adult 
speakers have, through tirne, become strongly engrained. Therefore, they must 
continuously guard againsr the multiple irnproprieties to which their original identities make 
them vulnerable. As a result, the transformation of their identities fiom corrupt to 
competent works primarily through the reductive process of circumscribing their habitua1 
actions to avoid excessive, indecorous behaviour. In this way, the person of the aspiring 
speaker becomes closely associated with the propriety of his actions. 
Unlike Sheridan's adult audience of "autodidact[s] " (Porter, English 1601, the 
irnplied students for Austin's system are young male pupils whose instruction is regulated 
carefully by teachers and detailed rules. As he explains, the immature judgrnent of his 
youthful learners makes this extemal regulation necessary: "On his commencement as a 
public speaker (which cannot begin too early), it is necessary to teach him everything and to 
regulate by rules every possible circumstance in his delivery. . . . After sufficient practice 
and imtmction, he will regulate his own m e r  according to the suggestions of his 
judgment and taste" (282). In Austin's pedagogical system, the speaker's abiiity to judge his 
actions appropriately depends on extensive prior instruction in the rules of proper delivery. 
In this way, the "merit of the personn proceeds from his conformity to rules which 
"prescribe or prohibit certain acts" (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 296). 
However, even though Austin provides a much more extensive system of mies for 
training aspiring speakers than Sheridan does, and even though he presumes a group of 
learners subject to the tutelage of a schoolmaster rather than self-taught adult learners, the 
principle of self-vigilance likewise underlies his pedagogical method. His discussion of the 
propriety of shedding tears as a public speaker demonstrates the importance of this principle 
to his theory of delivery. In this instance, self-vigilance becomes the means through which 
the person of the public speaker avoids the charge of acting in an effeminate manner, while 
benefitting ffom the highly moving action of shedding tears on rare occasions. Despite 
classical endorsements of the persuasive power of shedding tears, Austin asserts that tears 
are a dangerous sign of weakness and effeminacy which threaten the speaker's "manly 
f m e s s n  and rnay excite "derision rather than commiseration" (107). 
Austin's attitudes about the propriey of shedding tears refiect a contextual tension 
between endorsements and condemations of this f o m  of expression for men. On the one 
hand, the late eighteenth-cenniry cult of "sensibilityn fiequently represented the shedding of 
tears by men as a desirable action. Janet Todd cites Lovelace's explanation in CIarissa that 
"tears . . . are no signs of unmnnliness, but contrarily of a humane nature" (Richardson qtd. 
in Todd 99) to exempli@ the sensibility doctrine that "[tlhe man of feeling cries easily and 
other benevolent characters share his tears" (Todd 99). This doctrine, she argues, 
represents the body as "a true communicator beyond rational speech" (99). The style of 
acting popularized by Garrick during the eighteenth century similarly endorsed tears as a 
positive action. According to Leigh Woods, "[tlears and other signs of extreme emotions 
did not represent weakness to Garrick and his audience, but stood rather as an energy which 
could be chanwlled constructively into dynamic and alhuistic actionn (53). To the extent 
that Austin believes in the body's persuasive power "beyond rational speech," then tears 
have a role in his system of delivery. However, the "extreme emotions" of the theatre are 
not, in his view, appropriate to the domain of public oratory. Primarily, then, his 
discussion indicates a wary, fairly condemnatory attitude about the social propriety of male 
public speakers shedding tears. This attitude can be linked to the post-revolutionary, 
conservative reaction to the cult of sensibility. According to Todd, "[t]o many in Britain the 
cult of sensibility seemed to bave femùiized the nation, . . . and emasculated menn (133). 
By contrast with an ostensibly effeminate indulgence in tears, Austin advocates a vigilant 
self-control that corresponds more with a masculinized 'rational and scientific world viewn 
typical of the middling ranks in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Davidoff 
and Hall 26-27) than it does with the priaciples of sensibility. 
However, instead of banning the potentially effeminate action of tears altogether 
from the speaker's inventory of socially decorous behaviour, Austin perrnits "the affecting 
effusion of tearsn a degree of acceptance in his system (113). This acceptance depends on 
the speaker's ability to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate occasions and to maintain 
vigilant self-control even while he sheds a few tears: 
he will restrain himself as much as possible, and not suffer his pathetic 
imagination to get the better of him, except on the most justifiable occasion; 
and then he will be brief. If he burst out for a moment, he will stifle his 
emotion and quickly recover his voice, and speak his feelings with f m e s s ,  
even though the silent tear obscure his eyes, and trickle d o m  his rnanly 
cheek. (113) 
This prescriptive passage indicates the great importance that Austin places on the aspiring 
speaker's ability rationally to control and even wifhhold the self, so that his bodily actions 
betray no embarrassing habits that would disgrace the person of the speaker. For the 
aspiring speaker, the art of restraint is a paramount strategy for gaining social acceptance, 
for being deemed "civilizedn in Elias' sense of the bodily rationalization integral to the 
civilizing process. if the aspiring speaker allows his strong emotions to "get the better of 
him," then he runs the risk of k ing  judged, not 'affecting," but ridiculous. This mle 
endorses and constmcts a speaker characterized primanly by his negative, self-disciplined 
capacity to "retrenchn (Austin 137) his bodily expressions to avoid the social embarrassrnent 
of ridicule. 
b) Waiker's Quasi-Logicai Enurneration of Rules 
The means for securing the limited ideal of elocutionary cornpetence include 
adherence both to the fundamental principle of self-vigilance and to numerous specific rules 
of conduct. The enuneration of copious rules designed to train the speaker in decorous 
delivery occurs in Walker's and Austin's treatises (the latter to be discussed in the next 
chapter). This enumeration constitutes a M e r  use of the whole-part quasi-logical 
argument: having divided the whole study of elocution into its elemental parts, Walker sub- 
divides each of these parts into an extensive catalogue of specific niles that the aspiring 
speaker must follow. This technique of vertical differentiation gives his elocutionary system 
an impression of depth and complexity, while masking its narrow scope. 
Waiker's intention in developing this detailed system is, as he explains in the 
"Preface," to provide 'plain practical rules in a scholastic and methodical form, that would 
convey real and useful instruction" (1: viii). While the "scholastic and methodical-formn of 
his system addresses mainly the interests of an audience of scholarly judges, its "real and 
usefbl instructionn is directed primarily to his implied snidents who, Like Austui's snidents, 
are expected to practise his rules under the careful guidance of an instnictor. Whiie 
implicitly agreeing with Sheridan's basic argument that elocution requires "settled 
principles" and "known rulesn (21), Walker distinguishes his own work fkom Sheridan's by 
clariQing that he intends to provide more than "florid harangues" that recommend but do not 
produce a practical system of instruction. This attempt to combine a "scholastic . . . formn 
with "useful instruction" was commended by the Monthiy Review, which acknowledged the 
superiority of Walker's system of copious rules to Sheridan's simple, general advice: 
. . . general rules (such, for instance, as, that the reader or speaker should 
follow nature, or imitate the tones of conversation) can be but of little use, 
without some certain method of applying them to particular cases. 
For these reasons we cannot but approve of the pains which those who 
have lately written on this subject have taken, to teach the art of elocution by 
plain practical rules, delivered in a methodical form. The Author of these 
Elements appears to us, to have been particularly successful in his attempt to 
reduce the principles and niles of elocution into a system. . . . (65 [1781]: 
$1) 
The schoolroom focus of Walker's treatise (held in tension with his other focus on 
the world of the "learnedn) is evident from the prefatory reference to his "long practice, in 
actual tuitionn (1: xiv), a practice descnbed many years later by a former student wishing to 
praise "the guidance and correctionn that Walker offered his pupils: 
Methinks, Mr. Urban, 1 now see the worthy man, rendered venerable by his 
years, but still more by his vktues and consurnmate ski11 in his profession, 
standing in the rnidst of his pupils (who are listening with silent respect and 
attention) in the very act of communicating his instruction; and surely no 
object could be more grateful to the sight, or pleasing to the feelings. . . . 
[Albove all, the moral and pious tendency of his tuition cannot be too much 
extolled and admired. He never omitted any opporninity to irnprove the 
heart, at the same time that he was initiating his pupil in the science of 
Elocution. (Gentleman 's Magazine 1807: 1 122) 
The methodical detail of his system for "real and useful instruction" addresses a 
pedagogical context that would permit early and extended supervision of the learner's 
progress through the many stages of the rules for the elements of elocution. This pedagogy 
is directed, not toward "strong" (Walker 1 : 48) speakers who do not require the substitute of 
a repertoire of rules in order to secure the highly valued competence of decorous physical 
conduct, but rather "weak" (1 : 47) speakers for whom the regulation of niles and exercise 
provides the educational rneans for securing adequate, though not excellent, delivery. As 
W&er explains, in c o n s ~ c t i n g  his techne of elocution, he has "rather consulted the 
in f i i t i e s  than the perfections of my fellow-creanires; by endeavouring to point out those 
resources which are necessary to the weak, without imposing them as rules upon the strongn 
(1: 47-48). 
Although the numerous rules that Waiker articulates for each element of elocution 
are necessary, he implies, for acquiring cornpetence in public speaking, the rules on their 
own do not constitue a sufficient means. The student's diligence in practice likewise is 
crucial. This stress on personal diligence shows another use of the person-act scheme of 
argumentation: the person's inherent virtue of diligence underlies the success of the rules for 
action articulated in Waker's system: 
Nothing but habitua1 practice will give the musician his neatness of execution, 
the painter his force of colouring, and even the poet the happiest choice and 
arrangement of his words and thoughts. How then can we expect that a 
luminous and elegant expression in reading and speaking can be acquired 
without a sirniiar attention to habitua1 practice? This is the golden key to 
every excellence, but can be purchased only by labour. unremitting labour, 
and perseverance. (2: 1 19-120) 
Appropriately , Waiker, who has already characterized himself as a persevering , industrious 
writer and teacher, invokes similar traits in his implied students. For both Walker and his 
shidents, extreme diligence is a necessary trait for success precisely because they do not 
"natukdlyn possess uexcellencen; instead . they must consciously and unremitting ly labour to 
achieve the social cachet of a "luminous and elegant expressionn or, in Waker's case, the 
cultural capital of being recognized as the author of a systematic, scholarly inquiry . By 
naming "habitua1 practice" as the primary method through which both he and his implied 
students may approach, if not actually amive at, higher social and disciplinary positions, and 
by characterizing this labour as "unremitting ," Waiker postpones the question of when 
success or the lack of success can be measured def~t ively .  In this way, he introduces a 
kind of perpenial motivation to the aspirant's efforts to achieve the distant ideal of 
excellence. The copiousness of the niles that the student must master through his diligent 
practice fumer extends the magnitude of his labour and defers the attairunent of "elegantn 
elocution. In part, then, this system turns the student's focus away frorn the final "end" and 
ont0 the "means" as valuable in themselves. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that 
"[aln activity may . . . be evaluated as a means. This evaluation does not result from the 
transformation of an end into a means, but from the importance something . . . is 
recognized to possess as an instrumentn (276). The mles of Waiker's system combined with 
the student's "habitua1 practice" are the valuable instruments of elocutionary pedagogy. 
In addition to possessing an inherent character of diligence. the kind of person suited 
to Iearning Walker's system cm be deduced from the specialized grammatical teminology 
which he uses to articulate his rules. His use of this terminology means that his readers 
must already be able to decipher the significations of the complex meta-language of 
grafnmar before they can practise the ostensibly 'plain practical rules" that Walker has laid 
down. His ideal reader is someone who already possesses not only a practical rnastery of 
correct grammatical forms, but also a symbolic or reflexive mastery of the critical codings 
(i.e., the rules, the labels, the concepts) which explicate the practices of grammar. 
Although he may flatter himself that his system provides "real and useful instruction" 
through "plain practical rules" for al1 those classified as "weak," in reality, the rules and 
principles articulated in his treatise are already socially exclusive because they are fully 
accessible only to an audience familiar with the specialized technical terminology of verbal 
grammar and able to comprehend absaact, scholarly language. His first rule of 
punctuation, for example, instructs the reader as follows: "Rule 1. Every direct period 
consists of two principal constructive parts, between which parts the greater pause must be 
inserted" (1: 64). Other rules, and explanations for these rules, employ a host of technical 
grammatical terms (e.g., "nominative case," "genitive case," "the object and the adjunct," 
"clause. " "concluding series, " "penultimate member," "cornplex sentence, " "loose sentence, " 
"substantive," to cite just a few), which together severeiy constrain the accessibility of 
Walker's text. 
Clearly, such a scholarly, exclusive discourse appeals primarily to those members of 
Walker's implied audience who inhabit "the philosophical and critical cornmunityn 
responsible for defining the standards of language use that the broader (but still exclusive) 
reading public sought to pactise (Ulrnan 32). The youthfuiness of Waiker's implied 
students suggests that most would not possess the high literacy necessary to decode 
appropriately the meta-language of grammatical terms and concepts. Therefore, the 
successfbl employment of Walker's treatise as a tool for learning proper elocution requires 
the mediation of masters of elocution who will decode and enforce the language of Walker's 
rules for the students they supervise. Unlike Sheridan's Lectures which attempt to provide 
the adult learner with simple prescriptions that he cm apply on his own, Waiker's system 
addresses the context of an educational institution in which schoolmasters "regulate by rules 
every possible circumstance" (Austin 282) in their young pupils' delivery. 
The logos of the middle sections of Sheridan's, Walker's, and Austin's treatises thus 
address both readers interested in developing and enforcing standards of language use, and 
readers who wish to leam how to act according to these standards. By cornbining 
substantive reasoning "bas& on the structure of realityn (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca ix) 
with the formal appeals of quasi-logical argumentation, these writers present a logical case 
for valuing the new "reality" of elocutionary study to both groups of readers. In part, this 
value derives from the "apparent neutralityn of the academic systerns these writers develop 
(Bourdieu, Distinction 477). However , as Sheridan's dy sanalogy between written and 
spoken language shows, the value of the new elocutionary field also is linked explicitly to 
the issue of social status-specifically, to securing (or not losing) the cultural capital of 
gentlemanly status by conforming to a systematic techne of elocution. Even though the 
elocutionary technai are intended as applied systems of instruction. the competent practices 
of elocution that they define require a highly developed "receptive competence." This 
competence is required not only of the teachers and scholars positioned as extemal judges of 
aspiring speakers, but of the aspirants themselves whose command of the codes of proper 
conduct depends on their abiliry to vigilantly "guard against bad habitsn (Austin 124). 
Further, the extensive, complex detail of Walker's and Austin's rules for proper conduct 
(see Chapter Four for a fuller analysis of Austin's systern), while it may help to make 
elocution a knowable and teachable art, also increases the possibilities for students to 
transgress these rules and thus to "disgrace" (Sheridan 21) themselves. As well, the division 
of elocutionary study into multiple parts and sub-parts focuses the leamer's attention ont0 
the instrumental "meansn rather than the desired "endn of acquiring competent delivery. 
These quasi-logical divisions foreground the diligent process of leaming each of the many 
steps within each rudimentary part, rather than the achievement of effective delivery as a 
whole. 
In the ways that 1 have anaîyzed, the logos of the middle sections articulates a 
rationally impressive case for the scholarly and social value of systematic elocutionary 
study . However, a fundamental tension underlies these substantive and forma1 arguments, 
namely the tension between the competent speaker who successfully learns the "rudimentsn 
of delivery (Sheridan 95) by following the elocutionists' prescnptive technai and the 
"strongn speaker for whom, as Walker explains, niles are an imposition not a help (1: 47- 
48). Austin likewise characterizes his implied student as someone for whom a middling 
position of competence, rather than excellence, should be adequate. The reason for 
studying the art of delivery, he maintains, is not because "[tlhese acquisitions are . . . 
equally within the reach of alln but because "it is sharnefùl to be the last in the race of 
honour" (124). According to this logic, the elocutionary systems promise to help "weakn 
(Walker 1: 48) speakers avoid disgrace, but they do not offer any sure methods for 
achieving the "honourn of truly excellent delivery. Nowtheless, the image of an ideal orator 
who commands an emotionally powemil, rather than decorously restraiwd, delivery frames 
the more circumspect person of the competent speaker implied by the elocutionary technai. 
As 1 shail discuss in Chapter Five, this ideal orator inspires but exceeds the scope, and in 
some ways contradicts the objectives, of the elocutionary systems of instruction. 
C W T E R  FOUR 
TIIE VISUAL ORDERING OF THE SPEAI(ER'S BODY IN 
AUSTIN'S SYSTEM 
The detailed system of rhetorical gesture which makes up the second half of Austin's 
Chironomia contributed distinctively to the elocutionary movement not only because of its 
extended focus on this part of delivery but also because of the many visual illustrations 
Austin included to clarify the operations of his system. Pnor to the Chironomia, James 
Burgh's The An of Speaking (176 1) had provided a lengthy descriptive catalogue of the 
ph y sical expressions of di fferent passions or attitudes, but these descriptions were pure1 y 
verbal. Austin's treatise, by contrast, integrates visual illustrations with words to represent 
gesture more fully than preceding elocutionary texts.' Most strikingly, the Chironomiu 
includes a separate section of eleven one-page 'plates" illustrating the various forms of 
physical delivery that make up Austin's system; as well, in the main part of his text, Austin 
uses other visual foms of a scientific nature to elucidate his system, most notably symbolic 
codes, lists, and tables. 
Although the 'visual literacyn of Austin's treatise is mainly one in which "visual 
communication has b e n  made subservient to language" (Kress and van Leeuwen 8). his 
visual forms have rhetorical functions that exceed a merely supporting role to the dominant 
verbal text. As Kress and van Leeuwen argue, 'the Msual component of a text is an 
'Like the Chironomia, John Bulwer's Chirologia (1644) provided detailed illustrations 
of rhetorical action, specifically hand gestures. However, there is no definite evidence that 
Austin was familiar with this text. As weli, this text was published some 100 yean before 
the flourishing of the British elocutionary 
to the elocutionary texts published during 
the absence of evidence that it influenced 
movement; as such, it is an important forerunner 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, but in 
Austin et al., it is beyond the scope of this study. 
independently organised and structured message," which repays analysis in its own right and 
not only from the perspective of the structures and functions of verbal text (4-5): Austin's 
various visual forms contribute in important ways to the construction and interpretation of 
his system, much as technical illustrations elucidate a scientific analysis. The complex 
layering of visual illustrations, symbolic codes. written descriptions, and extemal references 
produces, in this section of Austin's treatise, a 'stratifieci" technicd document. According 
to Bruno Latour, 
The difference between a regular text in prose and a technical document is 
the stratification of the latter. The text is arranged in layers. Each claim is 
interrupted by references outside the texts or inside the texts to other parts. to 
figures, to columns, tables, legends, graphs. Each of these in tum may send 
you back to other parts of the same texts or to more outside references. 
(Latour 48) 
Austin's visual text conforms pnncipaily to what Kress and van Leeuwen cal1 a 
''xientificltechnological coding orientation" (53). This orientation to the world privileges 
an ab stract , g eneralized, non-naturaiistic representation of reali ty over visual images w hic h 
emphasize more naturalistic, sensory feanires such as colour, texture, depth, and setting. 
The visual and verbal partitioning of the public speaker's body and gestures contributes 
further to this sense of the scientifically analyzed body. Even though Austin presents his 
work as an educational text, his visual ordering of the speaker's body addresses primarily 
an implied audience of specialized readers interested mainly in the scientific dissection and 
appraisal of competent spealang rather than readers striving to l e m  its successful practice. 
The scientific-technical nature of Austin's discourse on gesture is not surprising, 
given his active participation in the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin's amateur society of 
scholars interested both in ancient leaming and in science and modem literature (Gilbert 
227-28). As a member of this society, Austin presented and had published in the 
Academy's Transactions at least t h e  scientific articles: 'Description of an Apparatus for 
Impregnating Water and Other Substances Strongly with Carbonic Acid Gas" (1790), 
"Description of an Apparatus for Transfemng Gasses over Water or Mercury" (1799)' and 
"Description of a Portable Barorneter" (1803). In addition, he subrnitted in 1813 an article 
'On a New Construction of a Condenser and Air Pump" to the more prestigious Royal 
Society of London, addressed in letter form to the leading chemist and president of the 
Royal Society, Sir Humphry Davy. 
These articles demonstrate Austin's involvement, in a modest and amateur way, with 
the flourishing field of chemistry of the tirne. According to Jan Golinski, late eighteenth- 
century and early nineteenth-century developrnents in chemistry stressed this field "as a 
means of cultural and material improvement, capable of mobiiizing the energies of 
gentlemen and aristocrats in the pursuit of national progressn (7-8). Davy's approach to 
chemism in particular, Golinski claims, emphasized 'how its applications could benefit 
humanity in a stable and stratifted society" (9). If? as M. Berman argues, scientific societies 
of the era were motivated by the ideal of 'the wealthy amateur pursuing scientific research 
at his leisure" ('Hegemony" 34) and therefore offered an "obvious avenue to improved 
social statusn (36), then Austin's participation in the RIA was a means for securing cultural 
capi ta1 while contributing to the advancement of chemical knowledge. 
However, like his representation of the purpose and value of his rhetoricai system, 
Austin characterizes his forays into chemistry in modest, obliging terms. For example. he 
writes, "As a srnail attempt towards the improvement of this instrument, 1 beg l a v e  to offer 
to the Academy the following description of a portable barometern ("Description of a 
Portable Barometern 100); and to Sir Humphry Davy, 'According to your desire, 1 give you 
a description of my glass condenser, which, upon inspection, you were so obliging as to 
consider might possibly be found useful in some of those extensive and profound chemical 
researches, in which you are happily engaged" ('On a New Constructionn 138). Austin's 
articles do not recount the dramatic findings of innovative empirical experiments, but 
instead describe the construction and application of chemical appmtus that supports the 
central experimental activities of leading scientists. Similarly , for the most part Austin 
positions his systematic study of rhetorical gesture as supportive of, and hence subordinate 
to, the higher elements of verbal eloquence and the "intemal" parts of oratory. 
Austin's familiarity with the field of chemistry helps to explicate the foms and 
functions of his visual illustrations in the Chironomia. Specifically, the stratification of 
verbal and visual text-of coded legends and outside references in his scientific 
artidles-provides a context for understanding simiiar forms of stratification in the 
Chironomia. As weli, we can read Austin's ordering of the speaker's body in the 
Chironomia as linked to the contemporary interest in devising a uniform chemical 
nomenclature and in clearly depicting chernical apparatus. According to David Knight, 
By the later eighteenth century, the idea that chemistry was a mystery had 
been generally given up . . . research in chemistry soon becarne something 
for men of genius to perform with expensive apparatus, although its new 
language, devised by Lavoisier and his associate, was intended to be open, 
cl-, and unarnbiguous. If we foiiow the progress of chemistry . . . , we see 
in its visual part a transition from pictures and illustrations through to tables 
and diagrams; and this is closely related to the growth of a chemical 
community, ail trained in much the sarne way so that they could interpret 
these abstract foms of visual language, just as they could make sense of the 
bnef and impersonal text which the illustrations accompanied. ("Illustratingn 
136) 
In the Chironomia, Austin articulates a system of gesture which in many ways conforms to 
these developments in contemporary chemistry: he attempts to devise a "new languagen that 
will clearly and unambiguously denote the copious elements of rhetorical gesture: he 
stratifies "impersonal" verbal descriptions with visual ~ustrations to descnbe the parts and 
positions of the generic speaker's body; he uses abstract tables to order the symbolic 
elements of this new system of notation and the body positions to which these symbols 
refer; and his diagrammatic drawings of rhetorical gesture depict the generic speaker as 
more of a mechanical "apparatus" than a live, persuasive performer. As Knight argues, 
these foms of communication-despite the intention of openness and accessibility-presume 
a specialized comrnunity of readers trained to decipher the abstract, non-naturaiistic 
conventions of a scientific discourse. 
Although Austin's speciaüzed visual-verbal discourse in the Chironomza gives an 
initial impression of logical, scientific coherence, in reafity this discourse contains frequent 
incongniities which seem to be amplified, not reduced, by the visual illustrations he claims 
clari@ his verbal text (vii). As with the other elocutionary works, the instabilities of 
Austin's system are, 1 suggest, a symptom of the Chironomia's rnixed implied readership 
comhsed primarily of a culturaily prestigious group of "liberal schoIar[s]" (vi) interested in 
the analysis and appraisal, not the practice, of the codes and standards for poiite 
communication, and secondarily of a young group of pupils for whom prescnptive guidance 
in the performance of bodily decorum is intended to help them behave appropnately in "the 
great theatres of public eloquencen (Austin fi). To negotiate this tension, Austin constmcts 
a technically sophisticated system that appeals to the former group, while including 
prescnptive rules for the latter. As with Waker and Sheridan, the result of this 
combination is uneasy. In this case, the predominance of Austin's abstract, analytic 
discourse in the construction of his system of gesture forces its practical, prescriptive 
dimension into the margins. As a consequence, the Chironomia articulates principally a 
method for anaiyzing and decoding, rather than for learning and producing, proper 
rhetoricai gesture. 
During the Late eighteenth century , the field of chemistry experienced 'fa conrngion 
nomenclalive" (Crosland 203). This phenomenon, as Knight argues, constitutes a 
significant dimension of the scientific attempt to order the world logically: 'An important 
aspect of classification is naming. Once we can give names to things we have corne some 
way towards ordenng them; and the names may even indicate the place things have in the 
ordern (Ordering the World 24). The reforms to chernicd nomenclature proposed by 
Lavoisier and his associates demonstrate, says Knight, such an attempt. But these reforms 
were only one of seveml new systems developed dunng this period2 As an amateur 
chernist and member of the Royal Irish Academy, Austin witnessed-if he did not actually 
suffer from-the naming 'contagion" at first hand: his articles demonstrate his acceptance of 
the new terminology proposed by Lavoisier (for instance, he uses the tems 'oxygenn and 
"carbonic acid"), but he also no doubt was familia. with Stephen Dickson's rejection of 
Lavoisier's system. Dickson, a professor at Trinity College, Dublin, expounded his views 
in his Essq on Chernical Nomenclature (1796) and in a paper which he read to the RIA in 
2 See Crosland for more on the different chernical nomenclatures proposed during this 
period. 
1800. This context of scholarly interest in devising a new methodical language for naming 
chernical substances. based on "sound principlesn yet arnenable to minor reforms in the 
future (Crosland 179), helps to explain Austin's similar effort in the Chironomia to deveiop 
a new methodical language for notating and classifjmg rhetorical gestures.' 
Austin presents this system of notation. or new "language" of gesture. as the most 
important aspect of his contribution to the study of delivery: 
One of the rasons which may be assigned for the neglect of cultivating the 
art of gesture, is the want of a copious and simple language for expressing its 
different modifications with brevity and perspicuity . . . . mt  has been the 
misfortune of this art, that to display it fuily and intelligibly is most difficult. 
for it has hitherto been unfurnished with appropriate written language . . . . 
To produce a language of syrnbols so simple and so perfect as to render it 
possibie with facility to represent every action of an orator . . . and to record 
them for posterity, and for repetition and practice, as well as common 
language is recorded . . . may not be deemed unworthy of attention . . . 
(27 1, 274-5) 
By making the notation of gesture, rather than gesture itself, the foundation of and 
motivation for his whole system, Austin makes the abstract analysis of bodily conduct more 
signifiant than the embodied practices themselves. The rules for recording and decodi ng 
the meanings of gesture within his system are more important than the rules for producing 
those meanings in real, material performances. Even more than Walker, Austin focuses on 
developing an abstract, theoretical discourse about delivery, a kind of meta-language that 
can "represent" and "recordn physical actions but does not necessarily show how to pructise 
them. This hierarchy, in which notation takes precedence over performance, privileges the 
forms of writing and verbal language over those of non-verbal, bodily persuasion. 
' ~ h e  development of chernical nomenclature is by no means the only contextual activity 
that resembles Austin's efforts to develop a system of speciaiized names and symbols for 
gesture: contemporary music and dance are just two other fields in which symbolic notation 
was a primary concern. Joshua Steele's Prosodia Rahnalis (1775) best exemplifies the 
links between musical notation and vocal delivery; Austin's systern is unique because it 
devises a system of notation for gestural delivery. 
Paradoxically, making gesture intelligible means transforming it from embodied 
communication into a kind of wntten, Linguistic code. Austin's system thus posiiions the 
reader pnmarily as a distant, rational analyst and supenor observer of gesture, rather than 
an embodied, impassioned leamer and performer . 
But if Austin is ambitious to produce a 'simplen yet ucopiousn language that will 
express the different modifications of gesture with "brevity and perspiccity," then the way 
in which he describes the composition of this special discourse in his chapter "On the 
Notation of Gesture" shows its inconsistencies and limitations. Most notably. his code 
draws on a hybrid mix of pre-formed symbolic systems, depending on the conventions of 
both "common" verbal language and Arabic numerals. While this mix helps to expand the 
range of gestures that Austin's system can symbolize, it creates-as Austin himself 
acknowledges-arnbiguities and inconsistencies in the system's application. But instead of 
attempting to obscure the imperfections of his final system of notation, Austin chwses to 
foreground the narrative of his process of putting the code together. This narrative once 
again asks the reader to approve Austin's work on the basis of his diligent, well-intentioned 
effort rather than on the actual success or coherence of his final product. 
The twenty-six letters of the alphabet form the basic set of symbols that he uses in 
his notation. Each letter represents, in abbreviated form, a particular modification of 
gesture. These modifications are described using the vocabulary of common ianguage. 
Further, Austin mnemonically connects the single symbolic letten with the descriptive 
words they stand for by using the first letters of these words: for exarnple, the symbol "a" 
stands for 'ascending"; the symbol 'b" stands for 'backwards," and so on. This system 
addresses the main limitation of 'common languagen for noting gestures because it avoids 
the unwieldy quantity of words required to describe them fully. According to Austin, 'the 
number of words necesçary for any such description is so very great, that to particularize 
the gestures used in a few sentences would occupy in common lmguage almost as much 
r o m  as a long orationn (277). Austin's criticism of "common" verbal language creates 
space for his own, innovative symbolic system of notation which will reduce the space that 
the description of gestures occupies while nonetheless permitting a more extensive and 
refined representation than "cornmon language" aiiows. By implication, those who read and 
speak this specialized language wiii , like the lang uage i tsel f, display refinement . 
However, his choice of the alphabet as the basic code for his system demonstrates 
his desire to maintain a strong connection between his new system and the "ordinw 
language. " To justiw this decision, he candidly explains that initially he considered 
inventing completely "new m e s n  for signifiing the minute modifications of gesture. but 
on reflection he reaiized the extreme 'embarrassment" of such an approach. Therefore. he 
"detemined to try every contrivance which rnight extend the resources of the ordinary 
language" (357). This decision to draw on "ordinaryn language to develop his symbolic 
codes seems to conflict with his earlier critique of its shortcomings for his specialized 
purposes, but it also indicates his desire to make his code "open" (Knight, 'Illustrating" 136) 
to a more general readership. The deliberate association of his new system with "ordinary 
language" shows how Austin tries to negotiate the problem of appealing simultaneously to 
"learned and lay audiencesn (Ulrnan 35). Further, by modestly presenting his novel system 
of notation in the terms of established, common language, Austin reinforces the disciplinary 
decorum of his project and thereby avoids his own potential "embarrassment:" he does not 
make the presumptuous claim to have invented an entirely new language but carefully 
situates his work within the framework of dominant cultural forms and conventions. At the 
same tirne, however, he preserves the uncornmon value of his symbolic system by 
emphasizing its distinctions from and improvements to the resources of ordinary language. 
Thus, Austin's decision to associate his symbolic language of gesture with ordinary written 
language is rhetorically strategic; however, as he himseif admits, this choice lads his 
method into a series of logical 'difficulties" which, in order to be "got over" (357), require a 
variety of devices. 
Austin's narrative of the process of his composition reveals the limitations of his 
simple, fixed set of alphabetical symbols to 'discriminate" the 'minute and undefined 
differencesn among gestures (357). Most importantly, he encountered the problem of 
severai narnes of gestures beginning with the same letter, which meant that the signification 
of the symbol 'an became multiple and ambiguous (Le., did it refer to arcending or across 
or advancing or . . . ?) . Initially, Austin he tried to resolve this and other difficulties by 
resorting to what he terms "literary contrivances: " for example, he  introduced distinctions 
by means of upper and lower case letters, and also by varying on occasion the rule that the 
symbolic letter is necessarily identical with the first letter of the descriptive word (e.g., 
across bewne symbolized by "c" rather than "an; mended by "x" rather than "en) (358-59). 
Eventually, however. Austin discovered (so he  tells us) that the "resources of ordinary 
languagen were insuffcient for his purposes, and so he supplemented this basic approach 
with an altogether different method for reducing the arnbiguities and amplifying the 
distinctions of meaning possible through his basic alphabetic code. This scientific method is 
analogous, Austin says, to the system of "Arabic nurnerals" in which the value. or meaning. 
of each numeral is determined by its place in a sequence of numerais (359).4 In the sarne 
way, Austin radically augments the possible distinctions among his symboiic letters by 
making their place in the sequence of the notation a pnmary marker of their meaning. 
Thus, for example, in the sequence of symbolic Ietters "phfd." the first letter relates to the 
position of the hand ("prone"), the second to the elevation of the arm ("horizontal"). the 
third to the transverse position of the a m  ("fonvardsn), and the fourth to the direction of the 
motion ("descendingn) (359-60). Conceivably. a sequence of notation could include the 
same symbol twice, as in "phxx," but the meanings of the repeated symbols would be 
distinguished by their position in the series. Thus, the first "xn would stand for the 
transverse position of the arm ("extendedn) and the second "x" for the force of the motion 
("extremen) .
This alternative method of distinguishing the meanings of the symbols requires the 
reader to decode the alphabet in a new way: a series of letters with no spaces between them 
does not construct a single meaningful word, but instead a series of separate meanings, 
represented in highly condensed fonn. And while each symbol has a mnemonic association 
with a particular descriptive terni, this association is determined not only by the symbol 
itself but also by the placement of the symbol in the sequence. Additionaily, Austin extends 
the possible range of distinct significations of his code through another visual orientation. 
this time following the conventions neither of verbal nor numerical language: when a line of 
notation occurs above the Line of text to which it refers, the symbols refer to the movernents 
of the upper body; when one occurs below, it refers to the actions of the lower body. The 
4 As Austin explains in a footnote, 'In the management of the symbolic letters there is 
some analogy to the disposai of the arabic nurnerals, in which each is of value according to 
its place, though expressed by the same name. Thus each symbol in the sum 3333, is 
known to be of different valuen (315). 
visual orientation which Austin employs in this case is, appropriately. that of the (standing) 
human body. 
Founded partly in "the resources of ordinary language," but made applicable only by 
recourse to the sequentid order of arabic numerals. and further supplemented by visual 
analogy to the erect human body, Austin's system of notation is hybnd from the outset. 
This hybridity indicates the tension in Austin's situation of trying at once to make his 
system accessible to a relatively 'broad audiencen and to constnict an academicdly credible 
and innovative technical code for gesture. Caught between the desire to invent a wholiy 
new, scientifically perfect language for gesture and the conflicting desire to avoid appearing 
offensively presumptuous to his scholarly judges, saiving on the one hand to preserve the 
exclusive value of his systern and on the other to make it sufficiently accessible to his 
implied users. Austin articulates a logically imperfect but situationally understandable 
system of notation. 
Interestingly, the narrative that he recounts to explain how he constructed this 
system highlights, rather than obscures, the sense of its rnutability and incompletion. In 
part, Austin's story emphasizes his ingenuity in discovering new "contrivances" for 
extending the scope of his code, but it suggests more strongly the virtual impossibility of his 
task and the limitations of his final product. Recaiiing his opening strategies of negative 
politeness, this section of his treatise includes repeated dixlaimers about the success of his 
system (it is, he  says, "readily acknowledged to be imperf'ectn [275]); instead, he claims 
"indulgence" more on the basis of his intentions and his diligence in attempting the 
exceptionally difficult task of producing a system of notation for gesture, than on the final 
"executionn of this system (275-76). This strategy of ethos takes for gmnted that Austin's 
audience values-as he does4e goal of systematically encoding gesture; it also predisposes 
his audience to judge his work more favourably than they might were he to presume to 
claim complete success in meeting this goal. And it decorously re-inscribes the unstable. 
marginal status of his elocutionary project: although Austin seeks acceptance for his work 
within scholarly culture by writing it in the validated terms of abstract, scientific discourse, 
his negatively polite admission of its imperfections shows his embedded, disciplinary sense 
of his own limits, as well as the limits of his bodily subject-matter. 
Body Parts and Positions 
Having established the pnority of abstract notation to his conception of gesture in 
rhetorical delivery, Austin desribes, in an impersonal, technical fashion, the various bodily 
parts and positions which this system represents. This section of the Chironomia (Chapters 
M-W) dculates verbaiiy what 'is plates illustrate visually. In these chapters, he makes 
continuous cross-references to these plates, thereby showing the interdependence of visual 
and verbal text within his treatise and increasing its technical stratification. 
The division of the body into its fundamental parts and positions has important 
implications for the ideological scripting of bodily decorum enacted within Austin's treatise. 
Both Michel Foucault and Norbert Elias note the significance of differentiating the whole 
body into smaller components as part of the socio-politicai process of education in the 
noms of regulated, civilized behaviour. The Chironomia articulates a model for this 
educationai process, though this textual representation of an "anaiytic pedagogy" (Foucault. 
Discipline 159) is no guarantee that the teachers and students of elocution to whom Austin 
addresses his work will activate this model successhlly. In fact, as Robb and Thonsenn 
note, at least one set of students subjected to Austin's pedagogical system rebelled against 
it.' As a rhetorical model of bodily regulation, however, the Chironomia operates, as 
Foucault explains, not by 'treating the body, en masse, 'wholesale', as if it were an 
indissociable unity, but of working it 'retail', individuaily; . . . of obtaining holds upon it at 
the level of the mechanism itself-rnovernents, gestures, attitudes, rapidity : an infinitesimal 
power over the active body" (Discipline 137). Austin's differentiation of the whole body 
into its multiple parts thus scripts the implied student's active body as a 'mechanism" to be 
analyzed and manipulated by the "scnipu1ous1y 'classificatory' eye of the master" 
' ~ o b b  and Thonssen report that Jonathan Barber's students resisted his instruction based 
on the Chironomia by hoisting his bamboo sphere. which he used to teach Austin's system, 
on the top of a barber's pole; ' [t] he students found his teaching too mechanical and 
demanding " (xvii-xviii) . 
(Discipline 147). For Elias. dividing the whole body into parts that can be separately 
managed similarly contributes to the social process of producing rationally controiled 
bodies, but he emphasizes the internakation of the masterful eye: self-control constitutes 
one of the fundamentai features of the civilizing process rnanifested through increasing 
bodily regulation and decorum (Shilling 164). To the extent that Austin's treatise addresses 
teachers of elocution, rather than private adult leamers, Foucault's conception of the 
extenialized ordenng of the master's eye makes sense; however, by leamïng to identify 
their bodies through the parts and positions that his system names, the students of Austin's 
system will also, ideally, internalize this representation and the techniques of self- 
management that it makes possible. In this way, Austin's differentiation of the body 
models both an extenial technology of power for masters of elocution to apply to their 
students, and-perhaps to a lesser degree-an intenialized technology of the self. through 
which students "effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodiesn for the purposes of self-transformation into a higher state of 
being (Foucault, "Technologiesn 1 8). 
Like Walker's and Sheridan's division of elocution into its multiple constituent 
parts, the rhetorical technique of division which Austin employs in this section of the 
Chironomia increases the sense of his subject-matter's depth, while eliding the Iimits of his 
conception of bodily action. From the student's perspective, the vertical detail of these 
divisions may defer his realization of the limited results that Austin's system of instruction 
offers. However, whiie Austin may hope that his representation of the body divided into 
parts will impress both his scholarly and student readers as a comprehensive rendition, in 
reality his representation is highly selective and inconsistent, and it emphasizes the abstract 
separation rather than the embodied integration of its parts. These tensions surface in the 
different iists that narne and order the parts included in his system of bodily action, in the 
impersonai technical language which describes the positions of the arms and hands, and in 
his tabular representation of the fifteen systematic positions for the arrns. 
Austin bases his argument that the "classification and nomenclature" of an "almost 
. . . infiniten variety of rhetorical gestures is possible on the premise that, within their 
variety, they share sirnilarities and relations (293). This premise implies that the various 
parts of the body which perform these gestures ais0 are connectai and cannot, says Austin, 
'in tnith, be considered separate" (294). This 'tnith," however, presents obstacles to the 
articulation of his system, since this articulation calls for the careful differentiation of 
gestures and body parts at the same time as it requires the assumption of a foundational 
'wholen which encompasses di these differences. To deal with this incompatibiiity, Austin 
does not reject the essential "truth" he has just stated but instead argues from the new 
premise of "conveniencen for the separation of the body into distinct parts, and for the 
examination of each part according to the main gestures it performs. By distinguishing 
between two kinds of reality (the foundational, immutable r d t y  that the parts of the body 
cannot be separated and the imrnediate, expedient reality that a systematic knowledge of this 
whole requires precise separations), Austin clears a space for his subsequent utterances. 
Implicitly, he justifies his system's divisions as the means to a higher end, narnely an 
understanding of how al1 the parts of the body function together, as a whole, in the 
performance of rhetorical gesture. In reality , however, Austin's text (both its verbal and 
visual components) ends up enacting pnmarily the principle of segmentation, with few 
counterbaiancing explanations of how to re-integrate into a coherent, effective whole these 
many parts. As a result, it becomes unclear which reality is 'in mith" primary. 
In these chapters, Austin's use of lists and tables visuaiiy reinforces the separations 
arnong body parts and positions. In identifymg the body according to its parts, he initially 
mentions 'the head, the body, and the limbsn (293). Soon after, however, he offers a 
different, more formalized üst of 'the most distinguished parts of the bodyn which he 
presents as the bais for classifjmg gesture: ' 1 The head. 2 The shoulders. 3 The trunk or 
body. 4 The arms. 5 The hands and fingers. 6 The lower limbs and knees. 7 The feet" 
(294). By enumerating t'ese parts, Austin gives the impression of an exhaustive division of 
the whole body into ali its components. But despite its appearance, this second list is 
acîuaily highly selective. It corresponds more to the Bahktinian category of the "classical 
bodyn representative of 'high official culturen (Stallybrass and White 21) than to a 'warts 
and alln (Hall 6) natudistic depiction of r d ,  active bodies. The "typicain (Hall 6) body 
that Austin lists is discrete, decorous, erect, and masculine. Indeed, the presumption of the 
public speaker's masculine gender is so strong that Austin does not bother explaining this 
directly; instead, he aiiows his drawings and his subsequent explanations of desirable 
qualities to reinforce what he (and his implied audience) already take for granted. Thus, for 
example. in justifjring his treatment of 'the feet" prior to the body's other parts. he 
emphasizes their foundational role in establishing the 'manly dignity and gracen of the 
'standing figure." The culturaiiy validated terrn "manly" here refers not simply to 'rude 
strength" but to a higher, more complex class of manliness that combines 'stabilityn with 
elegance (295). Even though a few of Austin's illustrations depict female figures, these 
figures occur only in his plates of 'complex signifiant gestures" which are peripheral to his 
main system (see final section of this chapter). Sirnilarly, the concept of female speakers is 
penpheml to his view of rhetorical delivery. 
The order in which Austin discusses each of these bodily parts does not follow the 
order of his original lists. Most noticeably, his discussion begins at the end. with "the feet" 
rather than 'the head. " Whereas his list moves from the most noble to least noble part, his 
achial treatment moves from the most basic to the most refined and expressive part. The 
general instability of Austin's pnnciples of order becomes even more apparent, however. in 
his subsequent analytic discussion. For exarnple, the inversion of the list does not remain 
complete: Austin now moves from the feet to the arms to the hands, not from the feet to 
the hands to the arms. In addition to this difference in the overail ordenng of the pam. 
Austin's analysis of the parts ornits and conflates some of the parts narned in the list. Thus, 
he subsumes (with no explanation) the positions and movements of the 'lower limbs and 
kneesn within his discussion of the positions of the feet. Sirnilarly, he coilapses the 'head." 
'shoulders," 'eyes," and 'bodyn aii into one very short chapter, despite his inclusion of a 
passage from Quintilian which lauds the head as that part of the body which contributes 
pnncipally "to the expression of grace if deliveryn (349). As a result of these re- 
organizations, the m s  and the hands end up receiving the greatest attention (one fairly 
lengthy chapter each) in what is thus clearly a highly selective analysis of the public 
speaker's body. 
One way in which Austin emphasizes the role of the arms and the hands is by 
differentiating their many possible positions. In Chapters W and MII, he identifies these 
positions partly by assigning different descriptive wordî to the different forms. For 
example, the words 'do~nwards,~ 'horizontal," and "elevatedn refer to the possible 
elevations of the arrns, while the terrns 'across, " 'forwards. " 'oblique, " 'extended, " and 
"backwards" describe the transverse directions of the arms around the vertical axis of the 
body. But the resources of 'common" language only partly contribute to this descriptive 
anaiysis. More notably, Austin stratifies scientific-style languages to speciQ the anns' full 
range of distinct actions. Although his descriptive words do have ucommonn significations, 
they also refer in a technical sense to the fundamental coordinares in Austin's geometrical 
system. These meanings can be properly understood only by reference to the geometnc 
coordinates of the generic speaker's body, as specified in the spherical illustration of Plate 2 
(see figure 5). Austin begins his chapter on the positions of the arms by verbally 
descnbing, in dense, technical language, this geornetric illustration. In tum, the symbolic 
code that he uses in the illustration to identie the different planes for the body's motions 
refers us back to the descriptive words (e.g., the code "q" on the illustration refers to the 
word "oblique"). 
Austin's verbal descriptions of the arms' actions thus require the additionai 
explanation of visual images; although this cross-referencing contributes to the technical 
stratification of his text, it aiso diminishes its accessibility. As well, both the verbal and 
visuai texts operate according to a 'scientific/technicai coding orientationn which validates 
an abstract, segmentai, and intricately classified view of reality. Because this coding 
implies a leamed audience, it increases the scholarly nature of Austin's treatise; however, 
this coding simultaneously threatens to aiienate his implied students because it is difficult to 
penetrate if one has only the "resources of common language," because it presents a 
segment& and objectified mode1 of the speaker's body, and because its detailed complexity 
augments the possibilities for transgressing the boundaries of proper conduct. 
Austin further develops the technieai stratification of the amis' positions with a 
table, included in the main text, intended to help clarib his verbal descriptions (see figure 
1). The conventions of this visual clarification, however, demonstrate the specialized 
readership to whom Austin primariiy addresses his text, one familiar with the conventions 
of scientific discourse in which illustrations of this nature were ~ornrnon.~ 
%cientific books and periodicals of the period show in particular the common 
convention of creating tables with Little if any horizontal grid lines between rows of 
information; usually horizontal lines were used to separate titles from the main body. 
Vertical grid lines between columns of information were common but not always used, 
especiaily for tables containing only two or three columns of information. For numerous 
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Figure 1: Table of Arm Positions 
Because the elements of Austin's table consist 'almost entirely of words, not 
quantities, so they may seem more a part of the text than of . . . picturesn (Myers 243). 
However, as Greg Myers argues in a recent analysis of scientific illustration, the data in a 
table of this nature is 'not part of the text because the clusters of words are not be read 
sequentially , left to right and then to the next line and so on, but are each to be read as a 
unit of information that is related to other units in its row and columnn (243). Therefore, a 
reader familiar with the coriventions of scientific illustration would understand that Austin 
organizes his table according to the primary coordinate of the vertical direction (with its 
three possible positions: 'downwards, " "elevated, " and 'horizontal"), and makes the 
coordinate of the transverse direction, with its five possibilities, secondary to this first class. 
Although in verbal language the sequence of the descriptive tems 'downwardsn and 
examples of scientific tables of the period, see Philosophical Tramactions of the Royal 
Society, vols. 80-90, especially the Society's monthly 'Meterological Joumai. " 
'across" (for exarnple) would not significantly change the meaning of the description when 
they modifi the noun "arm," in Austin's numerically and geometrically organized- system 
the sequential order of the tems is essentiai to understanding their meaning. Only 'arm 
downwards acrossn makes sense in this framework, not 'arm across downwards." 
Relating units of information vertically foregrounds the connections between each 
systematic position through a pnnciple of numerical ordering. The order of the figures in 
the first vertical column and the order of the numbers that Austin assigns to each of the 
positions in the second column make sense because they proceed in precise sequence from 
lowest to highest number (Le., 19-33 and 1-5). The inclusion of two columns of numbers 
immediately beside each other, however, fosters confusion and suggests that Austin is 
unsure which sequence of numbers fundamentally organizes his analysis of the fifteen 
systematic positions of the arms. In general, a vertical reading makes the speaker's arm 
positions intelligible by allowing the analytic reader to see their systernatic arrangement as a 
whole, and to compare the discrete units of this arrangement. A horizontal reading . on the 
other hand, gives the reader detailed information about each particular position. But though 
a horizontal reading approximates the conventions of written communication (i.e.. reading a 
Iine of text fkom Ieft to write), it differs from this convention in the sense that it does not 
follow the rules of linguistic grammar. For example, the connections between the colurnns 
are conveyed impiicitly through the graphicd fom of the table, not through explicit verbal 
connectors and modifiers. As weU, the symbol of the period, which succeeds each of the 
numbers, does not signiw, as it typically does in written language. the end of a sentence. 
The relatively long, but untitled, columns of verbal description about each position which 
follow after the columns of numbers show the complexity of Austin's method of 
classification: partl y numerical. partl y verbal, partl y alphabetid . Notabl y, the verbal 
descriptions are almost, but not quite, grammatical sentences: they include a verb 
("Directsn) and a predicate (e.g., 'the arm downwards across"), but the subject of the verb 
(i.e., the speaker perfonning the action) is unstated. This implicit, unnamed subject further 
suggests Austin's desire to disembody gesture; seemingly, gesture can exist without an 
identifiable person, or subject, to embody it. 
As a whole, Austin's four chapters on the various parts and positions of the body 
employ a strong "scientific/technicai coding orientationn to constnict his vision of an ideal, 
decorous speaker. This rhetorical orientation integrates graphical. gwrnetric, and 
numerical forms dong with dense technical verbal Ianguage to convey an impression of 
systematic analysis and mathematical precision. Yet. as 1 have tried to show. the very 
hybndity of his forms as well as the occasional incongniities in the boundaries of his 
partitions and in the ordering of his segments introcluce logical inconsistencies into this 
scientific representation. And Austin himself, despite his apparent desire to render the 
speaker's body and possible gestures with scientific exactness, candidly contradicts this 
objective. For example, he asks the reader to note that "in speaking of angles and 
elevations determined by degrees, mathematical precision is not intended, and is not 
necessary: it is sufficient for the present purpose, that the position descnbed should be 
nearly in the angle or direction mentioned" (3 10, my emphasis). With this qudifying 
passage, Austin implicitly recognizes the impossibility-and maybe even the 
undesirability-of any r d ,  living body performing gestures with the "mathematical 
precisionn that his system appears to cal1 for. But if this is true. then his heavily scientific 
approach to systematinng gesture seems excessive and perhaps contradictory to the 
objective of improving the practical art of rhetorical delivery. 
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Figure 3: Example of an Eighteenth-Century Scientific Table 
(Philosophicd Tmnsachens vol. 86 [179q, 119) 
In the eighteenth century, the table was both a technique of power and procedure of 
knowledge. It was a question of organizing the multiple, of providing oneself with 
an instrument to cover it up and to master it; it was a question of imposing upon it 
an ' order' . (Foucault, Discipline 148) 
Once he has enumerated and classified the various permissible gestures of delivery 
according to the particular body part which performs each gesture, Austin attempts to re- 
combine these multiple segments within a single, master table (see figure 2). This table 
appears to cover and order the multiple modifications of gesture within Austin's selective 
system just as, within contemporary publications in chemistry and other sciences, synoptic 
tables ordered heterogeneous facts for presentation to the scientist's or philosopher's 
scrutiny (Golinski 21) (see figure 3). Tables organized both the factual data of research 
and, as with Lavoisier's new method of nomenclature, the names for chernical substances. 
Part of the logical appeal of Lavoisier's new system denved from its systematic 
representation in the abstract visual form of a table on 'a large folding plate, divided into 
six columns" with each column subdivided into two (Crosland 183). According to Myers, 
as a mode of scientific illustration tables eliminate the "gratuitous details of naturalistic 
representations. This abstraction "is part of the move from the particularity of one 
observation to the generality of a scientific claimn (235). Austin's inclusion of a master 
table to summarize the relations and distinctions between the multiple facts and names in his 
system of gesture thus contributes to this system's quasi-logical appearance of scientific 
rationality . 
The title that he gives to this table ('Alphabetical Arrangement of Symbolic Letters") 
re-emphasizes the priority of notation within his system of gesture: the primary pnnciple of 
arrangement for the gestures in his system is the aiphabetid ordering of the symbolic 
letters that make up his code of notation. It is not, as we might have expected from the 
preceding sections, the selective list of body parts that he has used (aibeit inconsistently) to 
organize the discussion that precedes the master table. Instead, in this table, the particular 
body segments that Austin's system treats become a secondary ordenng principle, 
subordinate to the order of alphabetical notation. The primacy of this alphabetical order for 
organizing the tabular representation of rhetorical gesture underlines how Austin's system 
attempts to transform the paralanguage of embodied practices into a disembodied, 
linguistically-based coding. As well, the tabuiar representation of gesture according to the 
twenty-six letters of the alphabet further augments the number of differentiations in, and 
hence the interna1 wmplexity of, Austin's language of gesture. 
Foucault's analysis in Discipline and Punish of the spatial distribution of bodies 
provides an inventory of techniques through which to decipher the rhetorical construction of 
Austin's table. These are the interrelated techniques of enclosure. partitioning, cornparison 
and classification, and ranking (Discipline 14 1 - 146). Importantly , though, Austin's table 
remains a textuai model for an analytic pedagogy of bodily regulation; it does not 
demonstrate the practicai activation of such a pedagogy on real bodies in r d  institutions. 
As well, Austin's proposed method differs from the pedagogies Foucault analyzes in that 
the students for whom he initially invented his system were "a limited number of the sons of 
the higher classes in Ireland" (Taylor qtd. in Robb and Thonssen xv), not students attending 
lower-class charity schools or state-run institutions. Further, whereas Foucault relates the 
techniques of spatial distribution pnmarily to the organization of multiple human bodies. in 
Austin's case we can read them in terms of his struggle to arrange the multiplicity within 
the single body of his model speaker. Despite these di fferences, Austin's ' Alphabetid 
Arrangement of Symbolic m e r s n  evidences the centraiity of the table as a procedure of 
knowledge and technique of power in the late eighteenth century (Foucault. Discipline 148) 
by showing the use of the four techniques of spatial distribution to represent, if not activate. 
a pedagogy of bodily regulation which pnvileges the scientific observer rather than the 
student performer. However, as the following analysis wiil demonstrate, Austin's effort to 
organize and master the messy multiplicity of bodily behaviours via the ordenng technique 
of the scientific table remains at best that: an effort. In reality, his master table contains a 
number of discrepancies that disrupt this effort to abstractly rationalize the foms of bodily 
persuasion. 
The techniques of enclosure and partitioning are evident in the cedlular construction 
of the table, where each point of intersectign between explicit and implicit gnd iines in the 
vertical and horizontal parameters visuaily encloses a specific element of Austin's system of 
gesture. In this visual sûucture, each element of information is, apparent1 y, "heterogeneous 
to al1 others and closed in upon itself" (Foucault, Discipline 14 1), thereby making it 
amenable to umeticulous controln (137). By contrast with Austin's earlier table of the 
fifieen systematic positions of the arms, this master table includes expiicit grid lines, 
particularly in the vertical direction, to enclose visually the information that it attempts to 
represent and organize. This visual enclosure simultaneously partitions the multiple 
elements of Austin's table to prevent their "diffuse circulationn (Foucault, Discipline 143). 
* 
According to Edward Tufte, in the visual organization of complex information, 
implicit typographical grids are preferable to the 'chartjunk" of "dark gnd lines" because the 
former graphical style gives priority io the information itself rather than to the visual 
'prison" of a gridwork which, perhaps inaccurately, encloses and separates the data (59, 
63). But the vertical grid lines in Austin's table give a visual impression of decisive, 
impermeable order; they help to combat the permeability of the columnar divisions by 
imposing, visually, a sense of strong separation and exact boundaries among the elements of 
information that they organize. The pronounced vertical lines and infrequent horizontal 
lines of Austin's table conform to the standard scientific models of his period (see figure 
3).' In this sense, there is nothing irregular about his format. However, a paradox emerges 
when we consider the nature of the information sharply separated by the vertical lines 
compared with the information less clearly distinguished on the horizontal mis. The table 
inscribes stronger visual boundaries between those elements which in the practice of gesture 
may occur simultaneously (e-g., the positions of the arms, head, and feet) than between 
those elements which, according both to Austin's system afd to the material reality of 
bodily conduct, can not occur together (e-g., the hand can not be simultaneously backwards 
and forwards). This paradox suggests the extent to which Austin's coding of bodily 
practices attempts primarily to dissect these practices in a scientific, abstract manner, rather 
than to represent them in an integrated fashion suited to learning how to perform them in 
fluent, persuasive fashion. 
The strategy of spatial distribution also, according to Foucault, creates analytic sites 
which permit supe~s ion  through compa&on and c l a r s i f ~ ~ o n .  In Austin's table, the 
vertical and horizontal parameters classifi each element of information included within 
these parameters. The visual proxirnity and juxtaposition of these multiple elements within 
the larger classificatory parameters of the table allow the reader to compare and contrast 
each partitioned ce11 of information. The graphical form of the table thus enacts what Tufte 
calls an effective 'micro1macro designn because it organizes so much relevant information 
within the human eye span. This ailows the reader or viewer to 'control" and reason about 
this information much more easüy than if the multiple elements were loosely distributed 
7 See n. 6, above. 
across many pages or contexts (Tufte 50). While Tufie is full of praise for the rationalizing 
effects of such a design, Foucault's perspective makes apparent the more chiIling -effects of 
the dominating power attributed to the mastefil eye both implied and constructed by this 
design. This is the eye which, from a supenor position, analyses the subjugated body in 
order to manipulate or reform it. 
The principle of ranking , by which Foucault means that each element (or body) in 
an institutional system is interchangeable because it is "defined by the place it occupies in a 
senes, and by the gap that separates it ffom othersn (145), also is at work in Austin's spatial 
distribution of units of information (rather than real bodies). Austin's system, however, 
ranks the multiple parts and motions of a single idealized body rather than, as Foucault 
discusses, multiple individual bodies within an institutional context. The principle of 
ranking is evident in the technique of numerical ordenng that Austin employs for assigning 
meaning to each of the symbolic letters in a sequence of notation. The meaning of a 
symbol in a notation is determined to a large degree by the place it occupies in the 
sequence, just as the location of a single arabic numeral within a series of numerais 
determines its value. Accordingly, in Austin's system of notation, the first place in a 
sequence above the line always means the position of the hand, the second always means 
the elevation of the arm, and so on, regardless of the particular symbolic element that 
occupies each place. Austin's table to some extent represents this ranking in the horizontal 
patameter: reading from left to nght, the first four columns follow the numericd order of a 
typical sequence of notation above the line of text, while the visual order of the eighth and 
ninth columns matches the sequence of notation for the feet. 
These intricately interrelated techniques of spatial distributions demonstrate Austin's 
own command of the powsrful discourse of scientific analysis, at the same time as they 
reinforce the relative subjection of the mode1 human body regulated by his master table. 
Despite Austin's implicit promise that his system offers a path to aspiring speakers through 
which they can improve their bodily practices and thereby secure greater social prestige and 
power, in fact this system subjects the implied speaker's body to the objectifying techniques 
of scientific analysis. Instead of granting the aspiring speaker power over his bodily 
behaviours, Austin's system gains power over the speaker by situating his ideaiized and 
generic body as its object of analysis. In this situation, it is not the embodied speaker- 
performer, but rather the distant, elite decoder-analyst who rnasters the art of gesture. 
However, for ail that Austin's table does enact, at a textual level, these various 
features which Foucault claims are typical of late eighteenth-century bodily regulation, the 
master table also reveals inconsistencies within his system. In particular, these 
incongruities include an ambiguity between different principles of arrangement for ordering 
the elernents in the table; a tension between the abstract disjunction of the body into discrete 
units and the embodied reality of bodily actions which cannot be thus separated; the 
omission of elements that logically would seem to form part of the system, and conversely 
the inclusion of elements that seem to exceed and hence disrupt the system's limits; and the 
practical difficulty of using this table as the master code for deciphering the meanings of 
Austin's system of notation. These instabilities, 1 suggest, indicate both the inherent 
resistance of human bodies to this kind of treatment and Austin's own ambivalent motives 
and attitudes: clearly, he wishes to purchase disciplinary prestige for himself and his subject 
matter by representing delivery in a speciaiized, scientific language, but at the same time 
(though less strongly) he seems to want to permit the embodied language of rhetorical 
gesture a power and position of its own, beyond the confines of strictiy abstract 
codification. 
The principle of alphabetic order frarnes Austin's table on the far left column. 
Thanks to the double vertical lines that enclose it on both sides, this column visually 
suggests a precise and firm boundary. The aiphabetical order of the individuai letters 
within this firmly bounded spacean order that presents each letter as a discrete 
unit-further creates an impression of logical arrangement; however, the completeness of 
this order is disturbed slightly by the unexplained omission of two letters, "j" and "y." The 
segmentation of the body into parts (Le., the hands, arms, body, head and eyes, and feet) 
constitutes the second pararneter for organhing the elements of the table and occurs in the 
top horizontal space of the table. This pararneter, though, is much less precisely arranged 
than the dominant vertical parameter of the alphabetic letters. In fact, it ambiguously 
organizes gesture parily through the segmentation of the body into its ostensibly 
fundamental parts and partly through the aiphabetical and numericai orderings of the system 
of notation. The conflation of these two perspectives results in a confusing horizontal 
parameter. Instead of invoking the classification of the alphabetic letters, here Austin 
organizes the various body parts according to the basic visual classification of his system of 
notation into a top and bottom sequence. The way in which he describes these two spatial 
categories ("Above the Linen and 'Below the Line") presupposes the full dependency of the 
language of gesture on the dominant language of verbal composition. That is, Austin's 
system of notation, by definition, can represent only gestures which correspond directly to a 
'Linen of verbal text. The iine of verbal text acu, both conceptuaily and visually, as the 
dominant, determining centre around which the sub-language of gesnire may be noted. 
This fundamental distinction therefore abstractly separates the public speaker's body 
into two main parts: the top and the bottom. Although this separation on one level makes 
sense because of its visual correspondence with the spatial orientation of a standing body, it 
aiso inserts a conceptual separation between the actions of the upper body and those of the 
lower body, preventing an integrated view of the speaker as a whole and conflicting with 
the realities of embodied practices. However, in terms of the rhetorical functions of 
Austin's treatise, this strategy of subordinating non-verbal language tg verbal language 
reinforces his socialiy-decorous effort to transform the devalued language of the body into 
the more prestigious codes of verbal language and scientific notation, and thereby to 
increase the discipiinary status of delivery . 
The two general categones of 'aboven and 'below" then become sub-divided into the 
various body parts that Austin has already analyzed in the immediately preceding chapters. 
Incongruously, though, the order of these parts as they are listed in the first horizontal row 
of the table differs from the order in which he has examined them (and, as we have seen, 
the order in which he examined them differed from the initiai order of his introductory 
hts). The new principle of division emerging from the positions of the notation sequences 
relative to the line of verbal text requires a new ordenng of the parts of the body. The 
primacy of the order of Austin's sequence of notation, rather than the order in which bodily 
actions are actuaiiy perf'ormed, is further underlined by the distinctions he makes within and 
between the first four columns ('Hand," 'Elevation of the k m , "  'Transverse Position of the 
Am," and "Motion and Forcen) and the fifth column ('Both Arms and Both Handsn). The 
double line between the fvst four colurnns and the fifth represents not a material distinction 
bekeen body parts or positions, but an abstract, graphic distinction within Austin's systern 
of notation between upper and lower case letters. Within the first four columns, the wholly 
theoretical nature of these divisions is dernonstrated by the fact that the two conceptual 
coordinates of the elevated and transverse positions of the arm can be distinguished only 
within the sequence of notation. When embodied in the practice of gesture. they always 
occur simuItaneousl y. 
In these ways, the pnnciples for reading Austin's system of notation take precedence 
over the order of the parts of the body which stmctured his earlier discussion. Although 
this latter principle of representation was itself highly selective and contributed to an 
objectified, segmented view of the public speaker's body, this assertion of his symbolic 
code as the primary screen mediating and organizing the representation of the speaker's 
body much more drastically demonstrates the extent to which the Chironornia articulates an 
intricate themeticai discourse about, not of bodily language. The more intricate and 
speciaiized this meta-language becomes, the greater its distance from the matenal practices 
and embodied meanings of human speakers, but the closer its proximity to the speciaiized 
discourse of scieftific analysis. 
The unresolved tension within Austif s system of notation between an alphabetical 
and a sequential pnnciple of ordering also surfaces in the table. For example. the method 
of noting the actions of the feet employs both ordering principles: the difference between 
"Steps" and "Positions" is indicated both by the distinction between lower case and upper 
case letters, and, redundantly, by the place that each symbol occupies in the notation 
sequence. This inherent tension also helps to explain why so many spaces in the table are 
empty: initially, Austin eied to develop a system that would be comprehensible only 
through alphabetical distinctions; therefore, he presumably tried to avoid assigning more 
than one or two descriptive words to each alphabetical symbol. Subsequentiy, he hit on the 
alternative sequential mode of distinguishing meanings which, in pnnciple, would pemi t an 
entry under each column for each symbol. However, instead of reconceiving his earlier 
approach from this new perspective, the table shows how he tries to merge the two different 
rnethods. While many spaces in the table remain blank, others include several entries-for 
example, the space at the intersection of row 'Cn and the fourth column, and the space at 
the intersection of row 'Sn and the eighth column. Here we see how, even with the 
merging of both rnethods of organization, Austin has b e n  unable to enurnerate sufficient 




column on the far nght of the table further destabiiizes the coheience of 
This column, which indicates the proper forms of notation for "significant 
Gestures," does not fit within Austin's fundamental division of "Above" and *Below." By 
conmt with the fundamental forms of gesture that the main part of his table encompasses. 
the dramatic expressions of passion which the final column identifies c m  be represented 
only with reference to the speaker's whole body. And unlike, for exarnple, the final 
cohmn of Lavoisier's table of chemicai nomenclature which gives the names for compound 
substances composed of the preceding elemental substances (Crosland 183), the compound 
gestures identifid in Austin's final column do not combine preceding elementas, positions. 
This means that these complex gestures cannot be encoded within the sequential 
organization of a line of notation, since this sequence is constructed according to the 
division of rhetorical gesture into its elementary and hierarchically organized elements, 
rather than according to examples of bodily action in their hllness. As Austin explains 
later, the notation of significant gestures or "the expression of particular passionsn occurs ''in 
the margin" of the text (362), not within the main sequences of notation situated above and 
below the line of verbal text. The final column thus exceeds the boundaries of his system. 
yet remains as a 'significantn supplement to it. The penpherai positioning of the notation 
codes for these "significant" gesnires in the table indicates Austin's ambivalence about their 
propriety for rhetoncai delivery and it reveals the instability of the conceptual and practical 
boundaries he is anempting to inscnbe around gesture. 
The master table acts as one element in Austin's complex stratification of technical 
forms (e.g., verbal descriptions, numerical ordenngs, graphitai forms, drawings, and so 
on) deployed to represent, in complete detail, his whole system of gesture. But each of 
these approachesd of which require reference outside themselves for proper 
understanding-introduces new instabilities into the system, which in turn require 
supplementary explanations, qualifications, and contrivances. Although Austin's attempt to 
represent the language of gesture within a complex tabular format suggests his desire to 
impose a firm, general order on the messy world of panicular bodily practices, this effort 
lads him to constnict a system containing its own multiplicities and inconsistencies. 
The Plates of 'Etzgraved Figures" 
The most purely visuai component of Austin's treatise is the set of "engraveci 
figuresn (vii) of the various positions and motions of gesture described in the main text. 
The placement of these figures at the end of the treatise belies their centrality to the 
explanation of his s~stern.~ As Knight explains, because engravings required different 
ptinting presses than type, engravings were printed separately from type, which kept text 
and illustrations apart in their published format ('lllustratingn 146). Rather than employing 
the established intaglio process of copper-plate engraving, Austin's plates used the new 
method of steel-engraving (Robb and Thonssen ix). According to Michael Twyman. this 
process constituted a "far reaching improvement in intagiio pnntingn because the tougher 
steel plates could withstand the Wear of printing much longer than softer copper ones 
(Twyman 22-23). The inclusion of these engravings would have made the Chironomia a 
relatively expensive work. Knight notes, for exarnple, how during this pend 'high-quaii ty 
scientific engravings might cost twenty guineas each [to pnnt]; an enormous sum in 1800" 
("Illustrating" 145). The finai cost of Austin's work was, however, less than it might have 
been precisely because he ended up including smaller and less expensive engravings than he 
initially had comrnissioned. As he explains, he commissioned a second artist "who first 
altered and completed, and then reduced the whole of the figures to their present form and 
size" (viii). This reductive revision had the benefit, claims Austin, of saving the 
"purchasern unnecessary expense; yet, by making such an "oeconomy," the book was 
deprived of "splendorn (viii). 
There are eleven plates in ail, each the size of a single page of text. Each plate 
contains between four and sixteen separate drawings. Many of these drawings represent the . 
entire body of the standing, gesturing public speaker, but-in the same way that Austin's 
verbal text examines the body according to separate parts-others show only segments, such 
as the feet and hands. Typically, these drawings are arranged sqmmetricaily in rows across 
8 In the facsimile reproduction of the Chironomia published by Southem Ulinois UP they 
are placed at the very beginning but in the onginal text they occurred at the end. See G. P. 
Mohmann, "The Real Chironomia," n. 6. 
the page. For epample, Plate 3 contains three rows of five figures each: these figures also 
are alignai vertically ( s e  figure 7). This style of layout, which includes sufficiint white 
space between each figure to clearfy distinguish it from others. gives an impression of 
methodical order. Some of the plates, though, are arranged less clearly; for example, the 
drawings in the fust plate (see figure 6) appear more cramped and less clearly distinguished 
than those in Plate 3. We can probably attribute this effect to the econornical reduction of 
the original drawings, which permits a greater number of figures to be included in a single 
plate but decreases the clarity of its layout. 
By altering his drawings from ones of 'splendorn to more econornical, smaller ones. 
Austin's engravings adopt pnncipally a didactic rather than elegant form. In scientific 
illustration, didactic drawings, according to Bert Haii, are used 
. . . to cIariQ a problem, to indicate to a viewer how something looks, be 
that something a specimen, a piece of apparatus, or the path of a moving 
body . . . the didactic drawing is purely instrumental, merely a convenient 
means of conveying information to the viewer that otherwise could only be 
put across using masses of words-if then. . . . On the other hand, "elegant." 
. . . is meant to convey the other function illustrations usually serve, that of 
enhancing the appearance of the iilustrated in the eye of the beholder. (28) 
The didactic function of Austin's drawings foregrounds their logical rather than emotionai 
appeak they are "plain and se~ceable"  rather than charming or beguiling (Hall 29). This 
didactic function corresponds with contemporary developments in chemical iihstrations. In 
particular, the Chironomia's engravings of the parts and positions of the speaker's body 
b a r  similarities to the 'plain and serviceable" depictions of chemical apparatus to be found 
bath in Austin's own articles (see figures 4a and 4b) and in other scientific publications. 
Knight notes how illustrations in chemistry textbooks of the p e r d  'show apparatus and 
indicate how it is to be us&" ("lllustratingn 144) so that experiments could be repeated 
exactly. Although Austin does not present his descriptions of chemical apparatus in the 
context of specific experiments, his combineci visuai and verbal descriptions provide 
precise, detailed information about how to wnstnict and use each apparatus. According to 
Knight, the straightfonvard depiction of chemicai apparatus sigdled a shift from the poetry 
of earlier aichemic illustrations to abstract geometric representation which gives "a strong 
feeling of the form of the vessels" ("Illustrating" 153). As well, illustrations of chemicai 
apparatus often tri& 'to get as many pictures on the page as possible" and imporht parts 
might be magnifiecl (153). 
- - 
' Figure 4a: Austin's Illustration of a Condenser and Air Pump 
- .  . &  . - *  - - 
Figure 4b: Austin's IUustration of a Condenser and Air Pump 
The correspondence between the Chironomiu's engravings and contemporary 
conventions for iiiustrating chernical apparatus reinforces the basic 'scientific/technologid 
coding orientationn (Krw and van Leeuwen 53) which 1 daim informs Austin's whole 
explication of his system of gesture. By representing the parts and positions of the public 
speaker's body as, in a sense, a mechanical "apparatus," these drawings address primarily 
an analytic, scholarly reader who may supenise and appraise but does not himself perform 
the functions of this 'apparatus." However, although the drawings do privilege an abstract, 
scientific view of delivery, they aiso contain elements of naturalisrn which slightly soften 
the "hardness" of their diagrammatic forms (Kemp 114) and introduce a hint of 'flesh-and- 
blood reality" into their "synthetic idealizationn (Kemp I l  1). These elernents imply a more 
generai readership interested in learning the practice of proper gesture. 
-- 
Figure 5: Spherical Diagram of Speaker, from Plate 2, 
Chimnomia 
* 
The most important image in these plates for understanding Austin's system is the 
figure of a genenc speaker enclosed within a sphere of "imaginary circlesn (see figure 5).' 
This illustration uses a speciaiized scientific discourse of geornetric forms to depict a 
"synthetic idealizationn of the public speaker. Primarily, this representation renders the 
speaker as a passive apparatus to be deciphered and regulated by a scientific reader. Kress 
and van Leeuwen point to the significance of the relationship between the viewer (or reader) 
and the "represented participant" in the text (e.g., Austin's enclosed figure). They 
distinguish between images which make demandc and images which make offers to the 
reader. The former, for exarnple, occurs when a "represented participant" in an image 
looks directiy and perhaps presumptuously at the viewer. Visual "offers," by contrast. "are 
realised by images which offer to the viewer represented participants as objects for 
contemplation, but do not demand that the viewer enter into an imaginary social relation 
with them" (28). Both the distant, impersonal position of Austin's figure and the indirect. 
oblique direction of the figure's eyes suggest that this image fits with the negatively polite 
category of 'offer" rather than the positive, presumptuous form of "demand." This 
representation situates the generic speaker in a relatively powerless, submissive position. 
offenng himself up to the scrutinizing gaze of the powerfûl anafyst-judge. 
The vertical angle from which the viewer perceives the figure in the image, 
however, conflicts with the modest. deferential form of the 'offer. " Instead of perceiving 
the figure from a high angle, which would tend to indicate that the viewer 'has power over 
the represented participant" (Kress and van Leeuwen 40), the public speaker stands raised 
slightly above the viewer and therefore is looked at from a slightly low angle. Indeed, 
according to Austin, this angular relationship is a fundamental feanire of the geometncally 
idealized speaker: 'It must be observai that the eye of the spectator, or of the person 
addresseci among the spectators, or on the stage among the interfocutors, is always supposed 
to be in the plane of the nght circle (ZR), and nearly in the point (0" (310). In other 
words, the spectator's eyes should not meet the speaker's eyes on an equal plane, but 
instead rest below them at approximately the position of the breastbone or upper stomach. 
9 Austin uses the phrase "imaginary circlesn to describe this image in his 'Table of 
References to the Figures," located at the very end of his verbal treatise and, in the text's 
original form, immediately prior to the visual plates. 
Contrary to the visuai relationship of the "offer," this angular relationship suggesis that the 
figure in Austin's image is superior to the viewer. The sphericai image of the public 
speaker places the speaker partly in a superior position to the viewer and partly in a 
subordinate position. 
The 'Galilean reality" which constitutes the dominant manner of visual 
representation in this image defines the " r d n  in terms of its 'size, shape, quantity, and 
mo tionn abstracted from the more sensory , naturaiistic aspects of colour , texture, setting , 
and perspective (Kress and van Leeuwen 52-57). This scientific modality prefers an 
abstract and typical representation of the world to a naturalisticaily detailed and 
particularized rendition. Just so, this geometric drawing abstracts and depersonalizes the 
public speaker into his typical dimensions: this figure is meant to conceptuaiize. in an 
ordered and geometric manner, the essential features of a genenc, nameless speaker. The 
decontextualization of this figure, dong with the drawing's relative lack of naturalistic 
depth and derail, heighten the image's scientific representation of reality mess  and van 
Leeuwen 52-57). 
However, this non-naturidistic, scientific manner contrasts with more naturalistic 
elements which to a small extent personaiize and particul&e Austin's speaker. For 
example, the detail of the speaker's clothing, facial features, and hair give him a naturalistic 
quality, unlike a purely abstract drawing of the human figure; as weii, the partial details of 
setting given through the outiine of the pedestal and the representation of visual depth with 
a shaded three-dimensional isometric form rather than a more abstmct two-dimensional 
Frontal view contribute naturalis tic aspects. This drawing , therefore, enacts a tension 
between two ways of encoding reaiity, namely between a 'scientific/technological coding 
orientation" and a 'naturalistic coding orientation" (54). While the former dominates 
Austin's vision of the ideal public speaker, the latter slightiy destabiiizes this attempt to 
abstract and objectify the speaker's body completely. By including some naturalistic 
elements, Austin creates an opening for those who have oniy "cornmon" reading and 
speaking skilis. Like the paradox of status aspiration, Austin's visual coding is flexible 
enough to permit the entry of the aspiring, 'commonn readerfspeaker, but at the same time 
inscribes the specialized language of scientific discourse. 
I have suggested that this sphencal diagram plays a central role in the visual 
illustration of Austin's system. As such. one might weli expect to encounter this drawing at 
the beginning of the plates. Strangely, though, Austin resentes it for the lower half of his 
second plate and begins instead with a plate devoted to the positions of the feet (see figure 
6). As a result, we do not see Austin's fundamental whole representation of the body until 
we have deciphered segmented edews of a single part of the body. This ordering, which 
Figure 6: Positions of the Feet, Plate 1, Chimnomia 
privileges the division of parts over the integration of a whole, matches the form of 
Austin's verbal text which begins by listing the 'most distinguished parts" of the body and 
then treats each part separately with little attention to how these parts function together. as a 
whole. Contrary to a naturalistic perception of the world, the sectional drawings of the 
positions of the feet pnvilege a theoretical approach to gesture. This approach assumes that 
actions of the feet can be properly known and controiied only by (unnaturally) detaching 
them from the rest of the body in the same way that Austin's illustration of chernical 
apparatus provide separate drawings of their different parts to help the reader understand 
how to construct his mechanisms (see figures 4a and 4b).I0 
Despite this analytic segmentation, the first row of drawings (positions 2-5) 
maintains a degree of naturaiism through details of clothing and shadows. and through the 
use of a the-dimensionai form and frontal perspective. By contrast, the next line of 
drawings eliminates most of these naturaiistic elements: the details of clothing and the 
shadowing that show depth are removed, while non-naturalistic dotted lines are added to 
indicate conceptuai angular relationships; the feet lose depth, becoming two-dimensional 
abstractions; most dramatically, the perspective shifts from a frontal to an overhead view. 
As a result, the viewer is asked to read these images not from a naniralistic, subjective 
orientation (an orientation which operates fiom the principle of 'what we would see if we 
were looking at them [e.g., the feet] in realityn) but instead from a scientific orientation 
which privileges the ostensibly higher reaiity of what we 'know, " objectively and 
concepnially, about the feet (Kress and van Leeuwen 32). 
Assurning the ability to decipher its visuai coding properly, this overhead view 
places the viewer in a position of full control literaily over the objects of anaiysis. Not only 
is the viewer positioned above the objectified feet, but the viewer's own distant, 
disembodied location is essentially invisible because purely theoreticai. D o m  Haraway , in 
her critique of the assumptions and methods of modem science, and Kristina Straub, in her 
'O~ustin's 'Description of an Apparatus for Transfemng Gasses," for example, includes 
four figures: the first two iiiustrate the separate parts of the mechanism; the third and fourth 
pnmady show how to assemble these parts. Similarly, his 'On a New Construction of a 
Condenser and Air Pump" provides figures which illustrate the apparatus as a whole and 
figures which give eniarged views of separate parts. 
theory of eighteenth-century spectatorship, both highiight the gendered nature of this 
viewer-viewed relationship. Haraway , for exarnple, describes a masculinist scienti fic 
approach as one which privileges an abstract, disembodied "conquering gaze from 
nowhere." This 'god trick of seeing everything from nowheren objectifies and subjugates 
whatever or whomever the disengaged, unrnarked scientist is analyzing ("Situatedn 5 8 1). 
Straub, for her part, notes the complex gendered quaiities of the idealized form of 
spectatorship in eighteenth-century British theatre: primarily, in the logic of this ideal, the 
audience of the critical, rational, "aii-but invisible" observer occupies a masculine position 
of dominance over the ferninized "othef of the decorously submissive spectacle (3-4). 
Similarly, Austin's 'conquering gaze" at the idealized speaker's feet places this speaker in a 
submissive, feminized situation controlled by the critical masculine eye of the implied 
scienti fic spectator. 
But, as Straub notes, the boundaries of the idealized iogic of the masculine spectator 
and the feminine spectacle are, in reality, frequently disrupted or nansgressed (4). 
Drawings 8 and 9 in Austin's illustrations of the feet perhaps perform such a disruption. 
They seem out of place in this overail set of drawings, primarily because of the 
individuaiizing details of clothing and the wholeness of the figures. These naturaiking 
details suggest "the accidents of a single specimenn rather than an abstract mode1 (Kemp 
11 1). The verbal descriptions of these figures in the main text explain the reason for their 
distinctiveness, an expianation which implicitly reifies the scientific, genenc codings of the 
other drawings. Drawings 8 and 9, Austin explains, represent improper, unacceptable 
positions for the feet: "The position of the orator is equally removed from the awkwardness 
of the rustic with toes turned in and knees bent, and from the affectation of the dancing- 
master, constrained and prepared for springing agility, and for conceited display. Fig. 8 
and 9" (301). Aithough these characters and positions would have a place in comic acting, 
they are outside the boundaries of dignified rhetorical delivery. l' Notably, Austin's verbal 
" ~ e e  West, 122- 147, and Woods, 16- 19 on comic roles for actors during the late 
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. Austin's illustrations closely resemble 
Henry Siddons' illustrations of 'Idiotismn (for Austin's "rustic") and of 'Vulgar Arrogancen 
and 'Fopperyn (for Austin's dancing master) in Practical Zilustratiom of Rhetoricul Gesture 
and Action Adapted to the EngZish Drmna (Siddons 6, 32, 62). 
and visual descriptions of these figures extrapolate a whole chracter of irnpropnety (Le.. 
the character of the rustic and of the dancing-master) from the single, smali featÜre of the 
positions of the feet; indirectly, these exampIes wam the aspiring speaker that an enor in 
any one of the many components of decorous gesture can infect the entire person. In this 
case, the naîuralism of the illustrations indicates the inferior nature of their content, while 
the use of abstract diagrams to portray acceptable positions shows the superionty of these 
positions. Paradoxically, though, the very inclusion of these dramatic characters in the first 
plate suggests Austin's ambivalent attitude about the propriety of theatrical gesture as a 
genre of rhetoncal delivery. Visually, these improper. unsegmented figures are much more 
engaging, seerningly much more human and communicative. than the geometric images of 
proper positions w hich surround them. 
Another distinguishing charactenstic of the illusnative plates in the Chironomia is 
the use of what Edward Tufte calls "small multiples." In small multiple designs, he says, 
"information slices are positioned within the eyespan, so that viewers make comparisons at 
a glance-uninterrupted visual reasoning." These designs draw the viewer's attention to 
specific differences and slight variations among pieces of information by otherwise 
maintainhg a constancy of design in the repeated image. As a result, srnall multiples 
visually enforce 'cornparisons of changes" and 'the scope of alternatives" (Tufte 67). 
Austin's use of a smali multiple design again reinforces the ways in which his system 
construcs an analytic pedagogy perceived primarily from the position of the rational 
observer and controller of bodily conduct, rather than that of the embodied performer. 
Austin's illustrations of the correct positions of the feet, especially the top two lines 
of drawings, present a limited example of small multiple design. The visual representation 
of the systematic positions of the arms (see figure 7) is perhaps the best example of a small 
multiple design because of the constancy of the basic repeated image, with variations 
Limited almost entirely to the positions of the arms. Note how the position of the speaker's 
feet stays constant throughout, as does his frontal orientation. The size of the figure is also 
constant, dong with the space between drawings and the short line of shadow extending 
diagonally to the right behind the generic speaker. The careful horizontal and linear 
arrangement of this series of drawings further contributes to the sense of coherent constancy 
Figure 7: Systematic Positions of the Arms, Plate 3, Chhnomia 
underlying the distinctions between individual images. As well. the title of the plate (only a 
few of the plates have identifjmg titles) reinforces this sense of coherent order surrounding 
and stnicmring multiplicity; it confirms the bounded scope that encloses the limited domain 
of akeman'ves. In this situation. only the mastemil analyst of gesture is in the nght 
position to perceive (and impose) the coherent order enacted by Austin's smail multiple 
design; the performer of these 'pieces of information," by contrast, can only enact them one 
at a time and is therefore unable to engage in the "unintempted visual reasoning" granted to 
the privileged analy st . 
Still, Austin's drawings do not entirely fulfil the concepnial, scientific ideal of a 
small multiple design: the variations arnong these figures include unexplained but noticeable 
differences in the position of the head as well as small changes in the naturalistic details of 
clothing (e.g., in some drawings the speaker's jacket is unbuttoned, in others it is done up). 
For ail that Austin seems to wish to analyze each part of the body in isolation, this small 
multiple design shows the difficulty of keeping these parts neatly separate, and it indicates 
his continuing desire to appeal not only to the elite scientific community of andysts but also 
to the more "commonn group of aspiring speakers who are more likeîy to be alienated than 
engaged by Austin's non-naturalistic rendition of the human body as a senes "information 
slices . " 
nie final two plates of the Chironomia, Iike Plate 3, have an identifjmg titie and, 
Iike Plate 3, they comprise to some extent an example of a small multiple design (see 
figures 8 and 9). However, these plates convey much less of a sense of precise, isolatable 
variation within a fixed, constant order than does the plate iiiustrating the systematic 
positions of the amis. The main reason for this, 1 suggest, is Austin's ambivalent attitude 
toward w hat he caiis 'complex signifiant gesniresn or, alternatively , 'the expression of 
particular passionsn (362), an ambivalence that has already surfaced in his peripheral 
positioning of these gestures in the master table. Whereas the systematic positions of the 
arms clearly form a fundamental component of his system (a component that he spends 
much effort to articulate logically and exhaustively), significant gestures occupy a much 
more problematic, marginal position. 
Figure 8: Complex Signifcant Gestures, Plate 10, Chimnomia 
The illustration of these gestures in Plates 10 and 1 1  foregrounds their incongruity 
with other components of Austin's system of gesture. For example, drawings 99 to 107 
maintain sorne constancy of design io the extent that we recognize the generic speaker of 
LTu O I r  - 
Figure 9: Complex Signifiant Gestures, Plate 10, 
previous illustrations, but the range of differences in the forms of this figure between each 
drawing is far greater than in earlier plates: the feet, legs, torso, arms, hands, shoulders, 
head, eyes, mouth, and so on, aii change frorn drawing to drawing. No fundamental 
similarities connect and control these variations. The succeeding drawings (1 08- 122) 
heighten the sense of individualistic multiplicity even more: we now encounter a senes of 
very distinctive figures, distinguished not only by physical form but more noticeably by 
costume, settïng , and-remarkabl y-gender. Unüke the preceding plates, w hich represent 
with only one exception a genenc male speaker. these drawings include nine illustrations of a 
female figure. '* The theaûicality of the attitudes and characters portrayed in these plates 
helps to explain both their presence and their peripheral position. As we have already seen. 
Austin simultaneously admires theatrical delivery but considers it inappropnate for public 
speakers. The peripheral positioning of these figures dows him to participate in the 
contextuaiiy popular rendition of dramatic attitudes without officially including them within 
his system of rhetorical delivery." The presence of femde figures can be explained 
sirnilarly: the acceptability of female actors within the world of the theatre justifies the place 
of female fonns in these final, peripheral illustrations but not within the main space of 
Austin's representation of delivery . 
The conneetion between these closing figures and the central drawing of the 
spherically enclosed ideal speaker seems distant indeed. The gap between them seems to 
constitute an incommensurable difference of kind, not simply a quantitative one of degree. 
Thus, despite their rendition of whole bodies, Austin's closing illustrations of the cornplex 
significant gestures do not represent a quantitative synthesis of the several distinctive parts of 
12They are, explains Austin in his 'Preface," illustrations of the renowned actress Sarah 
Siddons. Her permission for him to use these iliusûations was based, he says, on "private 
fn'endshipn (viii), but he is not clear about whether she actually posed for his illustrator or 
whether she ailowed him to use pre-existing drawings. As a whole, these drawings convey 
a much more thea t r id  fom of gesture than the other gestures. In his main text, Austin 
condemns theatrical gesture as "licentious" and improper for the decorous public speaker, 
yet he continues to give it presence both in the verbal and visual text. His reference to 
Sarah Siddons' "elegant dents" implies that Austin greatly admires at least some forms of 
theatricai action and some actors, an admiration that wnflicts with his attempt to exclude 
theatrid gesture fiom his system. 
"~enry  Siddons' Practical ILlustrationr of Rhetoncal Gesture and Action Adapted ro the 
English D r a  (1807), which is based on M. Engel's InPPin (1785), 
provides one example of a contemporary work that visuaiiy illustrated 69 dramatic attitudes, 
ranging from "Priden to "Obsequious Attention." However, with the exception of Siddons' 
depiction of "Horror" (24) and of 'Idiotism," 'Vulgar Arrogance," and 'Foppery" (see n. 
11, above), the bodily positions in his iuustrations do not closely resemble Austin's. 
Burgh's me Art of Speaking also includes extensive descriptions of the dramatic expression 
of particular passions, though his depictions are verbal not visual. For more on "expressive 
gestures" in eighteenth-century acting, see Bamett, 36-68. 
gesture that the preceding plates visually analyze. Even though drawings 99 to 122 show 
complete bodies in action, the constituent elements of their complex actions do not - 
correspond to the elements of gesture within Austin's system. As a result, these elements 
never receive visuai (or, for that matter, verbal) re-integration: Austin never shows the 
aspiring speaker how to put all the parts of gesture back together again once he has learned 
them in isolation. Instead, Austin's series of visual drawings intended to illustrate the verbal 
and graphical explanations of his complex system incongruously end with two plates of 
"significant" figures whose place within this system is ostensibly insignifiant, and whose 
actions are unrelateci to the preceding elementai forms. These final figures simultaneously 
dismpt and enrich Austin's construction of proper delivery because they move beyond the 
boundaries of actions appropriate to the submissive, strictly regulated, merely competent 
speaker to assert the powerful, but unregulated and unclassifiable, practices of "significant" 
delivery . 
Concluding Remarks 
An analysis of Austin's attempt to articulate a comprehensive and detailed system of 
gesture for delivery reveals a sophisticated integration of verbal and visuai rhetorical forms. 
The interaction of verbal descriptions with the less cornmon, more scientific languages of 
symboiic notations, tables, and geumetric drawings produces a richly stratified and 
multiform text. And while these various Languages are interdependent in the sense that none 
is fully comprehensible on its own, each form operates according to different principles of 
communication. As a whole, the verbal and visual languages of Austin's treatise 
demonstrate his desire to enclose his generic ideal of the competent, decorous speaker within 
firm boundaries and precise classifications. Thus, his system plays out a tension between 
multiplicity and selectivity: in constructing his version of Bahktin's "classical body" 
(Stallybrass and White 21), Austin strives, as Foucault explains, to master the multiple by 
imposing a selective order on it. But without the texture of multiplicity, Austin's system 
would be uninteresting and insignificant; therefore, his verbal and visual languages 
enurnerate at length the many distinctions which make up his system as a whole. However, 
as 1 hope the preceding analysis has shown, whether we consider his enurneration of the parts 
and positions of the body, his articulation of a system of notation, or the drawings in his 
plates, Austin's stmggle to organize the multiplicity of gesture within a single, coherent 
system inwitably entails incongmities. He resolves some of these incornpatibilities by 
engendering new "contrivances," but others continue to destabilize the firm boundaries of his 
conception of bodily decorum. 
Austin's background as an amateur chemist provides a revealing context for 
understanding the nature of his visual forms in the Chirommia. In accordance with 
contemporary conventions in the discourse of chemistry, Austin's visual codes pnmarily 
represent physical delivery as a disembodied, theoretical discourse to be spoken by scientific 
analysts and regulators of gesture, rather than a practical, integrated art accessible to aspiring 
speakers. This tendency foregrounds his efforts to establish the disciplinary status and 
scholarly propriety of rhetorical gesture through its articulation as a technically stratified 
discourse. However. Austin's use of the 'resources of ordinary language" (357) and the 
inclusion of humanizing naturalistic elements in his visual forms suggest his simultaneous 
desire to appeal to a more generai readership interested in leaming how to practice the 
standards and codes of poiite bodiiy conduct. Despite an apparent desire to secure increased 
cultural capital through the specialized scientific language of his system, Austin seems-in a 
manner consistent with the paradoxical structure of status aspiration-at the same time tacitly 
aware both of his own Limits and the limits of his subject-matter to complete explication in 
this language. 
As well, the incongruities in his system appear to stem, at least in part, from the 
ambivalence of his own position as schoolmaster to young boys of superior social class. In 
this context, the strong subjugating effects that Foucault identifies in late eighteenth century 
activations of bodily regulation would be inappropriate, to say the least. While Austin's 
system may imply the authority of the "scmpu1ous1y 'classificatory' eye of the master" 
(Foucault, Discipline 147)' this "eyen must also decorously negotiate its own ambivalent 
status in relation to the students it supervises, and especially the upper-class families of the 
students whose continuai patronage is necessary for the growth and continuation of an 
educational program in delivery. When Austin's pupiis enter b y  profession or by rank the 
great theatres of public eloquence," he wishes to be remembered by them fondly, not just 
obediently (xii). Finally, we can read the tensions in the Chironomia's system-in particular, 
the ambivalent inclusion-exclusion of theatricai 'cornplex significant geshiresn-as signs of 
Austin's own uneasiness about how his abstract codification and unnaturai segmentation of 
bodily language contradict his efforts to assert the signifiant persuasive powers of rhetorical 
delivery in its integrated, embodied practices. 
CHAPTER F N E  
CLOSINGS: THE "NATURAL" PATHOS OF DELIVERY AND 
THE IDEAL ORATOR 
The middle sections of Sheridan's, Waiker 's , and Aus th's treatises develop complex 
and relatively extensive, if not fully coherent, systems for the proper management of the 
voice and gesture in rhetorical delivery. These systems confirm the disciplinary status of 
delivery by articulating it as a teachable and knowable branch of the whole art of oratory. 
Still, as we have seen, the interna1 complexity characteristic of systems like Walker's and 
Austin's, although it does conaibute notably to the affirmation of delivery's scientific or 
scholarly status, shultaneously obscures the reductive scope of dieir inquiries into the 
"elemenan of elocution and the correspondingly limited character of the competent speaker 
which their technai both presuppose and consmict. As well, the impression of exhaustive 
treatment of their subject matter through Urtricate structures of division draws our attention 
away from the lack of re-integration of these parts, the lack of guidance for re-combining 
the several elements of elocution into meaningful, practicable wholes. 
One might logically expect the f d  sections of the treatises to fulfil the progressive 
sequence of their rhetorical forms (Burke, Counterstatement 124) by providing the kùid of 
summative, holis tic perspective that seems absent fiom their detailed, technical middles . ' In 
a sense, the f d  sections do perform that function by representing, directly and indirectly , 
'In the following discussion, 1 use the phrases "final sectionsn or "closing sectionst1 to 
designate not only the fuial conclusions, or perorations, of the treatises, but also the 
immediately preceding sections which for the most part focus in some way on the meaning 
and role of the "language of naturen in elocution. Specifically, these closing sections 
include the final two lectures in Sheridan's work, Lecture VI: "Tonesn and Lecture VII: 
"Gesture", and, from Austin's Chironomia, Chapter XX: "Of the Analogy of Gesture and 
Language," Chapter XXI: "Of the Significancy of Gesture," and Chapter XXII: "Of Grace." 
an ideal speaker who has mastered the art of elocution in its highest forms. From the 
perspective of classical oratory, these ideals, aniculated in particular in Sheridan's and 
Austin's treatises, partiaily fulfil the peroration7s function of surnrnarizing 'the whoien of 
the speaker's case (Quintilian 6.1.1 ).' In generai, classical rhetoricim agreed that a 
primary function of the conclusion of a discourse was to provide a brief summation of the 
speaker's main arguments to refresh the audience's memory . Ar istotle, for example, says 
that in the peroration 'you have to review what you have already saidn to make your points 
easily understood (Rhetorzk 3.18.4), while Cicero explains that, in the peroration, "the 
summing-up is a passage in which matters that have been discussed in different places here 
and there throughout the speech are brought together at a glance in order to refresh the 
memory of the audience" (Qg Inventionc 1.5 1-98). However. whereas classical theory 
advises the speaker to enurnerate the most important points of the case he has just made, the 
closing surnmations of Sheridan's and Walker's treatises do not rnainly recapitulate the 
many parts and mles of elocution that their middle sections have already discussed; instead. 
they present a new kind of summative ideal of elocution that exceeds the scope of their 
representations so far . 
By summing up the virtues of persuasive delivery , this ideal acts, in Burkean terms, 
as the principle of perfection motivating the symbolic hierarchy of elocutionary study and 
uniting al1 its rnembers. These closing visions of complete oratory unite al1 participants in 
the hierarchy of elocution in the sense that "each class of being in the hierarchy strives to 
achieve the perfection that the top of the hierarchy representsn (Foss 174). At the same 
tirne, however, these lower, aspiring classes are divided and estranged from the 
inspirational ideal (Foss 176). Whereas the middle sections of the elocutionary texts 
2The conclusion of Walker's treatise, by contrat, is very brief and does not delineate a 
summative ideal of elocution. The final section of his two volume work does, however, 
provide an extensive catalogue of the physical express ions of interna1 passions. This 
section, as Waiker notes, draws heavily on Burgh's catalogue in The Art of Speaking. 
Waiker 's closing inclus ion of a lengthy section on gesture destab il izes his previous 
definition of the field of elocution which did not include gesture. 
3Quintilian also discusses this enumerative and "regroupingn function of the peroration in 
Book VI. 1.1-8 of Iitstitutl'o Oratoria. 
develop a modest, approachable ideal of competent speaking, based on the mastery of the 
fundamenml "eiements" (Walker, title page) or "rudimentsn (Sheridan 95) of elocution, the 
f d  sections do not simply confirm the centrality of this limited, learnable ideal to the 
hierarchy of eighteenth-century elocutionary study. Instead, they leap, incongruousIy, from 
the representation of elocution as a knowable and teachable art to an affrrnation of the most 
powerful and signifîcant, but essentially mysterious and unteachable, forms of delivery. 
The closing sections of Sheridan's and Austin's treatises thus re-confi~gure the 
tension between the competent and the consummate speaker. Whereas the preceding 
technai of bodily decorum were expressly or implicitly intended to assist aspiring speakers 
who require the guidance of an explicit "repertoire of mles" combined with diligent practice 
in these rules to cross the threshold into polite society, the closing visions of the "genuine 
oratorn (Herries 236) by contrast idealize a superior speaker who naturally possesses, 
ostensibly through an effortless "inborn capacity ," (Cicero, De Oratore 1 .B), the
irresistible powers of delivery in its highest, mest manifestations. In Bourdieu's terms, this 
tension foregrounds the difference between those who acquire cultural capital primarily 
through educational means and those who possess it, effortlessly, by birth. However, 
because the transmission of physical capital between generations is less secure than the 
inheritance of economic and other forms of cultural capital (Shilling lQ), the elocutionary 
representations of the "nanuallyn talented, superior speaker both exclude those whose social 
backgrounds have not cultured them in these validated forms of conduct and create 
possibilities that those who do not possess significant inherited capital of other kinds may 
display great " inbornn physical capital. 
One of the key differences between the rule-bound cornpetent speaker and the 
naturally talented consummate speaker is the role which pathos plays in their conduct. The 
image of the competent, diligent, socially-aspiring speaker for the most part emphasizes the 
decorous traits of verecundia (a modest sense of shame) and of self-resûaint. These traits, 
which correspond with the status aspirant's "sense of iimits" (Bourdieu, Distinction 47 1 ) , 
make the display of saong emotion subject to the charge of indecorous self-assertion. As 
Quintilian cautions, "if the pleader is a feeble speaker," then grand emotional appeals are 
more likely to excite laughter than emotional engagement (6.1.44-46). Yet, according to 
Cicero and Quintilian, the great power of delivery lies in its pathos, in the "fire that voice, 
look, and the whole carriage of the bodyn give to the speaker's emotional appeals 
(Quintilian 1 1.3 -2). ' As John Herries explains in Elements of Speech, the nobles t form of 
delivery in public speaking is "animated with the SPIRlT OF THE PASSIONS. By that 
irresistible energy which penetrates the deepest recesses of the heart. Here dwells the 
triumph of original eloquence. It is this which distinguishes the genuine orator from the 
faise onen (236). The closing ideals of "genuuien oratory, then, re-assert the marvelous 
power of pathos, though not as a feature of the rule-bound competent speaker but rather as 
a characteristic of the truly excellent speaker for whom rules are an imposition (Walker 1: 
47). 
This closing validation of delivery on the bais of its powers of emotional persuasion 
reconfirrns the significance of pathos to rhetoric. Of the three classical appeals of ethos, 
logos, and pathos, the latter bas occupied the most problematic s tatus within the rhetorical 
tradition. While classical rhetoricians such as Cicero and Quintilian strongly endorse the 
importance of pathos to persuasion, the Aristotelian tradition has helped to foster a deep 
suspicion of non-rational, emotional appeals. a suspicion that continues today, as we see in 
Edward Corbett's comment that "there is something undignified about a rational creature 
being precipitated into action through the stimulus of aroused passions" (Classical Rheforic 
86).' Joseph Colavito argues that, even though the place of pathos in the rhetorical 
4According to Cicero, 'delivery is wholly the concern of the feelingsn (Pe Oratp~e 
3.59.221); "delivery, which gives the ernotion of the mind expression, influences 
everybody, for the same ernotions are felt by al1 people and they both recognize them in 
others and manifest them in themselves by the same marksn 3 S9.223). 
'Cicero, for example, argues that "nothing in oratory . . . is more imponant than to win 
for the orator the favor of his hearer, and to have the latter so affected as to be swayed by 
something resembling a mental impulse of emotion, rather than by judgment or 
deliberationn (pe Oratm 2.42). The beginning of Aristotle's Rhetorzk, by contrast, 
condemns other writers on rhetoric for dealing with "nonessentials ." "The arous ing of 
prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions," he claims, 'has nothing to do with the 
essential facts. . . . It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or 
pityn (1.1354a). Aristotle does subsequently include pmhos as an important appeai but, as 
his discussion of verbal style and delivery at the beginning of Book III makes clear, he 
rernains highly ambivalent about the emotionally charming effects of non-rational appeals, 
arguing that 
The right thing in speaking really is that we should be satisfied not to annoy 
tradition is significant, ir continues to have "a negative castn and to be viewed with 
'suspicionn (Colavito 493-494). The traditional association of delivery with the suspect 
appeai pathos suggests one reason why this canon has received less attention and less 
validation than the other parts of oratory. In their closing sections, however, Sheridan and 
Austin make pathos a primary, validated means of persuasion. 
They do this on two Ievels: on a substantive level, they posit the expression of the 
naniral language of the passions as an essential feature of genuine delivery; on a rhetorical 
level, the eiocutionary writers themselves employ emotiooal appeals to create a 
psychological rather than saictly logical comection (Cooper and Nothstine 85) between the 
lesser ideal of competent speaking and the closing, inspirational ideal of coosummate 
delivery . But both these forms of pathos introduce incompatibilities between Sheridan's 
and Austin's earlier representations of delivery and their closing ones. In particular, the 
association of elocution with the "language of nature" seems to conflict with the technical 
assurnption that an explicit analytic pedagogy of bodily decorum can be systematically 
articulated and taught. And the final amplified visions of genuine oratory which appeal to 
the aspiring speaker's ernotional desires contrast with the earlier quasi-logical elucidation of 
the basic elements of elocution. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's theory of the dissociation of ideas that yields the 
"appearance-reality" pair offers a critical tool for analyzing how Sheridan and Austin strive 
to alleviate some of the basic incompatibilities between the middle and closing 
representations of elocution, as well as M e r  incongruities generated prirnarily within the 
final discussions themselves as these unfold. Accordhg to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
the dissociation of concepts is "prompted by the desire to remove an incornpatibility arising 
out of the confrontation of one proposition with others, whether one is dealing with norms, 
facts, or truths" (413). The prototypical dissociation of a concept into an "appearance- 
reality" pair acts to resoive or overcome incompatible "appearancesn of reality by 
our hearers, without trying to delight them: we ought in fairness to fight our 
case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore, should matter 
except the proof of those facts. Still, as has already been said, other things 
affect the result considerably, owing to the defects of Our hearers. 
(3.1 4O4a). 
distinguishing between "those appearances that are deceptive from those that correspond to 
reality " (4 16). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca designate the former as " term 1" and the 
latter as 'term II" in the appearance-reaiity pair: 
aDDearance laml 
reaiity or, in general term II 
In this pair, term II is the validated concept that represents "real" or "me" reaiity while term 
I stands in for multiple erroneous or illusory appearances. 
This chapter will focus on how the elocutionist. employ the technique of dissociating 
key ideas into appearance-reality pairs as a strategy for resolving, or at least temporarily 
alleviating, the main conceptual incompatibilities that emerge in their closing sections. 
These techniques help to construct a mysterious, psychologicai connection between Iower 
and higher dimensions of the elocutionary hierarchy. As well, by emphasizing the role of 
natural talent, they make the learners, rather than the teachers and rules, of elocution 
ultimately accountable for success in delivery. To explore the substantive dimension of 
pathos in these closing sections, 1 will examine the sequences of dissociations put into play 
by Sheridan's and Austin's belated authorization of the art of elocution on the bais of its 
connections with the "language of nature" (Sheridan 113). To understand the inspirational 
effect of the closing ideals of the consummate orator, 1 will analyze the techniques of 
dissociation at work in their characterizations of this psychologically motivating but 
logically incongruous ideal. 
The Language of Nature and Elocution 
In the closing sections of their treatises, Sheridan and Austin attend to the 
relationship between persuasive delivery and "the language of nature," or "the language of 
the passions" (Sheridan 1 13, 10 1). This language, as Sheridan explains, consists of the 
"rue signs" of the interna1 passions or "emotions of the mind," as these are expressed 
externally through 'tones, looks, and gesturesn (100-101). The role of the voice, 
countenance, and gesture in communicating and arousing emotion has firm classical 
precedenu , especiaily in Cicero's and Quintilian's rhetorical theories ,6 but within die 
cultural context of the elocutionists this dimension acquires further credibility through its 
identification with contemporary philosophical-ps ycholog ical theor ies . This identification, 
which provides a kind of belated philosophical rationale for the study of delivery, amplifies 
the scholarly legitimacy of eighteenth-century elocutionary theory. But this rationale, while 
it may develop a culturally prestigious foundation for elocution as a field of enquiry, 
conflicts with the earlier quasi-logical representations of the parts and rules of elocutionary 
study. As well, the promotion of elocution as the communicative medilim for expressing 
the natural language of the passions through non-verbal tones and gestures reconfigures the 
disciplinary relationship between elocution and the art of written, verbal language. 
Especially within Sheridan's account, elocution and spoken language in this f d  
configuration occupy a superior and distinct position in relation to written language. 
Primarily, the elocutionary writers draw, either directly or indirectly, on the 
ostensibly authoritative views of Henry Homes (Lord Kames) about the meaning and 
operation of this natural language of the passions.' As Bizzell and Herzberg note, within 
the late eighteenth-century intellectual community, "Kames' influence . . . was 
considerable, and his effort to ground criticism and the arts in scientific psychology 
provided support for the important project of including the emotions, as well as reason and 
the understanding, in the study of human naturen (657). Austin extracts several lengthy 
passages from "the acute and learned author of Elements of Criticismn to explain "the 
external signs of emotions and passions" (469). His selections include the following key 
passage: 
The natural signs of emotions, voluntary and involuntary, being nearly the 
sarne in dl men, form an universal language which no distance of place, no 
difference of tribe, no diversity of tongue, can darken or render doubtful. 
Education, though of mighty influence, hath not power to Vary or 
sophisticate, far less to destroy, their signification. This is a wise 
%ee Cicero, De O r a t m  3.57-59; Quintilian, 1 1.3.1-14. 
'See Mohrmann, "The Language of Nature and Elocutionary Theory" and "Kames and 
Elocution" for more information about the contemporary sources for the elocutionary views. 
appointment of Providence. For if these signs were, like words, arbitrary 
and variable, it would be an inuicate science to decipher the actions and 
motives of our own species, which would prove a great or rather invincible 
obstruction to the formation of societies. But as rnatters are ordered, the 
external appearances of joy, grief, anger. fear, shame, and of the other 
passions forming an universal language, open a direct avenue to the hem. 
(Austin 472). 
In particular, as the above passage suggesü, the language of nature is socially 
valuable because, by contrast with the "arbitrary" language of "words, " it is "universal" (i.e., 
cross-cultural and tram-historical), because it is "natural" in the sense of being untaught, 
and because its meaning is invariable and "direct." From the perspective of Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca's theory, this rhetorical representation deals with the ilicompatibility 
between different notions of human language by dissociating the general concept of 
language into an "appearance" term and a "reality" term: the higher, mer  language (Term 
II) is the universai, untaught, mysterious language of the non-verbal expression of passions 
while the "arbitrary and variablen language of words and ideas occupies the position of 
Term 1, the potentiai source of error and illusion. 
Aowever, this validation of delivery on the bais of its connections with the natural 
language of the passions clearly conflicts with several of Austin's and Sheridan's preceding 
arguments and assumptions about the nature and significance of elocution. Notably, their 
closing focus on the language of nature positions new feanires of delivery as  more important 
than the essentiai elements detailed in their middle parts. Thus, these closing sections, 
instead of coherently tying together the various threads of the earlier sections, inuoduce 
new incompatibilities into the rhetorical formulations of their field of inquiry. These 
incornpatibilities include a tension between the new privileging of delivery as a passionate, 
mysterious, and universal form of expression by contrast with former attempts to restrain 
bodily conduct through rational systerns of verbally articulated rules and codes. This 
tension in turn destabilizes the preceding subordinate association of non-verbal eloquence 
with the established, gentlernanly art of written language. The question is, how do Sheridan 
and Austin (attempt to) deai, in their f d  sections, with these new disruptions to the overall 
coherence and decorum of their project? 
Of al1 the elocutionists, Sheridan most extensively exploits the topic of the natural 
language of the passions to legitimate his field of inquiry. Of his seven lectures, he devotes 
the finai two to this issue, though he has aiready ailuded to it in earlier sections. In 
Lectures VI, on tones, and VII, on gesture, he constructs a complex theoretical rationale for 
the value of what he characterizes as "al1 that is pleasurable, or affectingn in elocution (95). 
To demonstrate the appropriateness of the concept of the natural language of the passions as 
the main philosophical justification for the snidy of elocution, Sheridan rnakes a series of 
dissociations that permit hirn to continue claiming the significance of this rationale to the 
elocutionary project desp ite emerg hg incongruities . These moves allow Sheridan to 
distinguish between (yet also connect) the imperfect nature of current speakers for whom 
the rudiments of elocution are appropriate and the idealized nature of future speakers who 
rnanifest higher forms of delivery; they allow him to assert the scholarly credibility of his 
discourse while avoiding the problem of providing prescriptive instruction for achieving "al1 
that is pleasurable, or affectingn; they allow him to privilege non-verbal, spoken eloquence 
above verbal, written language, yet also to legitirnate elocution according to a traditional 
rnind-body hierarchy in which the body acts decorously as the externd conveyor of higher, 
interna1 meaning; and his crucial dissociation between the universal language of nature that 
humans share with animals and the language of nature available only to 'noblen humans 
allows him to re-afirm the value of cultivating non-verbal expressions of emotion. 
Sheridan begins his final two lectures on "Tones" and "Gesturen by dissociating these 
"two remaining articlesn fiom the earlier parts of elocution that he has covered. He 
classifies tones and gesnires as the source of "dl that is pleasurable, or affecting in elocu- 
tion" whereas the earlier parts, though 'essentially necessary , " comprised merely the 
"rudimentsn of public speaking (93). Thus, Sheridan establishes tones and gestures as the 
higher, more "red" term within the general concept of elocution, while the preceding parts 
are figured as less signifiant. However, by characterizing these l a s  significant parts as 
"fundamentaily , and essentially necessary , " he does not exclude them from the hierarchy of 
elocution. Rather, his dissociation of ideas constructs two ranks of beings within this 
hierarchy: those who are masters merely of "these rudiments of rhetoricn and those who are 
masters of "every thing, which cm add grace, or force to . . . delivery" (93). Although 
these two ranks are divided from each other, they are nonetheless connected because 
committed to the same overall hierarchy of elocution. In this way, Sheridan stresses the 
situational, kairotic value of learning the preceding hindamental points of delivery: "so low 
is the state of elocution amongst us, " he explains, "a man who is master even of these 
rudiments of rhetoric, is comparatively considered, as one of an excellent delivery" (94). 
Even though these "rudimentsn do not represent elocution in its highest, ideal form, within 
the curent time and circumstances one who possesses them will profit from the appearance, 
if not the reality, of "excellent delivery." However, the achievement of truly graceful and 
forceful delivery-the pr inciple of perfection motivating Sheridan's s ymbolic 
hierarchy-requires more than the competent management of articulation, pronunciation, 
accent, emphasis, pauses, and pitch; it requires rnastery of "tones, and gesture: upon which 
al1 that is pleasurable, or affecting in elocution, chiefly dependn (94). 
This introduction to the final two lectures creates an expectation that Sheridan will 
now provide, at the very lem, the same kind of practical (though limited) instruction for 
learning how to perform tones and gestures appropriately that he has given for mastering the 
"rudiments ." But instead of giving any kind of practical instruction about tones and 
gestures, Sheridan shifts to an extended theoretical discourse about these forms of human 
communication combined with a panegyric celebration of their persuasive powers. While 
this discourse is logically inconsistent with his stated objective of providing his adult 
learners with a practical methoci for acquiring "just and natural delivery," it is rhetorically 
strategic in the sense that it foregrounds the "speculative," scholarly nature of his 
disquisition whiie preserving the indeterminacy of tmly excellent elocution. 
As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain, typically knowledge of the "reality" of 
Term II in an appearance-reaiity pair 'is indirect, sometirnes even impossible, and rarely 
capable of communication in an exhaustive and unquestionable mannern (41 8). By 
simultaneously praising the natural language of tones and gesture as the most powerful 
aspect of elocution, yet avoiding the mundane task of explicating a practical method for 
acquiring these powers, Sheridan amplifies the value of this mysterious reality. Thus, the 
structure of his lectures moves from the explication of a techne designed to provide his 
immediate audience with the opportunity to become masters of a rudimentary degree of 
cornpetence in public speaking, to the re-mystification of this art in its ideal form. This re- 
mystification ensures that the art of elocution does not become "easy, and for that very 
reason insignificantn (Cahn 68). 
Sheridan launches his theoretical discourse about the tones and gestures with a 
disquisition on "the precise meaning, of the term language" (94). Whereas formerly he 
attempted to garner support for the methodical study of elocution by associating it, analog- 
ously, with "the known rules" of written language (see Chapter Three), now Sheridan 
validates the language of tones and gestures by dissociating written, verbal language and 
spoken, non-verbal language. In his initial anaiogy, the art of written language occupied 
the higher, more "reai" position which, claimed Sheridan, the irregular , unsettled practices 
of non-verbal spoken language should strive to imitate. Now, by contrast, his dissociation 
of the general concept "languagen situates the non-verbal signs of emotions as a more 'real" 
and important form of communication than the language of 'wordsn (100). 
Initially, he presents this dissociation in a fairly weak form, clairning that verbal 
language is "only a pan of language" and that there are other para that warrant attention as 
well. However, this apparently neutral whole-part division quickly adopts hierarchical 
values as Sheridan asserts that these "other parts" are not only "equally necessary" but "in 
their consequences of more importance" because they serve the "noblest and best endsn of 
"social communicationn (98, my emphasis). Here Sheridan re-confums the "serious moral" 
(Quintilian 4.1.7) nature of his enquiry by alluding to its implications for the spiritual well- 
being of the whole British nation and even al1 of humanity. The "ends" to which he refers 
consist of the ostensibly infallible, universal communication of emotions between human 
beings, a communication "necessary to society, and to the state of hurnan nature in general" 
(101). While Sheridan is unclear about how exactly this non-verbal communication benefits 
society, he can count on the persuasiveness of his generai argument because of its 
contemporary cultural currency, in particular in the doctrines of Scottish common sense 
philosophy and the aesthetic theories of Lord ka me^.^ By drawing on these current 
philosophical-ps ychological theories , Sheridan augments the scholarl y author ity of the 
elocutionary project. At the saine tirne, his lengthy theoretical disquisition on the nature of 
language takes his audience's attention away from the lack of practical instruction on tones 
'Sec Mohrrnann, "The Language of Nature and Elocutionary Theoryn for an elucidation 
of the comections between elocutionary theory and common-sense philosophy. 
and gesnires in these closing lectures. 
Sheridan overcomes the intellecnial impropriety of assening the value of bodily 
tones, looks. and gestures in their own right by dissociating this language into external 
appearance (i.e., its physical forrns) and higher , internal reality (Le., its abstract forms and 
meanings) . Unlike words, tones and gestures provide "fixed, self-evident, and universall y 
intelligible" signs of the passions (10 1). These signs, however, are not in themselves or for 
their own sake valuable; rather, their meaning and worth depends on their ability to 
accurately express the non-physicai reality of internal feelings. In turn, the external 
expression of these internal feelings is important because it conaibutes to an abstract, 
myster ious conception of social well-being . 
The premise that the physical expression of emotions comprises a "universaliy 
intelligible" natural language that "requires neither study, art, nor imitationn (105) leads to a 
new incompatibility in Sheridan's general conception of this language. Clearly, the idea 
that human beings successfully perform this language without study or art conuadicts an 
essential motivation for the elocutionary hierarchy-that is, to develop a regulated method of 
instruction in delivery. Even more disquietingly, the theory of the natural language of the 
passions-according to its fundamental premises-dissolves hierarchical distinctions not only 
between human beings of different cultures and classes, but between human beings and 
animals: 'man, in his animal capacity. is furnished, like al1 other animals, by nature herself, 
with a language which requires neither study, art, nor imitationn (105). 
To overcome this incompatible identification 'between the human and animal 
species, " Sheridan introduces a new dissociation intended to "mark their boundar ies" ( 106): 
while animals and humans share a natural capacity for expressing basic feelings through 
physical expressions, the latter possess "nobler faculties" that link them with 'spiritual 
beings" and distinguish them fiom "the brute species." Thanks to these noble, rational 
faculties, human beings are capa~le of improving, through their 'own pains and industryn 
(106). the basic resources of nature. In this new figuration, nature is "an instrumentn 
subject to "the care and invention of man." Here. Sheridan's argument cornes full circle, 
allowing him to reassert, at least indirectly, the value of conscious study and art to non- 
verbal delivery : by contrast with the basic, natural expressions of emotion common to al1 
species, the noble faculties of human beings create a whole new range of "internal exertions 
and emotions" distinct from tbose of "the brute species"; this higher, nobler set of emotions 
requires different tones and gestures than those universally supplied by nature. Thus, it is 
up to the "care and invention of man" to establish through art and custom those external 
signs which express these higher emotions . 
While Sheridan begins by assening the value of tones and gestures on the basis of 
their untaught, universal nature, he moves eventually, through a series of hierarchicai 
dissociations, to reaffirm their culnirallydetermined forms. At the same t h e ,  this move 
causes him to re-identim the non-verbal language of the passions with the verbal language 
of ideas, first of al1 because the meanings of both, he ciaims, are "established by customn 
and secondly because the expression of the nobler emotions requires association with verbal 
language to be fully determinate: 
But the tones resulting from the emotions and exertions of Our nobler 
faculties, tho' they excite feeling, as it is in the nature of al1 tones to do, yet 
it is only of a vague and indeterminate nature: not corresponding to the 
energies in the mind of the speaker, unless they are associated with words, or 
the symbols of ideas. . . . When any tones therefore are affixed to certain 
modes of expression, and adopted into general use; those tones, tho' they 
have no natural connection with the sentiment, no more than words have with 
ideas; yet by such association, become equally intelligible, and equally 
affecthg with those that have, and are made part of the language. . . . (108) 
Sheridan's discussion of the natural language of the passions in Lectures VI and VI1 
constructs a complex theoretical rationale for the value of "al1 that is most affecting, and 
pleasurablen in elocution, namely the tones and gestures. While an anaiysis of the main 
dissociative moves that characterize this discussion shows its logical inconsistencies, the 
sequence of these moves permits Sheridan to alleviate these incongruities as his discourse 
progresses, and thereby to preserve for his audience the mysterious value of the highest 
elements of elocution. As well, the philosophical nature of this section of his discourse 
enhances the scholarly credibility of his work by demonstrating the apparent association 
between the practical, physical art of elocution and learned. absaact enquiries into the 
nature of social communication and the super ior " interna1 facul ties " of human beings. B y 
characrerizing the "signs of internai emotions" as the "nobler branch of [human] language," 
he affirms the social and disciplinary value of his subject rnatter. And. though logically 
disquieting, the instability of his dissociations between the verbal language of id- and the 
physical lmguage of the passions, and between animal and hurnan forms of communication 
augment the indeterminacy of this noble language. This indeterminacy. which amplifies the 
reality-value of Sheridan's privileged term, is increased further by the absence of any 
practical, technical method for successfully learning and performing the language of the 
passions. 
The closing section of the Chironomia dso explores the role of the language of 
nature in elocution both by drawing on Lord Kames' views of this Ianguage and by 
foregrounding theatrically 'expressiven gestures which "represent a passion of the character 
being pornayedn (Barnett 36). But at the same tirne as Austin presents as a basic premise 
for the significance of non-verbal delivery the concept of a gestural language which 
indicates the emotions in a universally comprehensible manner, his representation 
demonstrates ambivalence about the propriety of including this powemil, but perhaps 
excessive, natural language of the passions within the hierarchy of decorous elocution. 
Simply the positioning of Austin's discussion of the expressive language of nawe within 
the treatise as a whole introduces an ambiguity about its statu: although it apparently 
articulates a fundamental premise for the study of elocution, by placing this section so late, 
Austin cdls into question its fundamental relevance. Austin's closing representation thus 
confuses the distinction between what is apparently and what is really the most significant 
or ûuest form of delivery. 
Moving from his systematic analysis of the parts of gesture and their symbolic 
notation, Austin includes two closing chapters that explore the nature of gesture as a kind of 
language in its own right. Chapter XX begins by boldly afirrning the equality of verbal 
language and the language of gesture: 'Gesture is in itself capable of being used as the sign 
of ideas, and therefore of being substituted for languagen (449). Contrary to Austin's 
earlier representation of the proper gestures for public speaking, this statement introduces 
the disciplinarily presumptuous view that gesture can actually replace verbal language rather 
than simply act as a secondary support to its dominant meanings. And not only does 
gesture express the rneanings of passions or emotions; it can even signify "ideas" 
independently of words. As evidence for this proposition, Austin refers to 'the excellence 
of the art of ancient pantomimes" (449), a reference which recalls the incongruities of his 
eariier chapter on the pantornimic art (see Chapter Three). 
As in this earlier chapter, however, Austin quickly re-establishes a decorous 
structure for the specific kinds of gesture appropriate to public speaking. He does this 
primarily by dissociating the language of gesnire as a whole into the mue or proper forms of 
gesnire for public speaking as distinct from those common to theaaical expression. Yet his 
dissociation ambivalently presents theaaical gesture as an ideal model at the same time as it 
excludes this form of gesture from the hierarchy of elocution: 
The action of the theatre supplies the most perfect models, because in its 
highest performance, tragedy, d l  the qualities of perfect gesture are required. 
But for rhetorical delivery, we have seen that some of those qualities are 
unnecessary, and some are improper. If the speaker have judgment sufficient 
to retrench what is superfluous, or improper for his use. the action of the 
theatre may, no doubt, afford him very useful instruction. and become under 
proper restrictions the best model. . . . But he must carefully guard against 
atternpting to introduce the full license of theatrical action into rhetorical 
delivery of any kind. (46 1-62) 
This dissociation between theatrical and rhetorical action is unstable, encouraging the 
snident of public speakmg to follow the "most perfect models" of theatre while at the sarne 
time requiring him always to 'guard against" its licentious extrema. In this way, Austin 
represents theamical action as both the highest reality and the erroneous appearance of 
reality. Indirectly, this dissociation depends on a distinction within the character of the 
speaker: the speaker who can successfully negotiate the mysterious relationship between 
theatrical and rhetorical action is he who possesses "suficient judgmentn to make the right 
decisions. By appealing to this characteristic of the speaker, Austin makes the possible 
overstepping of the boundaries of decorous gesnire become the fault not of his prescriptive 
techne but instead of the student's own judgment and nature. 
The subsequent chapter, "Of the Significancy of Gesture," also opens with a general 
pronouncement about the relationship between verbal and non-verbal language, a 
pronouncement that once again appears to position non-verbal language as equal, if not 
superior to, verbal language in its 'significancy." The terms and phrases that Austin uses to 
describe the former language aiign it with the vaiidated reality principle of Term II: for 
example, tones, looks, and gestures are "a sure indicationn of the emotions; they udiscover 
the thoughts distinctlyn ; they are "never misunderstoodn (469); indeed, their 's ignificancy" is 
by defmition what Austin calls "auth" (481). Thus, the initial structure of dissociation in 
this chapter functions to privilege the untaught, natural signs of emotions above the 
"arbitrary," unreliable significations of verbal Ianguage. However, this hierarchy obviously 
conflicts with assumptions that underlie Austin's preceding techne of gesture: the 
assumptions that proper gesture can be taught and should be socially regulated, that the 
highest, most significant form of gesnire is cultivated, and that the primary role of 
rhetorical action is to support, not displace, verbal language. 
To overcome these incompatibilities, Austin moves from "the authority of the acute 
and learned author of Elements of Criticism," through which he has established 'the 
existence of natural signs and their necessity" to another authoritative view. Now he draws 
on the Abbé du Bos' "division of gesture into natural and imtituted" (475).lU The category 
of "institutedn gestures would seem to introduce an opening for reafirming the importance 
of cultivated, socially-regulated action within the order of elocution. According to du Bos, 
however, Quintilian associates "instituted" gestures that signiQ independently or in the place 
of words with the questionable domain of theatrical and especially pantomirnic action." 
Thus, "naturallyn signifiant gestures continue to maintain the more privileged position, 
while "institutedn or "artificialn gestures classify as erroneous for public speaking: 
. . . a man who bats  his breast, uses a natural gesture indicating a strong 
affection of the mind: but he, who by his gestures described the forehead 
encircled by a diadem, makes use of a gesture of institution, signifjing a 
crowned head. An orator in speaking has no occasion to use these artificial 
gestures in order to make himself understood. And besides many of these 
[O~ean-~aptiste Dubos was the author of Referions critiques sur la poésie et sur la 
peinture, 3 vols. (Paris, 1755). An English translation of his work by J. Nourse was 
published in 1748. 
''For more on 'institutedn or, as Dene Barnett calls them. 'imitative" gestures in 
eighteenth-century theatre and oratory, see Barnett, 33-35. 
gestures could not fail to be incompatible with the decorum he ought to 
preserve in his delivery . (476) 
Instead of developing the log ical implications of this new dissociation between 
"naturallyn and "artificiallyn significant gestures funher, Austin reneats from the role of 
critical scholar, in which he comments on the relative rnerits of differing viewpoints, and 
takes on for the remainder of this section more the function of uncritical compiler. For 
example, he simply allows du Bos/Quindian's views to CO-exist both with Kames' 
preceding theory and, subsequently, with the ideas of other contemporary writers on gesture 
such as Johann Engel, Joannes Lucas, and Georges-Louis (the Count) de Buffon. As well, 
he refers the reader to both Sheridan's and Walker's views about "the external characters of 
the passionsn (482) without commenting on their different views. As a compiler of the 
views of others, Austin manages to demonstrate the breadth of his learning without being 
forced to take an explicit position for or agak t  any particular view, or to untangle the 
distinctions between possibl y conflicting views. 
Paradoxically, even though the gestures that Austin discusses in these closing 
chapters may have great social "significancyn because they are natural, universal indicators 
of the ernotions independent of verbal language, they are only peripheraliy significant to his 
system of delivery. By the end of his chapter on the "Significancy of Gesture," Austin 
returns to his dominant, and disciplinarily decorous, representation of rhetoricai action as 
primriiy and properly concerned with what he calls "not significantn gestures (497) rather 
than 'significantn ges tues. And, as the following passage shows, this dissociation between 
significant and not-significant gesture depends on the prior (unstable) dissociation between 
theatrical and rhetorical action, a dissociation here characterized in terms of degree not 
opposition: 
The significant gestures however nurnerous and correct which a great actor 
makes in the representation of an entire dramatic character, bear no 
proportion to the greater number of his gestures which are not significant, 
and which are no less necessary, though not so splendid nor imposing. . . . 
If the signifimnt gestures of the actor are less numerous than those which are 
less briiliant: the gestures of this kind ailowed to the orator are still more rare 
and reserved. (497, 499) 
In the end, Austin reasserts the relatively insignificant sratus of "significant" gesnire 
within the order of elocution, while at the same time permitting it a mysterious if.marginal 
position (as he has done in both the master table and the plates of drawings). His final 
affirmation of non-s ignificant gesture, despiie its ambiguous relations hip with the preceding , 
main discussion of signifiant gesture in this chapter, gives hùn the opportunity to return the 
reader's attention to the gestures his system has enumerated in the prior, rniddle section of 
his treatise. In addition, this affirmation allows him to assert the value of his system for 
guiding theauid as well as rhetorical action since, daims Austin, non-significant gestures 
"will be found to constitute the great mass of those which must also be introduced on the 
theatre" (499). Whereas he began these two closing chapters by praising theatricai gesture 
for providing "the most perfect models" of action to the discriminating student of public 
speaking, he ends by assening the supremacy of his own system of rhetorical gesture not 
only for the domain of public speaking but for the world of the theatre as well. In this way, 
he reverses his opening hierarchical dissociation, now situating rhetorical action in the Term 
II position and theatrical action as Term 1. 
The ambiguous relationship between the domains of rhetorical and theatrical action 
retlect, at least in part, the unstable social status of the world of the theaue in late 
eighteenth-century B ritain. Though securing an increas ingl y respectable reputation, as 
Straub argues this respectabiiity was precarious and counterbaianced by a continued 
perception of the socially and sexually suspect nature of the acting profession (Straub 9-10). 
And although the increasing role of elocutionary manuais in prescribing styles of delivery 
for private entertainment, rather than saictly for public speaking, creates a partial opening 
for the introduction of the theatre's "brilliant," passionate gestures, this leakage of public 
theaaical forms into the private spheres of polite society must be carefully regulated to 
prevent the intrusion of "1icentiousness" (Austin 240). Othenvise, private elocutionary 
entertainrnents may lose their status as tastehl and "innocentn forrns of leisure similar to the 
study of belles lettres recommended by Hugh Blair, and instead introduce the kind of 
"pernicious passion" they are intended to prevent (Blair 35). 
Charactenzations of the Ideal Orator 
In addition to presenting pathos, or the expression of the passions, as a fundamental 
rationale for the significance of delivery, the closing sections of Sheridan's and Austin's 
treatises function as f d  emotional appeals to the implied readers of their handbooks. The 
summative ideal of consummate oratory which these sections describe in a sense fulNs the 
peroration's function of providing a summary, though this "summary" exceeds the scope of 
the elemental parts of elocution detailed in the middle sections. As emotional appeals, 
however, these ideals more clearly fulfil the peroration's function of "@ectzun (Corbett 
307). In addition to summarizing key points to make them better understood, the 
conclusion of a speech, according to Aristotle, should "excite your hearers' emotions" 
(3.1419a). Quintilian discusses at length "the appeal to the emotions" suited to the 
peroration, suessing how this appeal will make the judges or hearers not only accep t the 
speaker's case, but more irnportantly desire it. A successful emotional appeal at the close 
of a discourse, claims Quintilian, sweeps the judge dong "in a tide of passion" to which he 
"yields unquestioninglyn (6.2.5-7). While the closings of Sheridan's and Austin's treatises 
may not quite sweep the reader dong in a tide of passion, they do appeai to the reader's 
emotions through their motivating visions of "excellentn delivery (Sheridan 95). Even 
though the implied users of these aeatises rnay never be able to achieve the f d  inspiring 
descriptions of the highest forms of delivery , they can al1 desire them. These final visions 
therefore simultaneously transcend and obscure the limitations of the preceding elementary 
technai, leaving the reader with a mysterious sense of connection benveen the two 
incongruous representations of bodily decorum. 
The logical incompatibiliv of these two images does not prevent the representation 
of the truly excellent speaker from acting as the ideal that motivates the rhetoricai hierarchy 
of elocution and which therefore inspires the aspiring speaker to achieve his appropriate 
level, or degree, within this hierarchy. As Burke argues, in a social hierarchy, "even the 
dispossessed tends to feel that he 'has a stake in' the authoritative structure that dispossesses 
himen (Am'rudes 329). The hierarchic order of elocution implied by these closing, 
summative ideals suggests that these ultimate terms encompass conflicting inferior elements, 
not by "outlawingn them, but by finding a place for them in a "developmental seria." 
According to Burke, "Once you have placed your terms in a developmental series, you have 
an arrangement whereby each can be said to participate, within the limitatior~ of ifs nature, 
in the ultimate perfection ("fmishednessn) of the seriesn (On SyrrzboLr 197-98). Despite 
separating the rank of competent speakers from the highest rank of perfect orators, the 
closing sections of Sheridan's and Austin's ueatises attempt, through various techniques of 
dissociation, to reveal the mysterious connection that exists between al1 mernbers of the 
hierarchy of elocution. In panicular, the construction of this hierarchic order depends on 
dissociations between the temporal and social locations of the different levels of speaker in 
the elocutionary hierarchy, and between the artificial, unemotional orator and the naturaily 
talented, passionate, and graceful orator. To preserve a sense of developmentai series and 
of mysterious communion between the separate ranks created by these dissociations, 
Sheridan and Austin present the separations between these ranks mainly as bridgeable 
differences of degree, not insurmountable ontologicai gaps (Whigham 72). 
Roughly half-way through his final lecture, Sheridan stops explaining the role of the 
language of the passions within human society generally and begins discussing iü role 
specifically within the art of elocution. This shift entails a series of dissociative moves 
which allow him both to advance an ideal vision of perfect oratory and to identifj an 
achievable rank in the elocutionary hierarchy for his immediate, imperfect audience of 
"persons who are advanced in lifen (127). Sheridan accomplishes this mainly through a 
temporal dissociation which both distinguishes the imperfect present from and connects it 
with the potentially perfect future, modeled on the idealized past, of elocutionary study and 
practice. Within this dominant dissociative structure, Sheridan effects other more subtle, 
yet signifiant, distinctions, particularly between the admirable forms of the language of 
nature ostensibly practised in ancient culture compared to the false modes of conternporary 
British oratory, and between the kinds of imperfect but "natural" elocution that are 
admissible in the current imperfect context by contrat with those "unnatural" forms which 
should be wholly excluded. This sequence of dissociations enables him to close with a 
hierarchic vision of the elocutionary symbolic order that Mplies, through the form of a 
developmental series, the participation of d l  members of the order in the "finishednessn of 
the ultimate stage according to the lirnits of their nature. 
Sheridan distinguishes between the m e  cultivation of the language of nature, to be 
found in the regular study and practice of classical oratory, and the false, capricious forms 
prevaient in the contemporary British context. Here, the value of the former "reality" 
compared to the latter is represented through the contrast of terrns signifying stability and 
harmony with those connoting instab ility and discord. Sheridan extends this basic structure 
of validation by clairning that the classical forms of the language of nature distinguish 
themselves from the lesser, irnperfect redity of the current scene because they were based 
on "cornmon standardsn and "general" models, rather than the wholly irregular practices of 
eighteenth-century British society. This argument presumes a neoclassical conception of 
"nature" as typical, uniform, and regular rather than a pre-romantic association of "nature" 
and the "nanirai" with individuality, irregularity, and spontaneity (Mattingly 81-84). This 
distinction provides Sheridan with the premise to justifi his own lack of precise rules for 
~eaching his audience how to acquire the "beauties" of the language of nature: without 
suitable models or common standards, he argues, it is impossible to develop rules for 
teaching students of public speaking how to imitate these non-existent models. Thus, until 
Britain develops these ideal models, the best that c m  be done is to give rules that teach 
individuais how to "avoid faultsn but not how to "acquire beauties" (1 19). The avoidance of 
faults, though an irnperfect form of elocution, is nonetheless situated as a necessary step in 
the movement toward the past/future ided of classical oratory. While Sheridan's irnmediate 
audience and immediate context c m  only advance by small degrees toward that ideal, the 
displacement of the ideal into a mysterious future allows him to promise great long-term 
rewards, provided of course that his audience continues to support a national project for the 
revival of elocutionary study. 
Given the immediate impossibiiity of securing the heights of nue excellence, what 
short-term methods does Sheridan offer to his audience for ensuring that their public 
speaking benefits at least to some degree fkom the power of the language of nature? Setting 
aside for the moment the higher reality of classicallideal oratory, Sheridan focuses 
expediently on the actual situation of his audience. Within this generally imperfect reality, 
he creates a new hierarchical dissociation between a speaker who follows "a rnanner of his 
ownn and a speaker who borrows or copies the manner of another imperfect speaker (1 19). 
While the former may not possess grace, he at least has the advantage, says Sheridan. of 
expressing his 'men feelings, whereas the latter appears "unnaturaln and affected (120). A 
distinguishing feature of the former speaker is that he employs "no artn in his delivery and 
in this sense exhibits a pleasantly 'naturaln manner (123). Here Sheridan draws on the 
association of "naturen and "naturai" with individuaiity and spontaneity. But this promotion 
of a non-artful form of elocution seems to conflict with his preceding glorification of the 
way in which classical oratory, he claims, artfully cultivated the language of nature so that 
it was graceful as well as forceful. To overcome this incompatibility , Sheridan emphasizes 
that art in iü proper, perfect form is desirable; however, this art must combine the best 
instruction, perfect patterns, and constant practice. Where this ideal form of art is 
unavailable or impractical (as it is for his immediate audience), then no art is preferable to 
"insufficient artn (121). Thus, says Sheridan, until the necessary elements for the proper 
cultivation of elocution are in place, "the best service 1 can do, is to inform individuals how 
they may by their own endeavours arrive at such a degree of excellence, as they cm attain 
without the aid of mastersn (123). 
However, Sheridan's expedient advice that the best way for his immediate audience 
to introduce the force, if not the grace, of the language of nature into their public speaking 
is simply to follow their own 'naturaln (untaught) rnanner introduces another tension. What 
if a person's natural manner involves 'bad habitsn? Initially, Sheridan deals with this 
possible problem simply by atraching a conditional phrase to his characterization of the 
current speaker who may achieve force but not grace in deiivery: 'Grace in elocution, it is 
hardly possible to obtain, in the present state of things; Force of delivery, is the necessary 
result of a clear head, and warm hem; provided no bad habits inteveren (my emphas is, 
122). This brief conditional clause indicates the exclusivity of the apparently wholly 
accessible secondary ideal that Sheridan has constructed to conform to his immediate 
context: if 'bad habitsn do interfere with a person's so-called nanual manner, or rather, if 
"bad habitsn constitute this person's m e r ,  then he is excluded even from this secondary 
hierarchy of elocution. 
A page or two later, however. Sheridan returns to the topic of 'bad habitsn and 
draws on a previous dissociative structure to permit them a limited, imprecise inclusion 
within his syrnbolic hierarchy. Iust as he has dissociated the preferable reality of a person's 
'own mannern from the affected appearance of someone who copies another person's 
manner, he now classifies 'faults" into two forms: the acceptable form of those that 
properly, "nanirailyn belong to the speaker and the unacceptable form of faults borrowed 
from someone else: 
'Tis granted; and it were to be wished, that a way were opened, by which 
speakers might be cured of al1 faults, in al1 the parts of delivery; but as this is 
impossible, without the aid of masters: and since thro' want of masters, faults 
there must be; the question is, whether a person should take up with his own, 
or those of another? A man's own faults. sit easy on him; habit has given 
them the air of being mural; those of another, are not assumed without 
awkwardness, they are evidently artificial. Where truth is concerned, the 
very faults of a speaker which seem nanird are more agreeable to the hearer, 
than such beauties as are apparently borrowed. (124) 
In this way, Sheridan privileges a person's 'ownn faults above those of another. 
Implicitly, this characterization supports a social ideology which validates the possession of 
personal propeny and the righü of the individual. Indeed, this whole section of Sheridan's 
treatise both perpeniates and appeals to such an ideology, emphasizing several times that the 
imperfect but best-available method that he recommends to his audience is "in the power of 
everyonen to pursue (123). While this rnethod may be in the power of his audience from 
the middling ranks to pursue (given the social worlds they already inhabit and their 
proximity to, if not full participation in, polite society), this assumption obfuscates the 
social elitism which, in reality, excludes very large portions of the British population from 
even entering into the lowest ranks of the hierarchy of elocution. 
As well, by clairning that every mernber of his audience (if not al1 British citizens) 
has the individual power to achieve at least forceful, if not graceful, delivery, Sheridan once 
again places responsibility for the success of his adult learners primarily on their individual 
"natural talents" (123) rather than on his own rules and insmction. He promises his 
audience that simply by combining rnastery of the "fundamental points" of elocution 
discussed in his earlier lectures with a "naturai mannern of delivery, each has the power "to 
obtain him the character of an excellent speaker, in proponion to his naturd talentsn (123, 
my emphas is). If a speaker does not secure a character of excellence, this is the resul t not 
of Sheridan's instruction but instead of the student's insuficient "rianual talentsn which have 
'entitledn (129) him to at best a limited stake in the social property and power of elocution. 
This terminology of individualisrn and natural talent ps ycholog icall y rnotivates members of 
the elocutionary hierarchy to continue striving toward greater degrees of perfection and at 
the same time to accept only partial success as consonant with their ostensibly "naturaln 
limitations. 
Although the b u k  of the second half of Sheridan's final lecture focuses on the lesser 
degrees of excellence that are, he maimains, realisticaily accessible to his immediate, 
imperfect and imperfectable audience, this characterization of the 'good" speaker who 
adequately "answer[s] every end of elocution in these times" (127) is subordinate to the 
higher past and hiture ideal of the truly excellent orator. To ensure that his audience 
properly understands and remains motivared by this ideal, Sheridan provides at the very end 
of his last lecture a succinct, explicit summary of the different ranks of speakers within the 
hierarchy of elocution: 
It is evident, in the use of the language of emotions, that he who is properly 
moved, and at the same time delivers himself, in such tones, as delight the 
ear with their harmony; accompanied by such looks and gestures, as please 
the eye with their grace; whilst the understanding also perceives their 
propriety; is in the fiisst class, and must be accounted a master. in this case, 
the united endeavours of art and nature, produce that degree of perfection, 
which is no other way to be obtained, in any thing that is the workmanship of 
man. Next to him is the speaker who gives way to his emotions, without 
thinking of regulating their signs; and trusts to the force of nature, 
unsollicitous about the graces of art. And the worst is he, who uses tones 
and gestwes, which he has borrowed from others, and which, not being the 
result of his feelings, are likely to be misapplied, and to be void of propriety, 
force, and grace. But he who is utterly without al1 language of emotions, 
who confhes himself to the mere utterance of words, without any 
concomitant signs, is not to be classed among public speakers. (133) 
This developmental series clarifies the separation between each rank at the same time 
that it creates a mysterious sense of connection from highest to lowest. The connection 
across ranks operates through the strategically vague concept of the naniral language of the 
emotions: each level possesses some form of this language, the substance that al1 mernbers 
of the hierarchy share. However, while this substance may be necessary for al1 levels, it is 
not sufficient for the highest, perfect orator who must combine the forces of nature with the 
graces of art. Here the concept of "naturen becomes realigned with the values of cultivated 
uniformity and regularity, yet it also maintains its d e f ~ t i o n  as an emotional force to which 
the individual speaker must "give wayn in an unregulated, spontaneous rnanner. Further. by 
specifying a kind of speaker who is wholly excluded from the hierarchy of elocution, 
Sheridan emphasizes the negotiable differences of degree, not the insurmountable 
differences of kind, which exist between al1 those who do participate in the elocutionary 
order, no rnatter what their level. His closing image thus creates a kind of congregation 
through segregation (Burke, On Syrnbols 281) and derogation, confirming the value of those 
within the borders of the hierarchy by stressing the disrepute and undesirability of those 
classified as wholly outside. Still, as Burke suggests, even the wholly dispossessed tends to 
feel a stake in the authoritative structure that dispossesses him because, once this structure is 
accepted as authoritative, his only hope of salvation lies in the possibility of finding a 
"niche" for hirnself within it (Burke, Attitudes 329-330). 
By establishing a mysterious sense of community between al1 members of the 
elocutionary order, Sheridan's closing hierarchy offers an inspirationai representation of the 
highest degree of perfection to help motivate his immediate audience in their lesser, 
imperfect expressions of this ideal; as well, by positioning this hierarchy after his extensive 
explanation that the most his audience of "persons . . . of advanced yearsn can and should 
hope to achieve is a limited degree of excellence, Sheridan mitigates the potentially de- 
motivating effects of presenting this audience with an ideal so far beyond their grasp. 
Additionally, the formal smcnue of Sheridan's closing hierarchy functions indirectly to 
solicit support for his discipiinaq aspiration to situate the canon of delivery at the centre of 
rhetorical snidy and to help ensure his own fùture as the leader of the revival of elocution in 
Britain. By accepting a iower or middling, or even wholly dispossessed, position within 
this ranked order, Sheridan's audience also accepts and endorses the highest ideal. And the 
actualization of this ideal in the future, as Sheridan aiready has made clear, depends on the 
development of "the best instruction, perfect patterns, and constant practicen in the an of 
elocution (121). Who better suited to lead such an endeavour than Sheridan himself? And 
who better suited to support it than those he has persuaded to invest in the hierarchy of 
elocution by attending or purchashg his lectures? 
Whereas Sheridan's closing section establishes the force of the language of the 
emotions as the essential feature of excellence in public speaking, Austin's ideaiized 
representation of the perfect orator stresses the counterbdancing quality of grace. 
Consonant with its ultimate value in Austin's hierarchy of elocution, "gracen is the most 
difficult quality to achieve and it mysteriously encapsulates al1 the subordinate quaiities that 
are necessary but not sufficient to acquire the character of a perfect orator. 
Although Austin does not, like Sheridan, make the natural language of the emotions 
the prirnary focus of his closing vision, he nonetheless draws on the topic of nature to help 
him overcome potential incompatibilities in his delineation of the properly graceful speaker. 
Anticipating the objection that the so-called mernal grace of physical gestures constitutes 
only the appearance of hternal, disembodied truth, Austin dissociates his conception of 
"genuine oratorical gracen from the false. merely external grace ûf physical affectations. 
Thus, he legitimates his definition of graceful delivery by associating it with the higher 
realrn of non-physical, internal meanings and dissociating it from its embodied character. 
Genuine grace is not identicai with internal tnith, but-like the physical expression of the 
passions-it aiways corresponds exactly with truth and "sincerityn: it is "the proper garb and 
ornament of tnith" (507). 
As well, the dissociation between fdse and genuine grace (similarly to Sheridan's 
argument about the language of nature) depends on the distinction between physical forms 
and habits which "nanirally" belong to the speaker, as his own property, and improper 
graceful forrns which are copied from others. But Austin is more explicit than Sheridan in 
clariwing the socially hierarchic nature of the differences between these two ranks of 
speakers: "nue external grace can hardly be either assumed by, or impaned, except to a 
mind of a generous and noble nature," whereas the affected imitation of grace is typically 
the property of the "awkward," the uvulgar,n and of "siily fellows" (506-508, my ernphasis). 
While on the surface Austin's rhetoric conveniently presents the difference between these 
b 
speakers as the consequence of their individual, internal natures, his choice of terms such as 
"noblen and "vulgarn indicate the social premises of his characterizations. These social 
premises become even more apparent in his concise explanation of the path to achieving 
m e  grace: "But genuine oratorical grace can only be the result of refmed cultivation 
adorning a superior understanding, or the rare gift of nature to a pure and exalted rnind, 
expressed by the actions of a distinguished personn (508). 
Austin's explanation of the sources and properties of "hien grace indirectiy draws on 
the principle of spreuatura, or graceful effortlessness, which distinguishes die élite fiom 
those below them. Accordhg to Whigham, the virtue of spremura "makes possible the 
symbolic demonsnation of differences in kind between the ruling class and others, in the 
face of substantive evidence to the contraryn (93). The conceptual distinction between the 
positive judgment of spreuatura and the negative judgment of affectation, or of displaying 
laborious effort in striving to act gracefully, provides the bais for a kind of "ontological 
criticism" that mystifies the actud lack of substantive evidence in the speakers' 
performances. By situating the source of external grace in the prior domain of the speaker's 
internal "noblen nature, Austin makes the ultimate bais  of judgment about a speaker's 
gracefulness not the substantive evidence of physical performance but rather the prior. 
incontrovenible evidence of his already-established social distinction or nobility. As 
Whigham argues, in court society the distinction between "an established courtiern and "a 
would-be" would "often have been achieved by application of a prior judgment or 
information on stanis" (149). Similarly , Austin's closing vision of nue gracefulness 
presupposes that the judges of the speaker's performance have pr ior information about his 
social status-that is, whether the person speaking already possesses a 'noble," "refined, " 
"distinguishedn position in the social order, or whether his origins are ''vulgar" or "silly." 
Regardless of the speaker's external, physical cornportment, only the former type has the 
opportunity to be judged truly graceful. 
But by continuing to exploit the topic of nature, Austin remystifies the bais of true 
grace. In addition to being a socially inherited property, this physical capital may, on rare 
occasions, be possessed by a person who does not by birth possess other forms of capital. 
For exarnple, by including the secondary possibility of a speaker who possesses grace "as a 
rare gift of naturen he denies the strictly social limits that determine who rnay and may not 
be judged graceful. As well, Austin suggesu that someone who "naturallyn possesses only a 
small degree of physical capital can greatly augment it through education. He rassures his 
aspirhg readers that, as long as they are not 'totally deficient in naturai qualifications" or 
"dispositions," they have the chance to improve their "talentsn and thus ascend to-d- 
though almost certainly not attain-the heights of "consumrnate eloquencen and "nue gracen 
(509). The imponant condition for this improvement. however, is the student's degree of 
"applicationn (509). In this way, Austin doubles the significance of the aspiring speaker's 
personal dispositions for determining the degree of bis success in escalating the hierarchy of 
elocution. But by making "application" an essential condition for movement up this 
hierarchy, Austin paradoxically confiims the inferior status of those who labour to improve 
themselves, since this display of effort is precisely the bais for the charge of affectation. 
The implicit social elitism that determines those who are permitted in the first place to 
embark on, let alone succeed at, the laborious task of striving toward true grace becornes 
even more explicit as Austin explains that those "menn who may hope to improve their 
"natural" talents through further cultivation in rhetorical delivery must already be, in a 
general sense, "well educated" (509). In this way, he ensures the social exclusivity of the 
highest rank in the elocutionary hierarchy while simultaneously preserving an impression of 
open opportunity by appealing to the "rare" possibility of grace bestowed solely "by nature." 
Ultimately, Austin's blurring of the boundaries between untaught "natural" talents 
and the social refinements granted by culture and application lads  him to appeal to the 
classical doctrine of decorum as the most fitting way to legitimate his ideal of the genuinely 
gracefbl speaker. At the same time, by returning to the authority of classical sources for the 
f d  word, he r e c o n f m  the disciplinary propriety of his novel inquiry into gesture: "So 
that it will be allowed, according to the very just maxim of Cicero and Quintilian, that 
decorum constitutes true oratorical grace. And accordingly this decorum admits great 
variety, and allows great scope for the action of the orator under different circumstances" 
(5 16). Whereas the buik of the Chironomia attempts to articulate a precise system of 
specific rules and notations that will make the art of rhetorical gesture fully knowable and 
teachable, in closing Austin posits an ultimately unteachable doctrine of decorum as both 
prior and superior to the technical specifications of his system. As Quintilian explains in 
the lengthy quote that Austin employs to finish his F i  chapter, "neither can that decorum 
be acquired without the assistance of art, nor yet be altogether delivered by the rules of art" 
(5 17). Thus, Austin preserves the value of his techne, since it constitutes 'the assisrance of 
art" that he promises can help aspiring speakers secure greater cultural capital, but he 
simuitaneously rnakes it unaccountable for the failure of any of his students to improve their 
status, since this failure can always be blamed on their imperfect 'natural" talents. 
The doctrine of decorum permits another escape from accountabiiity for student 
failures: not only does true decorum (or genuine grace) require, as Sheridan would Say, "the 
united efforts of art and nature," but the rules of art if pursued too laboriously themselves 
risk underminhg the highest grace and opening the practitioner to the charge of affectation. 
Austin suggests in the end (through Quintiiian's voice) that to become a perfect orator the 
aspiring speaker ultimately must discard the rules of art and act rather "according to the 
nature of his own peculiar powers" (517). While Austin's initial association of art and 
nature within the ideai of decorum creates a sense of unity between al1 r a b  in his 
hierarchy of rhetorical delivery, this new dissociation re-inscribes an apparently 
unbridgeable ontological gap between the aspiring middle-rank speaker who hopes to 
improve his status by labouring to master Austin's techne, and the speaker of "consummate 
eloquence" (509) who, by gracefully investing his delivery with 'his own peculiar powers," 
effortlessly aanscends the rules of art intended for less noble speakers. The instability of 
these final associative1dissociative moves dlows Austin to imply that learning his system of 
gesture somehow will help the aspiring speaker move closer to the ideal of genuine grace, 
but without makuig the risky claim that it necessarily or even probably fulfils this function. 
Concluding Rernarks 
The foregoing anaiysis demonstrates how pathos informs Sheridan's and Austin's 
closing sections, both on a substantive level in their discussions of the significance of the 
natural language of the passions and on a rhetorical level in their final psychologically 
motivating characterizations of the ideal orator. While these two levels of pathos apparently 
conflict with their preceding quasi-logical representations of rational systerns for defining 
and regulating bodily conduct, the use of dissociation alleviates the incongruities between 
the middle and closing sections of Sheridan's and Austin's works. Their closing appeals to 
the powerful but mysterious language of nature and to the ideal of the perfect orator 
transcend the limitations of their technai and the "rudimentsn of delivery these technai are 
intended to teacb and regulate. 
From the perspective of the implied aspiring speaker, the concluding visions of 
"consummate eloquencen (Austin 509) divert the student's attention from the ponderous task 
of training himself in the basic elements of acceptable, inoffensive delivery and onto the 
inspiring principle of perfection which motivates the hierarchy of elocution as a whole. 
Although this principle lies outside the reach of the aspiring speaker situated within the 
imperfect context of contemporary British society, it nonetheless validates the lesser 
achievements suitable to the limitations of his nature. At die same time, by asserting the 
vague but important role of "natural talents" (Sheridan 123) to the aspiring speaker's success 
at delivery, Sheridan and Austin in closing both give their implied readers hope that they 
may already possess these unteachable "talentsn and make the learner's possible failure at 
effective speaking primarily the fault of his own "naniraln deficiencies rather than the 
prescriptive technai of elocution. As Cahn notes, reference to a student's "naturai 
qualifications" makes it possible "to blame the student himself" for an unsatisfactory result 
(77) 
Further, the closing visions of the ideal orator-whose power rests, at least in part. 
on transcending rather than obey ing the rules of art-reinforce the distance between the 
limited technai of elocution and the competent speaker they claim to form, and the higher 
reality of "genuinen oratory which exists "beyond the niles of art" (Hernies 48). On one 
hand, this claim undermines the value of the elocutionary technai because it indirectly 
represents hem as logically disconnected ffom the ideal motivathg the whole hierarchy of 
elocution. However, with respect to the elocutionists' disciplinary ethos, this claim 
reinscribes their initial negatively polite self-characterizations because it shows that they do 
not indecorously presume that their systems can form a truly excellent orator; rather, the 
rnost that these technai can do is to help an aspiring speaker achieve a limited, respectable 
degree of improvement within the overail hierarchy. This potential status improvement 
does not so much transgress social boundaries as it supports the cultural superiority of the 
"noblen ideal which encompasses, yet lies well beyond, the nature of the student who 
requires a "repertoire of d e s "  to secure competence in the rudiments of elocution. 
CONCL USZON 
RECENT CRITICISM, CURRENT CONCERNS, 
AND FUTURE ORIENTATIONS 
Far from being disinterested figurations, stories about the past are purposehl 
consa-uctions, outcornes of the historian's desire to shape readers' understanding of 
the past and indirectly influence readers' self-understanding and attitude. (Takis 
Poulakos , Rethinking the History of Rhetoric 5 )  
. . . what 1 miss in reading several recent histories of rhetoric is sustained, explicit 
recognition that such histories are themselves potential objects of rhetorical study . 
In short, I think the history of rhetoric needs to address more the rhetoric of history. 
(John Schilb, "The History of Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of History" 13) 
Recent discussions in the historiography of rhetoric stress the significance of viewing 
the writing of Our disciplinary histories as themselves rhetorical actions, involving the 
construction of selective and partial narratives by writers siniated in their own tirnes, places, 
and institutions (Jarratt 190).' Carole Blair and Mary Kahl argue that the writing of 
r hetorical his tory requires a range of "inventional choices : " 
These choices . . . include the means of interpreting, contextualizing, organizing, 
legitimizing, and judging sources. . . . These choices also iünction advocatively, 
inviting the reader of this historical text to view the past of rhetorical theory as the 
historian presents it. (148) 
Susan Jarratt and Rory Ong, in their recent article "Aspasia: Rhetoric, Gender, and Colonial 
Ideology," ernphasize the "multilayered operations of historiography" in the construction and 
reconstruction of moments within Our disciplinary past (9). According to hem,  each 
historical representation of the figure Aspasia, from classical times to the present, acts as an 
'See also Berlin, Biesecker, Blair, Blair and Kahl, Crowley, T. Poulakos, and Schilb. 
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interpretative 'layer , " revealing the s ituated interests and concerns of the interpreter . 
In applying this concept of situated layering to the episode within rhetorical histow 
which has been designated "the elocutionary movement," I would argue that the original 
elocutionary texts themselves act as the initial rhetoricai "layern within the historical 
representation of this episode. In other words, the elocutionists were themselves 
historiographers of their own movement or rhetorical enterprise. They quite consciousl~ 
and strategically sought to mite their "new" field of study into the history of rhetoric and 
they represented this history selectively as a means of legitirnating the inclusion of their own 
endeavours. Like later historiaos and critics of the elocutionary movernent, the initial 
elocutionary writers also invented a narrative of rhetorical history that invites the reader to 
perceive rhetoric's disciplinary past and present in their terms. 
By way of conclusion, 1 turn now to a brief consideration of subsequent 'layers" in 
the disciplinary representation of the elocutionary movement. The purpose of this 
consideration is to highlight the rhetoricai nature of these layers as they interpret and judge 
the original texü. By drawing attention to the rhetoricai interests that inform these selective 
narratives, 1 do not mean to dismiss them as erroneous or invaiid; rather, 1 wish to point out 
how these twentieth-century rhetoricd representations of the eighteenth-century British 
elocutionary movement tell us as much about the critics' own disciplinary concerns and 
assumptions as they do about those of the elocutionists. Within these secondary texts, then, 
we discover yet another narrative of disciplinary self-constitution and self-affirmation ( C a  
6 1-62) which addresses and responds to the particular situations of these rhetoricians. 
Twentieth-Centuty Rzpresentations of the Elocutionary Movement 
The main historical and critical investigatioris of the elocutionary movement occur 
within a group of some twenty to thirty texts emanating from the American discipline of 
speech communication, mainly between 1950 and 1970, though severai discussions were 
published in the 1930s and 1940s as well. Primarily, these texts were published either as 
fair1 y br ief articles in speech communication journais (e. g . , Quarterly Journal of Speech, 
Southern Speech Journal), or as articles or discrete sections within book-length treaunenü 
of the history of speech studies in the u.s.' As well, Haberman's unpublished dissertation 
provides the iengthiest treatment of the movement to date. In addition to the commentaries 
closely connected with the field of speech communication, Wilbur Samuel Howell's 
Eighteenth Century British Logic and Rhetoric offers a lengthy treatment of the elocutionary 
movement within the parameters of Howell's larger survey of the emergence of a "new" 
logic and rhetoric during the eighteenth century. As I shall discuss more in what follows, 
the American provenance of the v a t  majority of these critical commentaries is noteworthy; 
in my research, I have run across only two fairly recent treatments of the elocutionists by 
British writers: Benzie's monograph on Ihe Dublin Oraior (i.e., Thomas Sheridan) and 
Michael Shortland's recent article 'Moving Speeches. " 
In this selective interpretation of the secondary criticism of the elocutionary 
movement, 1 wish to draw the reader's attention to three main issues as the rneans for 
foregrounding the situated rhetorical interests and values which inform these 
historiographical representations. First, 1 will discuss the extent to which these 
commentaries may be classified according to sorne of the general patterns of rhetorical 
history that recent scholars of historiography have identified. In particular, I will draw on 
Carole Blair's characterizations of two 'traditionai" modes of history-writing, namely 
"influence studiesn and 'systems historiesn (Blair 404). From this general positioning , 1 
move to a more specific examination of two of the disciplinary values that seem to motivate 
many of the twentieth-century discussions of the elocutionary movement. These interrelated 
and taken-for-granted values reveal themselves in the ongoing debates about the intellectud 
'These journal and book articles include Bacon, "The Elocutionary Career of Thomas 
Sheridann; Ehninger , "Dominant Trends in English Rhetorical Thought, 1750- 1800" ; Fritz, 
"From Sheridan to Rush: The Beginnings of English Elocutionn;Gray, 'What Was 
Elocution?"; Grover, 'John Walker: The Mechanical Man Revisitedn ; Guthrie, 'The 
Elocution Movement-England"; Haberman, "English Sources of American Elocution"; 
Hargis, "James Burgh and the Art of Speakingn; Howell, "Sources of the Elocutionary 
Movementn; Lamb. "John Walker and Joshua Steelen; Mohrmann, "Kames and Elocution": 
Mohrmann, "The Language of Nature and Elocutionary Theoryn; Mohrmann, "The Real 
Chironomian ; Parris h, 'The Concept of 'Naturainess'" ; Parr ish, "Elocution-A Definition 
and a Challengen;"The Influence of English Elocutionists" in Robb; Vandraegen, "Thomas 
Sheridan and the Nanual School. " 
respectability of the elocutionary texts and about the "naturaln versus "mechanical" 
approaches of the original wr iters . The values of " intellectual respectability " and 
"naturalnessn act as two of the dominant criteria against which twentiethcentury critics and 
his tor ians judge the disciplinary legitimacy of the earl y elocutionary texts . ln develop ing 
their assessments of the eighteendi-century contributions, however, these commentators 
simultaneously justify their own more recent scholarly enterprises and disciplinary 
positions. 
Whiie my discussion is concerned primarily with indicating the situational, and 
hence rhetorical, diferences between the twentiethcentury historiographical representations 
of the elocutionary movement and the narratives told by the original writers, I also have 
been intrigued to discover the extent to which, at least on a general level, the more recent 
layers recall and redeploy several of the basic assurnptions that 1 have noted in the primary 
texts. Perhaps this is not so surprising, if we agree with Perelrnan and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
that appeals to so-called "universal valuesn are rhetorically persuasive precisely because their 
capacity to generate agreement derives from the abstraction of these vaiues (NOy Rhetoic 
76). Thus, both the elocutionisü and their historical commentators may draw on the same 
general assumptions and values, but the ways in which they make these values concrete for 
their particular audiences and situations differ. Abstract values or ideals can act, as Brody 
notes in her analysis of the historical trajectory of the ideal of 'rnady" style, as "a 
procrustean bed to accommodate new agendas" specific to the socio-historical circumstances 
in which the ideal is redeployed (15). 
a) Patterns of History 
In 'Contested Histories of Rhetoric: The Politics of Preservation, Progress, and 
Change," Carole Blair argues that, typically, the narrative stances adopted by writers of the 
history of rhetoric have engendered partial accounts "that mask their own partiality" (403). 
She characterizes the most common, traditional stances according to two general 
organizational patterns of history writing: the infiuence study and the systems study. The 
influence study, she suggests, "embodies a politics of preservation; its practice sacralizes 
ancient rhetorical theory by treating later rhetorics as monuments to classical rhetoricn 
(404). By contrast, systerns studies present "the history of rhetoric as a succession of 
paradigms that have given rise to present ways of theorizing. Systems studies treat 
historical rhetorics as relics of a primitive past that were necessary to the progress that 
produced the present state of knowledgen (405). 
Although most of the secondary treatments of the elocutionary movement take the 
form of relative1 y short, focused discussions, rather than Iengthy , full histor ical 
arrangements, it is possible to read within many of these brief commentaries the structures 
and implications of the larger pattern of organization that Blair identifies. In particular, 
the "systems" mode of history writing, with its assumptions of progression toward a present 
state of knowledge and practice, seems to dominate twentieth-cenniry accounts of the 
elocutionary movement, though this form plays itself out in several variations. The fact that 
historians and critics of the elocutionary movement take the eighteenthcentury episode as 
essentially foundatiod or original suggests that the genre of "influencen study described by 
Blair, in which the significance of later works is rneasured according to how well they 
preserve the clarsical heritage, has little bearing on this analysis. However, if we 
generalize the concept of the originary beyond its specific location in the ciassical, then the 
pattern of the influence study may be relevant to deciphering how twentiethcentury critics 
represent the eighteenthcentury "originaln movement. As well, an analysis of these critical- 
historical works shows how both general patterns of organization, with their motivations of 
preservation and progress, may be operating to some extent within the same text (just as, 
for example, the eighteenth-century elocutionists strategically drew on classical 
endorsements of delivery to authorize their own new systems and field of study). 
The systems approach to writing the history of the elocutionary movement is 
apparent in such works as Mary Margaret Robb's "The Influence of English Elocutionists, 
1760-1827" in her book Oral Intetpretmion of Literaure Ni Arnerican Colleges and 
Universiries ([1941]1968) and Frederick W. Haberman's "English Sources of American 
Elocution" in History of Speech Educarion in Amenca Background Series (1954); For both 
30ther sources that take a systems approach include Douglas Ehninger's "Dominant 
Trends in English Rhetorical Thought, 1750-1800" and Warren Guthrie's 'The Elocution 
Movement-England. " 
Robb and Haberman, the British elocutionary movement is s ignificant pr irnar ily because it 
initiated subsequent developments in the theory and practice of speech education the 
United States. In other words, they assume that the eighteenth-century views originate a 
progressive movement or "evolutionn (Robb , "Preface") toward a present state of 
knowledge. In Robb's case, the main motivation for employing such a pattern of 
organization is to consûuct a solid historical background for her particular field of teaching. 
namely the oral interpretation of literature. That is, her story of elocution's eighteenth- 
century origins helps to establish the contemporary disciplinary position of oral 
interpretation "as an important subject in the liberal arts curriculumn ("heface"). 
Haberman, for his part, creates a narrative that appeals more broadly to American 
patriotism. For hirn, the eighteenth-century elocutionists are important rnainly because they 
staked out an intellectual territory which later American writers (or heroes) were 
subsequently able to improve and take over as their own rightful property. 
The following opening passage from Robb's "Preface" demonstrates her assumption 
that the history of speech education, as narrated in her text, has unquestionable disciplinary 
value both for affirming the established heritage of her and her colleagues ' field of 
education, and for ensuring the coctinuing progress of this field: 
It will zlways be important for teachers and students to be aware of the 
historical background of the subject they are studying. Without knowledge 
of the history, they often claim as new techniques or concepts so old and 
worn as to have been discarded. It is impossible to see clearly where we are 
going unless we know where we have been; and we can often adjust, or add 
to that which, pedagogically speaking, is old as the hills. . . . 
The material is arranged in five different parts so that the reader may 
easily see the pattern which the evolution of speech education took from 1750 
to the present time, especially that of the teaching of oral interpretation. . . . 
It is hoped that the continuity of the history will give readers, especially 
teachers, a feeling of pride and security. This is not a new or untried field of 
study but one with a history. ("Preface") 
The first sentence of this passage provides a general truth or maxim as justification 
for Robb's specific study, a justification which highlights the significance in al1 disciplines 
of knowing the history of the field in order to avoid claiming as "newn that which is 'old" 
and, especially, in order to continue the progressive movement of the discipline's. history . 
Robb's shift from third to frst person pronouns between the second and hird sentences 
particularizes her general arguments in terms of the teachers and students specifically 
involved in the subject of oral interpretation. The sense of a progressive movement from 
past to present and on into the future surfaces through key terms such as 'evoiution" and 
"continuity." By describing how the arrangement of her rnaterial is intended to help the 
reader "easil y see" the historicai pattern, Robb naturalizes the rhetorical constructedness of 
her narrative, implying that her role has been simply to present the objective historical truth 
of a clear evolutionary pattern in an accessible manner. In this evolutionary scheme, 
neither the past nor the present acts as the ideal disciplinary form: the past of speech 
education is filled with "concepts so old and wornn that they have been "discarded," while 
the present. Robb suggests, suffers from practitioners of speech education who, not 
sufficiently knowledgeable about the history of their field, make the rnistake of proposing 
os tensibly "new techniques" which have already been "discardedn as inappropriate. The 
future of speech education holds great promise, however, if Robb's colleagues use her 
(selective) history as the basis for making informed improvements to the evolving subject. 
Robb's opening justification and description of her work irnplies a sense of 
disciplinary insecurity about how her subject matter is represented and perceived within her 
educational context. Presumably, her motivation to offer other teachers in this field "a 
feeling of pride and securityn stems at least partly from a sense of insecuriq about the 
position of oral interpretation in twentieth-century Arnerican pedagogy. Perhaps more 
importantly, by seeking to redress the apparent ignorance of rnany of her colleagues about 
the history of speech education, Robb seerns intent on improving the disciplinary profile of 
her subject. In effect, she introduces her work as a kind of defense mechanism against both 
the internal ignorance and lack of professional pride of her colleagues, and the implicit 
external criticisms of teachers and scholars outside the field. 
Haberman's narrative addresses less specifically the pedagogical concerns of teachers 
of speech education. appealing instead to a sense of national pride by characteriring the 
evolution of elocution as the progressive movement from British origins to superior 
Arnerican formulations. The opening and closing paragraphs of Haberman's article indicate 
this framework, each one beginning by stressing the sense of continuity or association 
benveen British origins and American practices, but ending-especially in the closing 
paragraph-with a representation of this relationship as one in which the Americans 
successfully challenged, and hence distinguished themselves from, the foreign originators: 
As a modern study elocution originated in England. In its first half century, 
from 1750 to 1800, it was accepted in America as readily as in its native 
land, and in the next century cultivated even more assiduously. The 
Americans, in the early stages of the movement's history, republished British 
authors, copied them with or without acknowledgement, modified and 
adapted their teachings to meet their situations. . . . Meanwhile, they were 
creating a movement in America which possessed attributes of independence 
as well as adaptation. ("Englishn 105) 
Both the purposes and the books which the elocutionists wrote to 
accornplish them, were eagerly accepted in America. The demand for 
elocution in this nation being as great or even greater than it was in England, 
it is no wonder that the British found a market here for their books, or that 
piratical publishers should look for the cheapest way to capture the market. 
or that a band of indigenous writers should arise to challenge the supremacy 
of the originators of the movement and eventually to take over its direction. 
("Eng1ishn 122-23) 
Although the body of Haberman's discussion focuses on the authors and texts of the 
British elocutionary movement, these framing paragraphs highlight the specifically 
American perspective in which this movement is viewed. Clearly appealing to a "modern" 
American audience, whose taken-for-granted nature is demonstrated by the phrase "this 
nation," Haberman constructs a narrative of the progressive development of elocution which 
begins with the influence of the British on the Americans but culminates with the 
independent leadership of the latter. While Haberman does not, like Robb, overtly explain 
that a main purpose of his narrative is to foster pride in his readers, his use of the value- 
laden term "independencen together witb his final glorification of the "band of indigenous 
writers" sprung from American soi1 undoubtedly feeds a sense of nationalistic pride. The 
historical progress of elocution thus acquires significance as one thread in a larger cultural 
narrative of American supremacy based on the nation's mythologized spirit of independence 
and challenge. 
Other criticai-historical discussions of the eighteenth-cenw elocutionists also 
implicitly or explicitly foreground the twentieth-century American cultural and disciplinary 
interests of its writers, but they do so somewhat more according to the "influence study" 
pattern of organization that Blair identifies. This pattern is less prevalent than the systerns 
approach but still noteworthy in twentieth-century criticism. The "influencen pattern tends 
to privilege the eighteenth-century writers as the influentid "founders" or "fathers" of 
modern speech communication. The identification of key individuals and texts as the 
pr imary , author itative sources for subsequent theor ies and practices of elocution scripts an 
ideological narrative predicated on the celebration of the individual. As Barbara Biesecker 
points out, the problem with "a system of cultural representation that coheres around the 
individual subjectn is that it entails "a mechanics of exclusion that fences out a vast array of 
collective rhetorical practices to which there belongs no proper name" ("Attempts" 156- 
57)." In the influence pattern of organization, the original treaunents of elocution by the 
'Biesecker's cornments about the ideology of individualism relate to general questions 
about the criteria typicdly used to determine the inclusion or exclusion of particular figures 
and practices within the canon of rhetorical history : 
What are the criteria against which any particular rhetorical discourse is 
measured in order to grant or deny its place in the canon? One way into this 
question is to recognize that the rhetorical canon is a system of cultural 
representation whose present form is predicated on and celebrates the 
individual. It is a lisr of proper names signifying the exceptional 
accomplishments of particular individuals over tirne: fiom Gorgias, Isocrates , 
Cicero, and Augustine to John Winthrop, Jonathan Edwards, Susan B. 
Anthony, and Martin Luther King, Ir. To each of these proper names 
corresponds a text or set of texts, and between them is rnarked a certain kind 
of originating function that wins the individuai mernbership in a distinguished 
ensemble of individuals. ("Attemptsn 156) 
This "individual" approach is by no meam limited to the those texts demonstiating an 
"influence studyn pattern of organization; it is equally present in more progressivist 
constructions, and it figures strongly in the naming of Sheridan and Walker as the founders, 
fathers, or leaders of the so-called nanird and mechanical schools of elocution, 
respectively . 
individual founders become, with some provisos, a kind of ideal toward which the imperfect 
disciplinary context of current speech education needs to return in order to Save i ~ e l f  rom 
the "opprobriumn (Gray 1) being heaped upon it. 
G. P. Mohrmann's recuperation of Austin's Chironomia, for example, stresses the 
foundationai status and complete mure of this text? Whiie the Chironomia held a 
deservedly high reputation through the nineteendi-century, its neglect and disparagement 
within the context of nventiethcentury speech education constitues, Mohrmann argues, one 
cause for current misunderstandings of elocutionary theory in its original "totality:" 
Upon its publication in 1806, the Reverend Gilbert Austin's Chironomia 
gained immediate acceptance as the standard English work on gesture, and 
the treatise continued to receive favourable notices on into the twentieth 
century. By the turn of the century, however, . . . Chironomia was to suffer 
an unusuaily severe reversa1 of fortune. Today, the force of this once- 
dominant presence is almost entirely dissipated. . . . ("Realn 17- 18) 
m h e  totality that was elocutionary theory . . . can be best understood 
by starting with the totality that is Chironomia. The scholarship, the scope of 
coverage, the analysis of g e s t u r e c h  can provide a measure of 
understanding: but these are not discrete elements. It is the unified thrust of 
the coherent entity that takes the reader directiy to the essentials of 
elocutionary theory and marks Chironomia as the best single introduction to 
the elocutionary movement. ('Realn 27) 
Mohrmann's characterization of Austin's treatke contrasts its current weak, 
"dissipatedn disciplinary status with images of saength and invincibiiity, evident in the 
choice of terrns such as "force," "dominant, " 'totality," "unified thrust," "coherent entity ," 
and "essentials," to validate its recuperation. In particular , Mohrmana's representation 
privileges Austin's text on the bais of its apparent unity, a taken-for-granted value in 
Mohrmann's perspective. By equating Austin's single, os tensibly coherent text with the 
whole of elocutionary theory, Mohrmann indirectly claims that elocutionary theory is itself 
- - -  
60ther cornmentaries that evince features of the "influence snidyn pattern include those 
by Fritz, Mohrmann ("Realn), Grover, and Gray. 
unified and coherent. Thus, his revdidation of the Chironomia as the stiil-essentiai 
introduction to elocutionary theory simultaneously promotes the disciplinary integrity of the 
whole field of study, not just of Austin's text. 
But Mohrmann's appeal to the unified coherence of the Chironornia is destabilized 
even within his own discussion, through his representation of Austin's system of notation 
for gesture. This section also indicates the limits of Mohrrnann's use of the "influence 
studyn pattern of history to constnict his interpretation of Austin's text. Whiie he does 
praise the Chironomia as a complete, total source for elocutionary theory , he criticizes 
Austin's pradcal system of gesture as "tedious," "fnistrating," and 'pointlessn ("Real" 25- 
26, my emphasis). Mohrmann assumes that Austin's scholarly neatments of elocutionary 
theory somehow can be separateci from his system of notation for gesture in appraising the 
historical-theoretical value of his work. He does not, however, seem to perceive how this 
separation disrupts his closing characterization of the treatise as a "coherent entity" with 
"unified thrust" ("Realn 27). 
The patterns of arrangement that Wilbur Samuel Howell employs in his extended 
ueatment of the elocutionary rnovement in Eighteenth-Centus, British Rheroric and Logic 
conform principaily to a systems approach, yet with some features of an influence study; the 
latter pattern ernerges more strongly in his article 'Sources of the Elocutionary Movement in 
England: 17ûû- 1748. " Both these discussions, however, differ from the commentaries 1 
have already analyzed because the British elocutionisa are represented as the 'antin figures 
within Howell's historical narrative. Commenthg on Howell's book as a whole, James 
Berlin notes how its narrative of Locke "as the historical bearer of the m e  rhetoric after 
ages of trial and errorn presupposes a progressive view of civilization and of the role of the 
"new" rhetoric in that progression ('Pos tmodernisrnn 173). As a whole, then, Howell 's 
history adopts primarily a systems pattern of organization, dividing rhetoric into "oldn and 
'ne w " s ystems , and pr ivileging the dramatic irnprovements that the latter introduced to 
rhetoric "in an era of important changen (Brirish 695). 
But what about the position of the elocutionary movement within this narrative? On 
which side of the conflict does Howell place it and what were its implications for the future 
progress of rhetoric? Despite the recognition that eighteenth-century elocutionary snidies 
offered in many ways a new and distinctive consideration of the canon of delivery within 
the discipline of rhetoric, Howell effectively relegates this movement to the "oldn (rad 
'badn) rather than the "newn (rad "goodn) camp. He does this by introducing the. 
elocutionary works within the context of classical views of delivery (e-g., those of Cicero 
and Aristotle). But digning the elocutionists with the limitations of the classicai tradition 
(that is, its limitations according to Howell) is not enough: the work of the elocutionists 
fdls far below even this level because of its ostensibly reductive focus on the canon of 
delivery as if this canon were the whole art of rhetoric. Ultimately, Howell uses the 
elocutionary rnovement as the scapegoat, the anti-progressive figure in his narrative of the 
progression of the "new" rhetoric. By endorsing "a futureless idea which was destined 
against logic and common sense to have a two-hundred year future in England and 
America" (Bnrish 146), the elocutionists are to be blamed for the subsequent degeneration 
of rhetoric's reputation: 
By separating themselves from any obligation to consider the theory of 
content and arrangement as parts of rhetorical doctrine, and by stressing 
instruction in voice and gesture as a mechanical rather than an intellectual or 
philosophic matter, the elocutionists made rhetoric appear to be the art of 
declaiming a speech by rote, without regard to whether the thought uttered 
were trivial or fdse or dangerous; and under auspices like tbese rhetoric 
became anathema to the scholarly community and sacred only to the anti- 
intellectuals within and without the academic system. (British 713) 
Although Howell's main pattern of arrangement is a progressive one, with the 
elocutionists acting as the anti-progressive poison to the improvernents of the "newn 
rhetoric, he also incorporates features of an influence study. In this case, though, it is not 
the elocutionary texts which figure as the foundationai, influentid sources to which current 
scholars should return; rather, virtually the only legitimacy that Howell gram to the 
eighteenth-century elocutionists depends on the extent to which they followed the acceptable 
influences and theories of rhetoricians culturdly and his torically outside the British 
movement inelf. In effect, Howell creates a dissociation between the " r d n  nonBritish 
sources of elocution, and the merely "apparent," derivative nature of late eighteenth-cenmry 
British views. Thus, for example, Howell faintly praises Austin's Chironomia because it 
demonstrates "a real grasp of classical learningn and because Austin kept "his readers 
constantly aware of the actual [non-elocutionary] writings upon which the theory of delivery 
rested" (British 251). In both Brirish Logic and Rhetoric and "Sources of the Elocutionary 
Movement." Howell reveals an almost obsessive desire to prove that the real, nue 
foundation for al1 the British texts is to be found in the seventeenth-century Continental 
rhetoric of Michel le Faucheur entitled Trame de [ amon de l'orateur. ou de le . C r -  
. . ronornahpn m du m. Having established this text as the ultimate source of British 
elocution, Howell is able to deny the originality of subsequent British treatrnents, or 
alternatively he can note variations from the theories of Le Faucheur as unfortunate 
deviations. As Carole Blair explains: 
The historian who traces influences attempts to find in a theory only what has 
been said before. She tries to locate characteristics of a theory that render it 
similar to antecedent theories. In so doing, the historian is almost certain to 
pass over the unique features of a theoretical text, seeing in it only those 
characteristics that are reminiscent of an earlier theory. (406). 
By taking this approach, Howell cm construct a historical narrative which dismisses the 
British elocutionary writers and theories as essentially derivative or merely reminiscent of 
the earlier mue sources of elocution. 
Whether one considers the generally more friendly twentiethcentury treatrnents of 
the elocutionary movement which 1 discussed in the first parts of this section, or Howell's 
more condernnatory narrative, both the systems and influence patterns of organization seem 
to be at work, with the former predominant but not exclusive. The systerns approach in 
particular privileges the 'modem" American cultural and disciplinary situation out of which 
these critics write: examination of eighteenth-century British elocution clearly is motivated 
by, and in the service of, these writers' contextual concerns for legitimating their own 
scholarly and teaching practices. The influence pattern also represents the British 
movement from the (necessarily) partial perspective of mid-twentieth-century speech 
educators, though in this case the critics argue that their own contemporary discipline needs 
to pay more attention to the originators of speech education in order to remedy the 
limitations of current views and practices. Howell's history, by contrast, occurs outside the 
immediate context of speech education and therefore places the elocutionary movement not 
within the history of speech education specifically but within a more general, 
'philosophical" approach to rhetorical theory. Perhaps not surprisingly, this difference of 
context and academic interest permits Howell to characterize the elocutionists as esentiaily 
againrt rather than part of the progress of rhetoric. 
In the two hundred years betweeo the time of the early elocutionists and the 
movement's main critics and historians, the question of the scholarly respectability and 
disciplinary decorum of this field of inquiry rernains central. lust as the British 
elocutionists showed themselves aware of the problematic nature of their attention to the 
neglected canon of bodily delivery and thus worked in cornplex ways to try to demonsuate 
its academic legitimacy, so too twentieth-century commentators foreground this issue within 
their discussions. The stress placed on determining the scholarly value of the 
(sub)discipline of elocution indicates not only the continuing instability of the reputation 
accorded to the early elocutionary works but also the uneasiness of twentieth-century speech 
educators about the academic legitimacy of their own work. Whether or not the early 
elocutionists are judged as respectable scholars therefore affects the disciplinary credibility 
of twentiethcentury teachers of speech. In both situations, the primary criterion of 
judgment addresses principally the theoretical or "intellectual" statu of elocution as an 
academic field of inquiry, rather than its more practical dimensions in teaching students 
effective styles of ernbodied performance. This stress indicates the emphasis within 
traditional histories of rhetoric on developments in rhetorical theory, rather than on its 
diverse practices or on handbooks directed primariiy toward practice, and it reconfirms the 
standard privileging of mind over body in rhetorical (as well as other) inquiries. 
As the preceding citation fiom his conclusion reveds, Howell does not attempt to 
establish the scholarly respectability of the elocutionary movernent but instead condemns it 
absolutely on the bais of its 'intellectual" and 'philosophical" deficiencies. The 
elocutionists, he claims, have no place within the discipline of rhetoric because they failed 
utterly to consider "the theory of content and arrangement as parts of rbetorical doctrine" 
and because they made delivery into a wholly "mechanical" art divorced from "thought" 
(British 7 13, my emphasis). This harsh condernnation clearly takes for granted the 
unques tionable value of such abstract concepts as "intellectual," "theoretical," and 
"scholarly . " Deploying an oppositional form of dissociation. Howell constructs a .plot that 
pits the respectable forces of philosophy and theory agaiost the disreputable forces of 
mechanical practice. By aligning the elocutionists with the latter, he places them not only 
outside the domain of scholarly respectability, but actually in opposition to the disciplinary 
ideal of philosophic intellectual ism that motivates his symbolic hierarchy of rhetorical 
history. In this narrative, the elocutionisa become the identifiable representatives of the 
evil force of anti-intellectualism against which Howell wages his war. That Howell 
perceives this battie as one of high moral consequence is evident from his use of such terms 
as "anathema" and "sacredn to describe the effects of the elocutionists' introduction of the 
false id01 of ami-intellecmalism to rhetorid worship . 
Further , although Howell suggests that, to achieve a respectable scholarly status, the 
elocutionists needed only to infuse their work with more "thoughtn and philosophy, he 
seerns to believe that bodily delivery, by its very nature, is incapable of being thus purified 
(and disembodied). Howell's approving reference to Aristotle7s representation of the role 
and position of delivery in rhetoric as the lead-in to his section on the elocutionisü suggests 
that he, like Aris totle, considers delivery to be "-very properly-not regarded as an elevated 
subject of inquiryn (Rhetoric 3.1404a). But Howell's judgment of the elocutionary 
movernent as "mi-intellectualn and therefore scholarly disreputable not only acü as an 
accusation of disciplinary guiit for this particular episode in the history of rhetoric; radier, 
Howell extends the elocutionists' guilt to encompass the whole ostensible degeneration of 
rhetoric7s scholarly reputation in the nineteenth century and beyond. The eighteenth- 
century elocutionists thus become responsible not only for their own intellectual deficiencies 
but for the curse of academic disrepute under which Howell claims the entire discipline of 
rhetoric subsequently suffered. The identification and characterization of this curse, which 
according to Howell drastically affected rhetoric from the early nineteenth century and into 
the twentieth, thus legitimates his own focus on eighteenth-century developmenü in rhetoric 
and logic as the 1 s t  era during which rhetoric had some scholarly significance. 
By contrast, other commentators with greater personal-professional stakes in the 
outcome have laboured to establish the scholarly credibility of the elocutionary movement, 
in this way indirectly legitimating their own academic work. Importantly, those who 
defend the elocutionists' disciplinary decorum invoke the same general values as the basis 
for their judgments. That is, like Howell, they presuppose the unquestionable value of 
abstract concepts such as "scholarly," "intellectual," and "philosophical" in deterrnining the 
fuial judgment. In addition, several invoke the related value of the "scientific" as the bais 
for their evaluation, a strategy which recalls the elocutionists' own attempts to represent 
their field of smdy as a scientific, systematic enterpri~e.~ Though les forcefully than 
Howell, these commentators likewise contrast, at least implicitly, the ideals of scholarship, 
theory, and science with the devalued concepts of the merely practical or mechanical. 
Generally, the defense of the elocutionists' scholarly respectability is measured not against a 
set of internally generated standards-that is, standards intrinsic to either the study of 
elocution or even the larger rhetorical discipline-but instead according to the external 
standards of other, more established and academically respected fields. Ironicaily, then, in 
their very efforts to establish the academic legitimacy of elocution as a signifiant dimension 
of rhetorical study, these commentators subordinate it to apparently superior domains, such 
as philosophy and science. 
G. P. Mohrmann's "The Language of Nature and Elocutionary Theory" exemplifies 
this effort to demonstrate the elocutionists' intellectual respectability by appealing to criteria 
ouüide the specific area of elocution.' To justifi his approach, Mohrmann opens his article 
with an account of the scholarly disrepute that the eighteenthcentury elocutionists suffer 
from in twentieth-cenmry views. In response to the problem as he has constructeci it, 
Mohrmann offers evidence to show that bis perception is incorrect: 
[Tloday the elocutionary movement is regarded as hardly more than a 
shaliow response to pedagogical expediency. A variety of forces that 
supported the movernent are cited in historicai surveys. but the elocutionists 
seem to have been intellectually dormant. They appear to have plunged 
blindly onward, so engrossed in teaching delivery and in writing textbooks 
that they paid littie heed to the thought of their age. The evidence has not 
7~hose  who invoke the value of science include Haberman and Parrish. 
The  very title of this article indicates Mohrmann's desire to represent the eiocutionists' 
as "theorists," not mere mechanists or technicians or teachers. 
suggested that they anchored their contributions in an intellectually 
respectable position. 
This paper presents evidence indicating that a philosophical 
justification for elocutionary theory had widespread currency during the 
eighteenth cenniry. ("Language" 1 16) 
In this introduction, Mohrrnann dissociates the appearance of the elocutionists as 
intellectually "dormant," blind, heedless, and drifting, from the realify, which he is about to 
demonstrate, of the philosophical substance which anchors their theories. This vivid 
dissociation thus creates the motivation and rationale for his enquiry into the influences of 
Scottish common sense philosophy on elocutionary doctrines. Although Mohrmann initially 
describes the relationship between these two fields of study as one of "paralleln doctrines. 
the remainder of his discussion clarifies his presumption of a one-way, hierarchical 
relationship between them. The important point to prove is that elocutionary theory was 
strongly influenced by the more intellectually respectable field of philosophical enquiry, not 
that there was any cross-fertilization between them. Constructing the relationship in this 
way , Mohrmann appeals to a criterion of scholarly credibility extrinsic to the field of 
elocution or rhetoric: he makes the academically privileged forms and history of 
philosop hical enquiry the standard agains t which the intellectual leg itirnacy of elocu tionary 
theory should be judgedg 
While Mohrmaon's discussion displays f ~ m  conviction about the intellectuai 
respectability of eighteenthcenniry elocutionary doctrines, this conviction in no way 
destabilizes the disciplinary devaluation of the merely practical or pedagogical aspects of 
elocution. Rather , as his vivid opening characterization of current views indicates, he 
accepts the association of the "teaching of deliveryn with the negative motive of 
'expediencyn and the unappealing image of shallowness. Although he argues mainly that 
this characterization falsely represents the truth of eighteenth-century elocution, clearly if 
vhis  relationship of subservient indebtedness also figures in Mohrmann's exploration of 
the influence of the aesthetic-literary theories of Henry Home (Lord Kames) on the 
elocutionary writers, despite an acknowledgment that Sheridan published and lectured on 
elocution before the publication of Kames' key work, Elements of Criticism, in 1762. See 
Mohrmann, "Language of Nature." 
this fdse appearance were true then Mohrmann would condemn it. Thus, his validation of 
elocutionary doctrines-like Howell's condernnation-perpetuates a hierarchy whicb privileges 
abstract theorizing as distinct fkom educational practice.1° This validation aiso recalls the 
saategies of disciplinary decomm performed by the original elocutionists: like the 
eighteenth-century writers whom they study, twentieth-century commentators appeal to the 
values of theory as opposed to practice, and of the intellectual scholar as opposed to the 
student-performer, to validate or condemn not only the original elocutionary movement but, 
more Mportantly, the position of delivery within the twentieth-century discipline of speech 
communication. 
C) The Natural-Mechanical Debate 
One way in which the question of the eloc!itionists ' disciplinary respectability plays 
itself out in twentieth-cenniry commentary occurs in the ongoing debate about the so-called 
"natural" versus "rnechanical" schools of elocution. This debate, essentially constmcted by 
secondary critics, feeds the pages of their scholarship by providing a continuing source of 
discussion and disagreement about an issue that they represent as of crucial scholarly 
significance. The opportunities for diverse formulations and distinctions that this debate 
provides help to give the secondary criticism an impression of critical depth and complexity. 
At the same Ume, by taking for granted the positive value of the 'nanual" and the negative 
value of the "mechanical," this debate reveais some of the ideological assumptions and 
tensions which inform and work to naniralize twentieth-century American views of socially- 
appropriate bodily behaviour . In some ways , these assump tions and tensions recail 
eighteenth-century views, while in other ways. they reflect the cultural specificity of the 
commentators' situations. 
In its initial formulation by Robb, Fritz, and Ehninger, the natural-mechanical 
debate proposed the simple division of eighteenth-century elocution into two categories: the 
'Vhis sharp separation is not, however, characteristic of al1 the discussions which try to 
show the scholarly respectability of the elocutionary movement. For example, Robb, as we 
have seen, draws a strong connection between improvements in teaching delivery and 
improvements in understanding the historical-theoretical background of elocution. 
"naturai" school, fathered by Thomas Sheridan, and the " mechanical" school, led by John 
Walker. The main bais for this division is Sheridan's endorsement of a mode of-public 
speaking thar models itself on the "naturainess" of a private, conversatiooal manner 
compared to Waiker 's apparently excessive enumeration of specific rules for mechanically 
Iearning and regulating delivery." As subsequent critics are quick to point out, however, 
such a division oversimplifies the situation. Some writers, such as Donald Hargis in 
"James Burgh and me An of Speaking," counter the undesirable relegation of eighteenth- 
cenniry figures to the "mechanical" category by arguing that these writers also took "Nature" 
or "naturai" modes of expression as the ideal standard for elo~ution.'~ Hargis, for example, 
closes his reconsideration of Burgh's The Art of Speoking by stressing the premise of 
"nature" that underlies his mechanicd system: 
Considering Burgh's basic premises only, his theory of elocution emerges as 
contemporary. He recognized elocution as a teachable art in which the 
speaker must have a thorough comprehension of an idea and must 
communicate it meaningfully and unaffectedly with a responsive vocal- 
physical mechanism. And, as the foundation Stone of delivery , he turned to 
what he thought were universal modes of expression to be found in nature 
and which were to be tempered by thought and individual difference. 
However , as these precepts were shrouded in unders tatement, confus ing 
exposition, and practicai emphasis on mechanics . . . they had linle 
influence. (284) 
Hargis admits in this assessment that Burgh's work suffers from too much attention 
to the details of the mechanics of delivery, but he counterpoises this negative judgrnent with 
the positive assessment that 'nature" acted as the 'foundation" to the mechanical system. By 
claiming that this (understated) premise makes his work 'contemporary," Hargis indirectly 
"This reference to Sheridan's endorsement of a "namal" conversational manner is, as  
far as it goes, quite accurate. However, these writers do not mention that Sheridan 
identifies the exclusive social context of fashionable court society as the source of the 
standard for this "nanirally" polite conversational style. 
''David Grover in "John Walker: The 'Mechanical' Man Revisited" makes a similar 
argument. 
validates and defmes the ideal of naturalness that he believes should motivate not only 
eighteenth-cenniry treatments of elocution, but ucontemporaryn approaches as well. This 
ideal includes the ability to speak umeaningfully,n "unaffectedly," thoughtfully, and 
individually, yet also somehow universally. Hargis' qualification of "universal modesn with 
the positively valued concepts of "thought" and 'individuai difference" refiect, 1 suggest, a 
continued cultural privileging of mind, or 'thought," over body as well as a specifically 
American ideology of individualkm which mystifies the social forms and meanings of 
bodily behaviour. The quaiities that Hargis specifies for the ideal of naturd delivery also 
diminish the responsibility of the instructor for the student's ability to speak effectively, 
s ince these qualities exceed-and even oppose-the boundar ies of prescrip tive ins tmction. 
Other participants in this debate also focus on the question of the nuances and 
intricacies that under lie the overl y-simple division between natural and mechanical. In 
particular, they attend to the multiple dimensions of the concept of the "natural, " pointing 
out, for example, how this term can refer in a neo-classical sense to "the ideal of regularity" 
and the imitation of approved models, or in a more Romantic sense to concepts of "variety," 
"individualisticn expression, and spontaneity (Mattingly 82-84; Vandraegen 59-60); the 
natural approach to elocution might also refer, on the one hand, to the speaker's personal 
sensation of naturalness or, on the other hand, to the audience's impression of the speaker's 
naturalness. As Parrish explains, "we must distinguish between the spontaneous or habituai 
utterance which feels natural to the speaker, and utterance that seem natural to the 
audiencen ("Conceptn 451). By making such distinctions, these critics are not merely 
describing some of the tensions and assumptions which they take to inform the original 
elocutionary texts; more significantly, they are adâressing questions and ambiguities at the 
heart of their own educational practices. 
These discussions indicate a tension between a desire, as teachers of speech, to 
legitimate explicit insnction to their students in the methods and conventions of effective 
delivery, and a simultaneous presumption, as modem Americaos, of the value of 
spontaneous, individudistic self-expression. Notably , these critics-perhaps even more than 
the eighteenth-century elocutionists-do not question the appropriateness of the "naniral" as 
the ideal motivating their own field of study, no matter how this mysterious ideal may be 
defined. Daniel Vandraegen, for example, counters the separation of elocution into a 
"naturai" and a 'mechanical" school by arguing that both groups shared a laudable 
cornmitment to the ideai of the natural as an educational objective: 
Both groups, now referred to as the 'naniral" and the *mechanical," pursue 
the same prime objective. Both endeavor to teach students to speak and read 
naturally. Robb's assertion that two separate schools followed "opposing 
pedagogical ideasn is misleadhg. Internai evidence reveals that while there 
are differences of method, both groups completely agree on the centrai 
pedagogical objective of directing students to perforrn in a natural manner. 
(59) 
Making this argument, Vandraegen clearly takes for granted the inherent value of the 
" ~ t u r a l "  as a pedagogical objective, not only for the eighteenth-century elocutionists but for 
twentieth-century speech educators as well. The assumption that delivery should, somehow 
or other, be "naturai" in order to be right or acceptable reflects, 1 suggest, the bodiliness of 
this dimension of rhetorical theory and practice. In what other areas of rhetoric is the issue 
of "naturainess" so consistently taken to be the most important criterion of evaluation? 
Instead of demystifying the socio-political structures and significations of the bodily 
behaviours inscribed within elocutionary texts, twentieth-century commentators for the most 
part work to reinforce the nanualization of these practices by masking, as Bourdieu might 
Say, their arbitrary cultural content and their role in manifesthg and perpetuating a 
particular social order. 
Only Parrish demonstrates an explicit awareness of the social dimensions of "natural" 
elocution. though he nonetheiess maintains the ideai of 'Nature" as the proper 'norm and 
guide. " Parrish's construction of the ideal of natural delivery works through the 
dissociation of the concept of natural delivery into two senses, the generally accepted but 
inappropriate sense, and Parrish's own more accurate explanation: 
There are involved here two applications of 'naniralnessn which may lead to 
different. and even contradictory results. When we instruct a student to read 
naturally we can only mean that he is to speak and behave as he ordinarily 
does, that he is to be himself. But when we praise a reader's performance 
for its naturalness we probably mean something quite different, since we may 
not know what his ordinary, or customary speaking is like. We mean rather 
that it seem natural-seems appropriate to the material or the character he is 
representing. The interpreter . . . must design a pattern of expression that 
will conform to the audience's conception of what is nanirai for the given 
content and situation. . . . Such expression may not feel namal to the 
reader, may not conform to his instinctive or accustomed manner of speech, 
for in this sense "naturainessn is not necessarily good. Natural speech is good 
speech when it seem natural to a properly qualified audience-or, what is the 
same thing, to a properly qualified tacher. (Concept 451452) 
Paradoxically. Parrish's dissociation between ineffective or inappropriate 
"naturalness," and appropriate, effective "naturalnessn defines the laaer in terms of the 
appearunce of naturalness that the audience perceives in the speaker's conduct. Though he 
does not smte this explicitiy, Parrish's conception of proper naniralness invokes the classical 
doctrine of decorum, making the speaker's effectiveness depend on his ability to suit his 
style of delivery to his subject matter and rhetoricai situation. This representation of 
decorum constructs an asymmetrical power relationship between audience and speaker: the 
audience occupies the superior position of arbiter, while the speaker's subjection to this 
externai judgment suggests a performative life of predicment, not of heroic potential 
(Whigham 52). Parr ish ' s specification of the "properl y qualified teachern as the audience 
entitled to pass judgment on the speaker's oaturalness or lack thereof recalls the 
elocutionists own privileging of the "scrupulously 'classificatory' eye of the master" 
(Foucault, Discipline 147) in assessing the student's conformity to the norms of respectable 
bodily behaviour . Strategically , Parrish conflates the normal with the natural, while 
ensuring that the judgment of normality is unrelated to the student's own "instinctive or 
accustomed manner" and lies wholly in the power of the schoolmaster. 
His recognition of the social structures and significations of bodily behaviours does 
not cause him to question the ideological assumptions or sociopolitical interests which 
inform these structures. Instead, he endorses the same general structure of cultural elitism 
and the same subjugating pedagogy of bodily decorum that we fmd in the original 
elocutionary movement. In twentiethcentury American speech education, as much as in 
eighteenth-century British elocution, aspiring speakers who have not been blessed with the 
habitus of 'good speech environmentsn (uElocution" 5) must purifj themselves of indecorous 
habits in order to achieve higher stanis. Speech educators, like the early elocutiooists, 
continue to create a disciplinary space and role for themselves as the "properly qu.aIified" 
gatekeepers who both instnict and evaluate students in the exclusionary standards of 
decorous behaviour. And, like their forerunners, they simultaneously naniralize, or place 
beyond question, the hierarchic social structuration and signification of bodily conduct by 
invoking the mysterious ideal of the "natural" as the highest fom of delivery. 
Current Concems and Future Orientations 
Since the early 1970s. criticai discussions of the elocutionary movement within 
speech communication studies have been. to my knowledge, virtually nonexistent. Perhaps 
one reason for this is the emphatic finaiity of Howell's 1971 judgment that the writers and 
texts of this movement deserve no place in the rhetorical tradition, except as the guilty 
source for the posteighteenth-century declinz of rhetoric's scholarly reptation. More 
recently, though. at lest  two general histories of rhetoric have afforded the elocutionary 
rnovement a relatively privileged, or at least fairly equitable, position within their 
arrangement of rhetoric's historical episodes. These works are Patricia Bizzell and Bruce 
Herzberg's anthology me Rhetorical Tradition (1990) and Thomas Coniey's Rhetoric in the 
European Tradtion (1 990). In my opinion, the significance of these inclusions der ives not 
sirnply from the space allotteci to the elocutionists, but especially the attention paid to the 
socio-political situations and implications of their enterprise. For example, Bizzell and 
Herzberg comment on the eighteenth-cenniry operations of "linguistic discrimination" which 
created a "ravenous marketn of Scots, Irish, and even Americans anxious to secure social 
standing by educating themselves in the exclusionary standards of "propern English (649), 
while Codey argues that both the elocutionary movement and the study of belles lenres can 
be best understood "against a background of social aspirationn characteristic of eighteenth- 
century British culture (2 12). 
Other recent, and to my mind fniidul, developments in the treatment of elocution as 
part of the rhetorical tradition(s) include more specific attention to its contributions to 
eighteenth-centwy and nineteenth-century rhetorical theories and practices. For example, 
Ulman's study of language theory within late eighteenth-century rhetoric reconsiders 
Sheridan's distinctive contributions dong with those of Campbell and Blair. This 
reconsideration takes seriously the theoretical value of Sheridan's views within their own 
terrns, rather than attempting to legithte elocutionary doctrine, as Mohrmann does, 
according to how much it reflected more reputable philosophies of communication. 
Or~oricaL Culture in Nineteenth-Century Arnerica (WU), a text that exemplifies the 
increasing research and re-evaluation of nineteenth-century American rhetoric, includes an 
article by Nan Johnson on "The Popularktion of Nineteenth-Century Rhetoric: Elocution 
and the Private Leamer." In this article, Johnson highlights "the practical uses of rhetoric in 
business, community, and private lifen and situates its popularization as part of "shifting 
economic and class distinctions that demanded more of rhetorical education than the training 
of a comparatively small number of young men for a few highly placed professionsn (141, 
140). l3 
I am encouraged by the treatments of elocution emerging in the 1990s, primarily 
because these discussions explicitly acknowledge the complex social dimensions of the 
practices as well as the theories of elocution within any particular historical moment. In 
this way, they begin to counter what James Berlin calls the traditional valorizing of "the 
sacred theoretical over the practical profanen by attending to the "consequences for 
behaviourn that the "concepts of rhetoric" always have ("Postmodernismn 185). Further, 
these discussions at least implicitly recognize the important. though intellectually devalued. 
role that bodily behaviours play in the acquisition and distribution of social power and 
prestige. And, unlike the assumptions of some earlier critics of the movernent, they are 
beginning to take seriously (as, for exarnple, Ulman's discussion does) the distinctive 
contributions of elocutionary theory to larger issues in eighteenth-century rhetoric. 
But what of the situated interests and concerns that inform my own selective account 
of the elocutionary rnovernent? Contemporary theorists of historiography argue that writers 
!rhese features of elocution that Johnson identifies were, as my study suggests, by no 
means exclus ive to nineteenth-century manifestations but were already , in different , 
culturally specific ways, part of the eighteenth-century landscape. 
of rhetorical history should self-consciously explain the particular motives and ideologies 
which inform their interpretations. In Berlin's words, "The historian must . . . be aware of 
her own ideological position" and must "identifjr her predisposition, understanding it herself 
and making it available to the reader" ("Revisionary" 56-57). As well, historiographic 
critics generally agree that one of the primary functions of the writing of history should be 
its funrre orientation. For example, Blair, in her formulation of "cr itical history" @ter 
alternative to "influencen and "systems" approaches) suggests that "[ilt poses the question of 
history precisely for the purpose of prodding the future" (420).14 Whiie I tend to agree with 
Ham Kellner's critique of Berlin's imperative that such a self-conscious revelation itself acts 
as a rhetorical device of "sincerity" and hence contributes to, rather than comments 
disinterestedly on, the writer's own attempt to mite a persuasive narrative (Kellner 249), I 
would like nonetheiess in closing to (re)foreground some of the disciplinary interests and 
concerns which have motivated my selective analysis of the elocutionary rnovement in the 
hope that they may continue to encourage future rhetorical studies. 
First and forernost, the question of the rhetorical nature of rhetorical history seems 
to me to be very relevant for our field since it engages the terms and forms of knowledge by 
which rhetoricians claim to interpret the world. As Blair and Kahl point out, "The historian 
of rhetoric occupies an authorial role that is arguably equivalent to that of the rhetorical 
critic" (148). Strangely, though, the value of taking a rhetorically critical approach to the 
construction of our disciplinary histories only recently has begun to interest rhetorical 
scholars. And these historiographic discussions by and large focus on the rhetorical 
constnictions of the secondary histories. rather than-as I have done-on the rhetoric of the 
primary texts, the sources or documents that the historian analyzes. 
Motivated by the work of rhetorical critics such as Michael Cahn and David 
Goodwin, 1 have been concernai in the preceding study to foreground precisely this issue of 
the rhetoric of the primary texts within the rhetoricai tradition. And, again consonant with 
the interests of Cahn and Goodwin. one of the main rhetorical features that intrigues me is 
the complex set of strategies of selfconstitution that the author of a rhetorical treatise 
14See also larran. 'Feminis t Historiography" ; Biesecker, " Attempü" ; Lundsford, "On 
Reclaiming Rhetorica"; Berlin 1990, 185. 
employs both to a y  to legitimate his or her own specific work within the discipline of 
rhetoric at a given historical moment. and simultaneously to re-affirm a particular. version of 
the whole field of rhetorical studies. As Goodwin explains, "Rhetorical handbooks are 
rhetorical, not only because they explicate the theories and practices of persuasion, but, 
more importantly, because they attempt to persuade the reader to believe in, and act on, a 
particular image of what rhetoric is and should be as a discipline" ( " h i t a h ~ "  26). 
1 hope my study of a few handbooks from the elocutionary movement may persuade 
my readers to appreciate how the interpretation of these (or other) handbooks as themselves 
rhetorical actions can enrich Our understanding of the intricate self-constitutions that the 
discipline of rhetoric performs within every different occasion of its utterance. This kind of 
approach, then, offers an alternative to the tendency of historians of rhetoric to focus on the 
content of a particular rhetorical theory and to masure its value prirnarily by the extent to 
which it contributes new ideas or concepts to previous theories. By contrat, a rhetorical 
reading of one, or several, treatises privileges the specificity and complexity of the 
rhetorical motives and structures at work in those particular texts, and attempts to 
understand how these textual structures imply and address the rhetors' (i.e., the writers') 
socio-historical situations. In the case of this study, 1 have drawn on both classical and 
contemporary theories of persuasion to show how the elocutionary texts employ the appeais 
of ethos, logos, and pathos to address a mixed implied readership of scholars and students. 
The particular rhetorical strategies that Sheridan, Walker, and Austin employ, 1 have 
argued, respond to a complex historical context which associates scholarly interest in 
standardking and codiwing language use with the statu aspirations and social mobility of 
the middling ranks in late eighteenth-century British society . 
A rhetorical approach to works on rhetoric makes the traditionai, lengthy historical 
narrative that extends over several centuries much more difficult to construct. But, as Takis 
Poulakos points out, a more narrow focus on limited or individual contributions to 
r hetor ical history is "indicative of a growing impulse across disciplines to conceive his tory 
in terms of brief, multidirectional strands and complex, interdependent networks, rather 
than unidirectional, extensive. and comprehensive narratives" (3). Given this presumption 
of the inaicacy and unevenness of the texmal and contextual dimensions of any handbook, 1 
would argue that a finai evaluation of its apparent success in responding effectively to its 
rhetorical situation is less signifiant than developing an appreciation of the tensions and 
incongmities that structure its rhetorical attempts to negotiate the complex dynamics of its 
social occasion. As John Schilb suggests, a rhetorical reading of the texts of history is 
valuable precisely because it attends to the "signs of internai difficulty," the 'disruptions" 
that traverse writers ' efforts to construct coherent plots (1 7). 
Funher, attending to the rhetorical complexities of particular primary texts and 
contexts within rhetorical history provides opportunities for creating more textured 
characterizations of episodes which traditionaily have been neglected or marginalized. This 
is because, no matter how "minor" the influence of a treatise may appear or how 
theoretically insignificant it may seem compared to "majorn works, if one look at it as a 
situated rhetorical action then it may acquire as much presence and depth as any other work. 
While 1 hesitate to categorize such an approach as wholly or exclusively "postmodernist," I 
do agree with Berlin's cal1 for "a plurality of micro-narratives, limited and localized 
accounts that attemp t to explore features of exper ience that the grand narratives typ icall y 
exclude" ("Postmodernismn 172). As part of this effort, Berlin stresses the significance of 
attending to, and valorizing, the rnaterial practices of rhetoric in any given moment, rather 
than only its ostensibly "intellectual" or "theoretical" formulations ("Postmodernismn 185). I 
too advocate such an emphasis, though 1 wish to foreground the relevance of perceiving the 
texts of rhetoric not only as having implications for the practices of their students or 
readers, but as themselves rhetorical practices. 
In addition, developing fuiler rhetorical characterizations of particular moments not 
formerly treated in this manner will affect the relative presence and positionings of other 
characters and events in our discipline's historicd narratives. In the words of T. Poulakos, 
"attention to the local makes an impact on the global in precisely the same way that the 
remangement of a few links makes a great difference in the way the entire chain turns out" 
(4). For example, by giving in my study a detaiied presence to a few of the elocutionary 
texts, 1 have attempted to demonstrate the intrinsic rhetorical interest of these texts, writers, 
and contexts. This characterization, however, dso has implications for how other moments 
within the narrative of eighteenth-century rhetorical studies are perceived. If indeed, as I 
hope to have shown, the "minor" elocutionary texts are themselves as worthy of 
attention-within this framework of rhetorical anaiysis-as any other aspect of eighteenth- 
century rhetoric, then the partiality of narratives that privilege the "newn rhetorics of George 
Campbell, Hugh Blair, Joseph Priestley, and so on at the expense of other players becomes 
more apparent. But my point is not to assert the primacy of the elocutionists and to 
downplay the significance of the latter writers to the disciplhary formations of eighteenth- 
century rhetoric; rather, 1 would suggest that a detailed rhetorical reading of any works in 
the eighteenth-century canon could yield new and interesting insights into their particular 
versions of disciplinary self-constitution. By extension, I believe such an approach rnight 
be fniitful as one way of understanding virnially any moment in rhetoric's multi-faceted 
writing of its own historical narratives and disciplinary identities. 
A second basic issue that has prompted the preceding study and which I hope may 
continue to prompt funher rhetorical inquiries concerns the traditionally devalued role of the 
body, or bodies, in rhetoric. Such a devaluation reflects the embedded Western hierarchy 
of mind over body (Porter, "History" 206), and its associated hierarchies of theory over 
practice and of reason over the emotions and senses. One of my ideological 
predispositions, then, is to interrogate such hierarchies by reveaiing their social and political 
significations. Unlike the dominant tradition of Western philosophy, the rhetorical tradition 
has recognized and. to a certain extent, permitted the material practices of bodies and their 
apparently non-rational forms of persuasion a limited role within the construction and 
communication of knowledge. However, as we see in the case of the elocutionary writers, 
because of the entrenched devaluation of bodily conduct in Western intellectual culture, the 
effort to reposition delivery as a legitirnate field of study requires a kind of disembodied, 
scientifically objectified representation of their bodily subject matter. Rather than 
dissolving the traditional dualism of superior mind over infer ior maner, the elocutionary 
movement primarily models a pedagogic programne in which the speaker's body becomes 
the site of an analytic regulation, exerted both by the extrinsic control of the schoolmaster's 
supervision and by the speaker's own selfconscious mortification in which the mind 
governs the body (Porter, "History" 2 13). The ongoing assurnption of twentieth-century 
criticism that the elocutionary inquiry into bodily delivery can be scholarly respectable only 
if its abstract "intellectual" and "theoretical" dimensions cm be proven shows the continued 
pervasiveness of this basic mindhody hierarchy. 
What possible future orientations do 1 see then emerging from the preceding snidy? 
First, if others like me are concerned about the fate of bodies within the rhetorical 
tradition(s), then 1 would encourage more attention to how the rnarginalized canon of 
delivery has been represented and enacted in Our disciplinary histories. And 1 would 
encourage such critical attention to focus on the complex issues of social power, cultural 
elitism, and political interests which inform these bodily rhetorics. By perceiving texts of 
and about bodily rhetorics as selective narratives in which "the territories of mind and body 
are not fmed-least of al1 futed by biology-but possess boundaries subject to negotiation 
within particuiar systems of values, judgments, and dutiesn (Porter, "History" 2 X ) ,  we can 
begin to interrogate these boundaries and the systems of values on which they rest. In 
particular, a critical approach to the rhetoricai construction of bodily rhetorics at different 
historical moments can cal1 into question the ubiquitous appeal to the "natural" which seerns 
to pervade discussions of delivery and which serves to naturalize the ways in which the 
ostensibly insignificant forms of bodily conduct "constitute the most visible and at the sarne 
time best-hidden (because mos t 'natural ') manifestation of submiss ion to the established 
order" (Bourdieu, Outline 95). Funher, inquiries into past and present rhetorics of the body 
couid examine the educational functions of these rhetorics as prescriptive technai that offer 
a "repertoire of rules" as a substinite for the practical mastery of highiy valued cornpetencies 
in bodily conduct. And the recognition that certain forms of bodily behaviour do hold high 
social value begs the question, whose interests and what sociopolitical agendas do these 
embodied values serve? 
A second orientation to the role of the body in rhetoric is to reconcepnialize future 
rhetorical theories and practices to avoid the traditionai denigration of the body beneath the 
privileged realm of the rational mind. 1 believe that such an orientation fin& its greatest 
source of possibility in feminkt approaches to rhetoric. Recent work in ferninist 
historiography emphasizes the value of lwking at the past differently in order to be able to 
re-write the future differently . As Jarratt explains, "The question here is how feminists 
writing histories of rhetoric can . . . create histories aimed at a more just future" (1 90). 
Given that the Western hierarchy of the rational mind over the non-rational body frequentiy 
has been rendered as a gendered hierarchy of masculine over ferninine, then any attention to 
the bottom half of this hierarchy implies a reconsideration and disruption of the 
as ymmetrical relationship that this hierarchy legitimates .15 The elocutionists themselves 
mainly perpetuated, rather than disrupted, established social hierarchies of class, gender, 
and ethnicity in their representations of properly regulated bodies in rhetoric. In so doing. 
they largely duplicated rather than questioned the conventional superiority of masculinized- 
mind over feminized-rnatter, even as they sought to rescue the body from neglect and 
disrepute (Porter, 'History" 206). But understanding the rhetorical complexities and social 
presumptions that inform this particular episode in the history of bodily persuasion prompts 
the question: what other representations and reconfigurations, that avoid the perpetuation of 
the "old hierarchiesn (Porter, "History" 207) might be possible? 
Responses to this question lie beyond the pages of this study, and in the voices of 
other rhetoricians beside myself. In particular, though, I believe that the work of feminis t 
scholars in diverse areas, including ferninist epistemology, French feminism, and feminist 
science, have rnuch to offer rethinkmgs of the roles and meanings of bodies in theories and 
practices of rhetoric.16 By attempting to deconstruct the traditional binary oppositions 
benveen (masculinized) mind/reason and (feminized) bodylsenses, feminist scholarship is 
working to create future spaces for alternative forms of knowing and acting, forms that 
better reflect the embodied realities of women's, and others', Lives. Within rhetorical 
studies, such alternatives might. for example, reconceive in a more holistic and equitable 
rnanner the relationships between the traditional appeals of parhos, ethos, and logos, and 
between the five canons of invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery; they might 
re-think the role of the body not as. to quote Austin, that of 'externaln oratory opposed to 
the internai operations of the "understanding" (Chironomia 1). but instead as a crucial 
source and site of invention: they might work to undo the social elitism intrinsic to 
historical (and even mid-twentiethcentury) studies of delivery by validating, rather than 
suppressing, the diverse bodily conducts of contemporary rhetoric's culnirally 
 or more on this gendered hierarchy, see for example Bordo, Haraway, Hekrnan, and 
Lloyd. 
16For example, in feminist epistemology , the work of Judith Butler, Lorraine Code, E. 
A. Grosz, Alison laggar; in French and Quebécois feminism, the work of Nicole Brossard, 
Hélène Cixous , Luce Irigaray , Julia Kristeva, Monique W ittig ; in feminis t science, the 
work of Haraway, Sandra Harding, Evelyn Fox Keller, Helen Longino, Janet Sayers. 
heterogeneous comunity of pra~titioners.'~ Above dl ,  they would interrogate the appeal 
to the "narural" that mystifies the sociopoIiticai interests which motivate the articuIation of 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of bodily communication in particular contexts. These 
initial thoughts are merely tentative and partial possibilities in what 1 see as a rich field for 
future exploration. My hope is that others too may be, if they are not already, motivated to 
participate in refomulations of rhetoric's disciplinary identities by reconsidering the 
implications of bodies, in al1 their cultural diversity, to its theories and practices. 
* -  
17por two recent examples of these kinds of rethinkings, see Ede, Glenn, and 
Lundsford, "Border Cross ingsn and Spoel, "Re-inventing Rhetorical Ep istemology . " 
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